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I. INTRODUCTION
Between the well-charted domains of for-profit firms and mod-
ern government lies what was until recently a virtual terra incognita.
Early explorers labelled this middle ground "the Third Sector,"
reflecting their recognition that they were in a distinctive sphere.
But their recognition was largely intuitive. The Third Sector was
said to be inhabited by a congeries of tribes who acknowledged
fealty to neither Caesar nor the Invisible Hand, who were account-
able in neither the arena of politics nor the marketplace of econom-
ics. Systematic study of this sector's inhabitants, known collectively
as nonprofits, lagged behind that of their neighbors on the govern-
mental and for-profit sides.'
I After I had written this paragraph, a quotation in J. VAN TIL, MAPPING THE THIRD
SECTOR: VOLUNTARISM IN A CHANGING SOCIAL ECONOMY 71 (1988) led me to very similar
language in COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILAN ' rHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS, GIVING IN AMERICA:
TOWARD A STRONGER VOLUNTARY SECTOR 31 (1975) [hereinafter FILER COMMISSION REPORT].
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Recently, however, this has begun to change. In the last decade
or so, a new generation of explorers, equipped with the insights of
contemporary social science, have sought to penetrate the mysteries
of the Third Sector. 2 Demographers have surveyed its inhabitants,3
cartographers have mapped its contours, 4 and a host of empirical
studies have described the cultures of particular precincts. 5 Building
on these studies, 6 other scholars have attempted, at a more Toyn-
beean level of generality, to erect theories explaining why nonprofits
evolve and how they behave once they appear.'
As a result, we now have several theories, complementary at
some points and conflicting at others, of the internal organization
and operation of nonprofits. 6 We also have a detailed and widely-
Though, as the title of Van Til's book suggests, the general cartography metaphor has passed
into common usage, the specific language of the Filer Commission Report is sufficientlyclose
to mine to warrant separate acknowledgment.
It is possible to identify a fourth sector, the "household" or "informal" sector. See J. VAN
TIL, supra, at 87. The presence of this sector is implicit in my discussion in section IV of the
need for altruism to take institutional forms, and warrants explicit discussion in connection
with the tax exemption of mutual benefit organizations. See infra notes 343-54 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the relationship between mutual benefit organizations and
household production.
In some respects' the watershed year was 1975. In December of that year, the Com-
mission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs published its report and recommendations.
See FILER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I. The Commission's research papers, which were
published in 1977 in collaboration with the Treasury Department, not only "provided scholars
and policymakers with a baseline knowledge. circa the mid-1970s, of the scope and operations
of the nonprofit sector," THE NONPROFIT SECTOR xi (W. Powell ed. 1987) [hereinafter THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR]; they also laid the foundation for analysis of the nonprofit sector's role
and offered specific proposals for law reform.
Another significant impetus to the study of nonprofits came in 1976, when the Program
on Non-Profit Organizations was established under the auspices of the Institute for Social
and Policy Studies at Yale. It was the first of several university-affiliated interdisciplinary
programs devoted to the study of nonprofits. •
3 The demographic accounts in the FILER COMMISSION RESEARCH PAPERS appear pri-
marily in Volume 1, History, Trends, and Current Magnitudes. See 1 COMMISSION ON PRIVATE
PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS, RESEARCH PAPERS (1977) [hereinafter FILER COMMISSION
PAPERS]. For a more recent survey, see Rudney, The Scope and Dimensions of Nonprofit Activity,
in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 2, at 55.
4 See, e.g., J. VAN TIL, supra note I.
See, e.g., 2 FILER COMMISSION PAPERS, supra note 3; Hansmann, Economic Theories of
Nonprofit Organization, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 2, at 27 (citing pre-Filer Com-
mission studies in the health care industry).
6 For a brief account of the development of general theories from particular industry
studies, particularly those in the area of health care, see Hansmann, supra note 5.
7 In distinguishing between theories that account for the role of nonprofits and those
that account for their behavior, I am following Hansmann, supra note '5, at 27-28.
For a survey of these "behavior" theories, see Hansmann, supra note 5, at 37-40. See
also E. JAMES & S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, THE NONPROFIT ENTERPRISE IN MARKET ECONOMICS
(1986). To the extent that these theories address a common issue beyond the behavior of
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accepted account that explains why nonprofits evolve in the ecolog-
ical niche they occupy in the western, and particularly the American,
institutional landscape. The emerging orthodox account of the role
of nonprofit organizations is aptly dubbed the twin failure theory. 9
It describes nonprofits as a response to social and economic chal-
lenges beyond the capabilities of for-profit firms on the one hand
and government on the other.") Though the two halves of the twin
failure theory — market failure and government failure — were
developed separately, together they give a plausible and coherent
account of the Third Sector. It is, however, an incomplete account.
Moreover, its omissions limit its utility as a tool for policy makers
and make it a potentially dangerous instrument in the hands of
those who would cut back government policies favoring nonprofits.
When fertile lands are discovered or rediscovered, the interest
they arouse is seldom exclusively scholarly. The Reagan administra-
tion early on sought to enlist increased aid from the Third Sector
as government's traditional ally in combatting social ills on a variety
of fronts." Some say that the federal government's unilateral dis-
armament on several of these fronts has wrought dramatic changes
in the nonprofit sector since 1980. According to this view, the Rea-
gan Revolution's retrenchment in many areas of social service that
were long reinforced, if not occupied, by the public sector has sent
significant numbers of refugees to the nonprofit sector. Serving
these refugees has seriously depleted the traditional resources of
the nonprofit sector and has forced organizations in that sector to
find alternative sources of supply, innovative ways to generate nec-
essary revenue. 12
nonprofits, it is what nonprofits maximize in the absence of incentives to produce net revenues
for equity owners.
1' See J. DOUGLAS, WHY CitAttrrv? 160 (1983).
'° I deal later with the market failure theory, see infra notes 33-63 and accompanying
text, and the government failure theory, see infra notes 206-20 and accompanying text.
11 The leading study of these developments is L. SALAmox & A. ABRAMSON, THE FEDERAL
BUDGET AND THE NONPROP/T S ecroR (1982). Salamon and Abramson describe the avowed
•Reagan objective of federal retrenchment, see id. at 21-22, and the traditional governmental/
nonprofit partnership in many areas of social service, see id. at 22-24. In W. NIELSEN, THE
GOLDEN DONORS: A NEW ANATOMY OF THE GREAT FOUNDATIONS 48-50,54 (1985) the author
argues that the voluntarism rhetoric of the first Reagan term was dropped and forgotten in
the second. Perhaps something of an afterglow is left in President Bush's "thousand points
of light." For an unsympathetic analysis of the ideology informing the Reagan administration
approach to the Third Sector, see J. VAN TEL, supra note 1, at 44-45,46-47.
' 2 Salamon and Abramson predicted this development on the basis of proposed Reagan
administration budget cuts in areas where nonprofits either relied on direct government
funding or could reasonably be expected to experience increased demand for their services
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Nonprofits have shown great imagination and have met with
considerable success in seeking these new sources of revenue."
Unfortunately, however, these successes have occasionally been in
areas of endeavor that some elements of the for-profit sector claim
as their exclusive spheres of influence. Nonprofits' enterprisory
activities frequently involve provision of goods and service in com-
petition with for-profit suppliers. Decrying these incursions, ag-
grieved for-profits have rallied under the banner of "unfair com-
petition," and have enlisted allies in the executive" and legislative 15
when government provision was reduced. L. SALAMON & A. ABRAMSON, supra note I I, at 57-
66. Subsequent events have tended to confirm their predictions, except as to some aspects
of health care. Salmon, The Results Are Coming /n, Fouivn. NEws, Jul.—Aug. 1984, at 16-23;
Salamon and Abramson, Nonprofits and the Federal Budget: Deeper Cuts Ahead, FOUND. NEws,
Mar.—Apr. 1985, at 48-54. Skloot, Enterprise and Commerce in Nonprofit Organizations, in THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 2, at 380, notes that "Mlle scope and magnitude of enterprise
activities in the nonprofit sector has expanded greatly," for reasons that include the Reagan
administration's budget cuts in areas of traditional nonprofit activity and that administration's
persistent calls for "self-reliance" by nonprofit organizations.
For a discussion of nonprofits' enterprisory activities, see J. CRIMMINS & M. KEIL, EN-
TERPRISE IN THE NONPROFIT SECTOR (1983); Skloot, supra; Troyer & Boisture, Charities and
the Fiscal Crisis: Creative Approaches to Income Production, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, THIRTEENTH
CONFERENCE ON CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS §§ 4.01—.04 (1983).
"Troyer & Boisture, supra note 12, at §§ 4—I to 4-31. Skloot identifies several broad
areas of nonprofit entrepreneurial activity. See Skloot, supra note 12, at 381-83. He also
discusses several successful examples in detail. See id. at 383-87. Nonprofit enterprisory
activity does, of course, present financial and other pitfalls for particular organizations and
for the nonprofit sector as a whole. Id. at 381, 387-90; see also Troyer & Boisture, supra note
12 (discussing financial risks and possible adverse effects on charitable programs and ex-
emption status).
" See, e.g., Orr. OF' ADVOC., U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., ISSUE ALERT: UNFAIR COMPETITION
WITH SMALL BUSINESS (1986); OFF. OF ADVOC•, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., UNFAIR COMPETITION
BY NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS WITH SMALL BUSINESS: AN ISSUE FOR THE 1980s (1984).
15 See Unrelated Business Income Tax: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1988) [hereinafter Pickle Hearings]. Citing
for-profit firms' complaints about unfair competition and the Small Business Administration's
concerns on that score, Rep. Rostenkowski, Chair of the House Ways and Means Committee,
requested the Subcommittee on Oversight "to conduct a comprehensive review of the Federal
tax treatment of commercial and other income-producing activities of organizations that have
tax exemption under section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code." Id. at 2. In his announce-
ment of hearings on that subject, Rep. Pickle, Chair of the Subcommittee on Oversight,
pledged "a full and fair hearing on all the issues involved." Id. at 5. But the impetus for the
hearings dearly came from disgruntled elements of the for-profit sector, and the outline of
issues in Rep. Rostenkowski's original notice left no doubt that the central question was
whether exempt organizations should be subject to further taxation.
As one witness at the hearings said elsewhere, "The truly difficult and important issue
involving the tax treatment of nonprofits concerns not the UBIT [unrelated business income
taxi but rather the scope of the basic exemption that underlies it, and that is where future
debate should focus." Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 75
VA. L. REV. 605, 635 (1989). As a practical matter, the questions of exemption and UB1T
can be collapsed into each other, in either of two ways. With a sufficiently broad view of
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branches of government in a campaign to re-examine federal pol-
icies that benefit nonprofits, particularly in matters of taxation.' 6
Advocates for for-profits maintain that current federal policies give
nonprofits unfair competitive advantages in the same revenue-gen-
erating activities in which for-profits engage. The most frequently
stated objective of the unfair competition crusade is to restore and
police the traditional boundary between for-profits and nonprofits,
a boundary defined with greatest particularity in federal tax law but
evident in other areas as well." There is at least some evidence,
however, of a desire to roll back the traditional frontier and annex
territory once widely acknowledged to be in the heartland of the
Third Sector. 18 And it is not overly cynical to suggest that some
exempt purposes, the issue of unrelated income never arises. This was in effect what hap-
pened under the pre-1950 destination of income test—devoting income from any source to
identifiable charitable purposes was itself treated as a charitable purpose. Trinidad v. Sagrada
Orden, 263 U.S. 578 (1924); Ruche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir.
1938). On the other hand, if' one assumes that the purpose of the UBIT is to eliminate
"unfair competition" and then defines "unfair competition" broadly enough, the UBIT
swallows up the tax exemption for charity, This would be the logical result, for example, of
arguing that the tax exemption itself gives charities an unfair competitive advantage against
for-profits providing the sane products. See infra note 359 and accompanying text for the
argument that granting exemption only to nonprofits is unfair. For a brief description of the
bask forms of nonprofit income, see text accompanying note 277.
For a survey of the early skirmishes, see S. PIRES, COMPETITION BETWEEN THE NON-
PROFIT AND FOR-PROFIT SECTORS: A SPECIAL REPowr OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF NATIONAL
VOLUNTARY HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS 16-17 (1985).
Other areas in which nonprofits enjoy advantages include Social Security, 42 U.S,C,
§ 410(a)(8)(B) (1988); unemployment insurance, id. § 3306(b)(5)(A), (08); minimum wage,
29 U.S.C. § 203(r) (1988) & 29 C.F.R. 779.214 (1989); securities regulation, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c(a)(4) (1988), 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1988); antitrust, Marjorie Webster Junior College v.
Middle State Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.) (applying loose
antitrust standards to organizations with "noncommercial" objectives), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
965 (1970); unfair competition, 15 U.S.C. §§ 44, 45 (1988); copyright, 17 U.S.C. §§ 110,
111(a)(5), 112(b), 1 18(c1)(3) (1988); and postal rates, 39 U.S.C. § 3626 (1988) (defining favored
mailers by referen& to former code, 39 U.S.C.S. §§ 4358, 4359(d), (j)(2) (Law, Co-op. 1967
& Stipp. 1978)). These areas are identified at Hausmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89
YALE L.J. 835, 836-37 (1980).
In several instances, the favored organizations are defined by reference to categories of
organizations exempt from federal income taxation. See 42 U.S.C. § 410(a)(8)(B) (1988); id.
§ 3306(b)(5)(A), (c)(8); 29 U.S.C. § 203(4) (1988) & 29 C.F.R. 779.214 (1988); 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c(a)(4) (1988); 39 U.S.C. § 3626 (1988).
18 See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1012(a), 101) Stat. 2085,
2390-91 (adding current I.R.C. § 501(m) (1988), which denies charitable status under section
501(c)(3) and social welfare organization status under section 501(c)(4) to organizations like
Blue Cross and Blue Shield that provide "commercial-type insurance"); SUBCOMM1TI'EE ON
OVERSIGHT, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, ANNOUNCEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE
REQUEST FOR PUBLIC COMMENTS ON DISCUSSION OPTIONS RELATING '1'0 THE. UNRELATED BUSI-
NESS 1NcomE. 'FAX, PRESS RELEASE No. 16 (March 31, 1988) (listing as "discussion options"
dramatic changes to scope of unrelated business income tax, including replacement of "sub-
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members of Congress would be willing to cede parts of the formerly
tax exempt nonprofit sector to for-profit firms in return for the
tribute of additional tax revenue.
In this campaign to re-examine federal policies favoring non-
profits, especially federal tax policies, scholarly exponents of the
market failure theory of nonprofits have offered support to the
irredentist claims of the business community." In part, this is be-
cause the market failure theory describes nonprofits as emerging
naturally in an environment to which many would like to see them,
or at least their favorable tax treatment, confined. What is, of
course, is not necessarily what ought to be. 2° Even if, as a matter of
fact, nonprofits tend to arise and thrive in particular industries in
the way that orthodox theory describes, it would not necessarily
follow that they should be confined to those industries. Nor would
it follow that they should be denied favorable status under various
bodies of federal law when they operate outside those industries.
Orthodox theory does, however, purport to bridge this gap
between the "is" and the "ought." Complementing the orthodox
descriptive theory of the evolution of nonprofits is a normative
theory of why nonprofits should be indirectly subsidized through
the exemption of their revenues from federal income taxation. In
barest outline, orthodox theory holds that, under the particular
failures of the market economy that tend to give rise to nonprofit
organizations, those organizations perform more efficiently than
alternative for-profit suppliers. 2 ' Unfortunately, however, their very
nonprofit nature bars their access to equity capital markets as a
source of funds for growth. They thus tend not to expand at what
economic analysis suggests is the optimal rate for allocative effi-
ciency. This inherent impediment is relieved, though only indirectly
stantially related test" with "directly related test" and application of tax to "inherently com-
mercial" activities).
LO See Pickle Hearings, supra note 15, at 1835 (statement of Henry Hausmann) ("careful
economic analysis in fact supports the conventional wisdom of the business community: the
UBIT [Unrelated Business Income Taxi helps to assure that nonprofit firms do not have an
undesirable competitive advantage in providing services that can be provided as well or better
by for-profit firms").
20 The difficulty, if not impossibility, of deriving the latter from the former is well
documented in the literature on the "naturalistic fallacy." See, e.g., D. HUME, PRINCIPLES OF
Moant_s 125-36 (Open Court Pub. Co. 1953, reprinted from 1777 ed.); D. HUME, TREATISE
OF HUMAN NATURE, Book 111, Part I, Section 1; G.E. MOORS, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 10-36 (1903);
Prichard, Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?, in MORAL OBLIGATION (1949); THE B-
OUGHT QUESTION—A COLLECTION OF PAPERS ON THE CENTRAL PROBLEM IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY
(W.D. Hudson ed. 1969).
2 ' For a fuller outline, see infra notes 281-89 and accompanying text.
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and rather crudely, by exempting their net revenues from federal
income taxation, thus increasing their pool of retained earnings
available for expansion.
So stated, the market failure theory of the federal tax exemp-
tion hardly seems a likely weapon in the campaign to put nonprofits
back on the reservation by restricting the scope of tax-exempt ac-
tivities. Because the orthodox theory confirms, rather than denies,
favored treatment of nonprofits in some areas, for-profit revanchists
seem at risk of being hoist with their own petard. Two points defuse
this danger. First, the forms of market failure that orthodox theory
give as both the raison d'etre of nonprofits and the basis of their tax
exemption arguably do not exist in several industries in which non-
profits are currently being charged with unfair competition. Second,
and somewhat more ambivalently, orthodox theory suggests that
nonprofits should not enjoy tax exemption of revenues earned in
these areas, because encouraging their presence in these areas will
not promote — indeed, tends to undermine — allocative efficiency.
The orthodox theory, therefore, provides a cogent rationale for the
existence of a tax exempt nonprofit sector, but strongly implies a
substantial reduction of its traditional frontiers. It is as if England
acknowledged Argentine claims to the Falklands, but only as to
lands too rocky for sheep. 22
In this article I suggest a different drawing of the boundary
between for-profits and nonprofits, and a correspondingly different
rationale for exempting the latter from federal income taxation. I
build, as all work in this area must, on the findings of those who
have mapped out the orthodox twin failure theory of the nonprofit
sector. Indeed, I find that the terrain covered by the economically-
oriented orthodox theory most certainly lies within the scope of the
nonprofit sector, both as a matter of fact and as a matter of sound
policy. Moreover, I acknowledge, as correct much of the orthodox
explanation of why this terrain does and should belong to the
nonprofit sector.
The problem with the orthodox theory is not that it is erro-
neous, but that it is incomplete, and incomplete on both its descrip-
tive and its normative sides. On the descriptive side, orthodox the-
ory's reliance on the perspective of neo-classical economics leads it
to overlook altruism, which I take to be the continental divide in
the nonprofit sphere. The benefits provided by organizations on
22 If the harshness of the metaphor strains credulity, see infra note 286, indicating that
the proper sphere of tax exempt nonprofit activity is where no profit is in fact passible.
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one side of the divide flow to their members in the form of ordinary
consumer goods and services purchased at fair market value; the
organizations on this side of the nonprofit range are mutual benefit
nonprofits. maintain that all other organizations that are truly
nonprofit exhibit altruism in one form or another. 23
 Altruism, I
shall try to show, operates in many of the areas where orthodox
theory predicts that nonprofits will evolve. Indeed, it is difficult to
understand how nonprofits would arise in these areas were it not
for the kinds of altruism I identify. Altruism, however, also gives
rise to nonprofit firms in areas other than those that orthodox
theory would predict. I argue that there is in principle no good or
service that an altruistic organization cannot provide.
. This raises the normative question: should nonprofits be en-
couraged to arise and operate in areas other than those in which
the orthodox theory predicts they will be the most efficient sup-
pliers? Orthodox theory says no. It implicitly assumes that the es-
sential function of nonprofit organizations is to remedy a particular
form of market failure and that nonprofits are to be encouraged
only as a means of addressing that problem. From this it follows
that the sole criterion of federal tax exemption of nonprofits is the
promotion of economic efficiency. Extrapolating from traditional
theories of the role of charities and the rationale for their exemption
from federal income taxation, I maintain that viewing altruistic
nonprofits as mere adjuncts to the market supply of goods and
services overlooks their distinctive function, the altruistic supply of
goods and services. In turn, this distinctive function provides a
broader rationale for the tax exemption of altruistic organizations'
revenues than does either the orthodox theory or existing tax law.
My normative discussion is limited to the policy bases for the
federal tax exemption of nonprofits, particularly altruistic non-
" I here describe altruistic organizations as the residual category of nonprofits; all
nonprofits that are not mutual benefit organizations are altruistic organizations. Logically,
the converse is also true: mutual benefit organizations are those nonprofits that are not
altruistic. I subordinate altruistic organizations for definitional purposes at this point in the
introduction because, as we shall see in section III, the concept of altruism is harder to state
in a few words.
In the remainder of the paper, the primary focus is on altruistic organizations, and
mutual benefit organizations are treated as the residual category. My discussion of mutual
• benefit nonprofits is offered primarily to suggest how my account of altruistic organizations
would fit into a fuller account of the entire nonprofit realm in terms of the recipients of the
benefits that nonprofit organizations provide. The fairly short shrift I give mutual benefits
is by no means meant to suggest that they are somehow less practically important or less
theoretically interesting than altruistic nonprofits.
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profits. Normative questions about the proper treatment of non-
profits arise in many contexts, but their status under the federal
income tax code is especially important." From the perspective of
nonprofits themselves, the exemption of their income from taxation
is obviously a considerable advantage. The organization may retain,
for the advancement of its own purposes, the part of its revenues
that would otherwise be paid to the federal government as taxes.
Moreover, nonprofits that fall within the charitable category of tax
exempt organizations are entitled not only to have their own income
exempt from taxation, but also to entice donors with the prospect
of tax-deductible contributions. 25 From the perspective of the fed-
eral government, the potential erosion of the tax base through abuse
of exemption status and contribution deductions creates an incen-
tive both to define the boundaries of exemption carefully and to
police those frontiers scrupulously. 26 Perhaps because most states
lack so large an interest, many have essentially abdicated their tra-
ditional role of regulating nonprofits, particularly charities, to the
federal government." Because the role of federal tax law thus looms
so large, the normative aspect of this article will focus on the public
policy issues involved in the federal tax treatment of nonprofits,
particularly altruistic nonprofits. 28
24 Sec supra note 17 for a list of the other areas in which nonprofits enjoy special
treatment.
25 !KC. 170 (1988).
2" For the source of this border patrol metaphor, and more on the importance of the
reality it describes, see Simon, The Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations: A Review of Federal
and State Policies, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 2, at 89-94 ("The Border Patrol
Function of Nonprofit Tax Law").
27 See generally Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility,
73 FIARV. L. REV. 433 (1960) (urging creation of separate state agencies to supervise charities);
Office of the Ohio Attorney General, The Status of State Regulation of Charitable Trusts, Foun-
dations, and Solicitations, in 5 FILER COMMISSION PAPERS, Supra note 3, at 2705, 2706 (1977)
("A majority of states do practically nothing in fulfilling their obligation to the public of
safeguarding the billions of dollars controlled by charitable trusts and foundations in this
country.").
28 it is important to bear in mind, however, that different policy considerations may
counsel in favor of different treatment for other purposes. See, e.g., E. JAMES & S. RosE-
ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 88-89 (concluding that general exemption of nonprofits from
real property taxation lacks a strong policy justification); Ginsberg, The Real Property Tax
Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations: A Perspective, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 291, 322 n.95 (1980) (noting
that "the issues surrounding ad valorem taxation are sometimes not analogous to those
arising from the taxation of income . . . ."); Kielbowicz & Lawson, Reduced-Rate Postage for
Nonprofit Organizations: A Policy History, Critique, and Proposal, II HARV. J.L. & Pus. Poet( 347,
401 n.317 (1988) (suggesting that some "distortions" in postal policy toward nonprofits may
be the result of "entanglement with tax policy"); Sacks, The Role of Philanthropy: An Institutional
View, 46 VA. L. REV. 516, 532 (1900) ("What may be charitable for purposes of exemption
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Section II sets out the market failure theory of the role of
nonprofits.29 Section III focuses on the role of altruism in nonprofits
and divides nonprofits into ten types, nine of which embody altru-
ism in one form or another. 3° Section IV shows how altruistic or-
ganizations offer significant advantages over individual altruism,
particularly in achieving economies of scale and continuity over
time, advantages that are not available through either for-profit
firms or government. 3 t Finally, in Section V, I turn to the normative
question of whether altruistic nonprofit organizations should be
granted federal income tax exemption. 52 After analyzing several
theories of that exemption, including one derived from the market
failure theory of nonprofits, I present the possibility of a synthesis
that would exempt the income of altruistic nonprofits as a means
of subsidizing the altruistic provision of goods and services without
regard to the character of the goods and services provided.
II. THE EMERGING ORTHODOXY — HANSMANN'S THEORY OF THE
ROLE OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
The chief architect of the market failure side of the emerging
orthodox theory of nonprofit organizations is Henry Hansmann.
Hansmann sets out his theory in a seminal article, the subtlety and
significance of which are hard to over-estimate." Hansmann begins
from the rule against perpetuities need not be so considered for purposes of tax benefits"
(footnote omitted)); Note, Preferential Treatment of Charities Under the Unemployment Insurance
Laws, 94 YALE L.1 . 1472 (1985) (questioning favored treatment of charities under the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act).
29 See infra notes 33-63 and accompanying text.
m See infra notes 64-187 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 188-276 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 277-380 and accompanying text.
3S Hansmann, supra note 17, at 840-43. Even his critics acknowledge his pre-eminence.
See, e.g., Ellman, Another Theory of Nonprofit Corporations, 80 MICH. L. REV. 999 (1982) ("[Hans-
mann's] two lengthy articles dominate the field and establish the topics for discussion."). And
his audience is not limited to academics. See Pickle Hearings, supra note 15, at 1835 (statement
of Henry Hansmann).
A roughly contemporaneous, but much briefer, account of nonprofit organizations in
terms of the monitoring difficulties encountered by their patrons and the compensating
assurance given patrons by the nonprofit form appears in Thompson, Charity and Nonprofit
Organizations, in ECONOMICS OF NONPROPRIETARY ORGANIZATIONS 125, 133-35 (K. Clarkson
& 0. Martin ed. 1980). Another early account of nonprofits in terms of agency problems is
Fama & Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 261. L. & ECON. 327 (1983).
On the foundation of Hansmann's work, Easley and O'Hara have erected a formal
model of the nonprofit firm as an optimal contract between firm managers and society. See
Easley & O'Hara, Optimal Nonprofit Firms, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS 85
(S. Rose-Ackerman ed. 1986); Easley & O'Hara, The Economic Role of the Nonprofit Firm, 14
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by identifying the essential characteristic of nonprofit organizations,
the fact that they are barred from distributing their net earnings to
those who control them, that is, to their members, officers, directors,
or trustees." As Hansmann notes, this prohibition does not pre-
clude payments for goods or services provided to the organization,
even by those who control it." Nor does it preclude the organization
from having an excess of revenues over its expenditures for such
goods and services. Showing a net profit in this sense is not incon-
sistent with being a nonprofit organization, and many nonprofits
do show such surpluses. Rather, "[i]t is only the distribution of the
profits that is prohibited." Or, stated affirmatively, the key to non-
profit status is that "[n]et earnings, if any, must be retained and
devoted in their entirety to financing further production of the
services that the organization was formed to provide." 36 Hansmann
refers to this essential feature of nonprofits as the "nondistribution
constraint.""
To simplify explanation and analysis, Hansmann next offers a
taxonomy of nonprofits in terms of two factors: how they are fi-
nanced and by whom they are controlled." With respect to financ-
ing, he identifies two polar modes, donative and commercial." Do-
native nonprofits receive most of their revenues from grants or
gifts; commercial nonprofits depend on the prices they charge for
the goods and services they provide." Those from whom the rev-
enues come, whether in the form of gifts or purchases, Hansmann
calls "patrons."'" With respect to control, the second factor in Hans-
mann's taxonomy, the critical question is whether it lies in the hands
BELL. J. ECON. 531 (1983). My discussion follows Hansmann's account for several reasons:
his is among the earliest and is probably the fullest to date, his is written in non-technical
language intelligible to lawyers not trained as economists, and his is the basis for his own
detailed normative discussion of tax policy.
Hansmann, supra note 17, at 838.
33 Id.
a Id. Though this dual definition of nonprofit status in terms of first, the prohibition of
distribution of profits to controllers, and second, the requirement that profits be used to
further the organization's purpose, is technically correct, its succinct statement elides an
important point: in the case of many mutual commercial nonprofits, the organization's
purpose is to confer benefits on its members, who arc also its controllers. See infra notes
163-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of mutual commercial nonprofits operated
for the benefit of patrons.
" Hansmann, supra note 17, at 838.
39 1d. at 840-42.
39 1d.
4, Id.
41 Id. at 841.
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of patrons or others. 42
 In mutual nonprofits, patrons control; in
entrepreneurial nonprofits, others control. 43 Combining these two
factors, means of financing and locus of control, Hansmann gen-
erates a four-part division of the nonprofit sector into donative
mutuals, donative entrepreneurials, commercial mutuals, and com-
mercial entrepreneurials. 44 He is careful to note, however, that these
four categories are ideal types; particular organizations will exhibit
varying mixes of financial sources and degrees of patron contro1. 45
Having marked off his territory and defined his terms, Hans-
mann turns to his account of the economic role of nonprofits. He
first describes the norma1 46 provision of goods and services in a
market economy: 47
Economic theory tells us that, when certain conditions are
satisfied, profit-seeking firms will supply goods and ser-
vices at the quantity and price that represent maximum
social efficiency. Among the most important of these con-
ditions is that consumers can, without undue cost or effort,
(a) make a reasonably accurate comparison of the products
and prices of different firms before any purchase is made,
(b) reach a clear agreement with the chosen firm concern-
ing the goods or services that the firm is to provide and
the price to be paid, and (c) determine subsequently
whether the firm complied with the resulting agreement
and obtain redress if it did not."
Hansmann suggests that "nonprofit enterprise is a reasonable re-
sponse to a particular kind of 'market failure,' specifically the in-
at 841-42.
43 Id.
" Id. at 842. As examples of the first, he lists Common Cause, the National Audubon
Society, and political clubs; of the second, CARE, the March of Dimes, and art museums; of
the third, the American Automobile Association and country clubs; and of the fourth, the
National Geographic Society, the Educational Testing Service, community hospitals, and
nursing homes. Id. (diagram).
" Id. at 841-42.
46
 I use "normal" here with purposeful ambiguity. As we shall see, orthodox theory takes
the market economy as the "norm" in two senses. The first sense is descriptive; market
provision of goods and services is what happens most of the time in capitalist economies.
The second sense, by contrast, is more strictly normative; market provision is presumptively
"as it should be" or "best." At this point in his analysis, Hansmann is taking market provision
as the norm in the first, descriptive sense. When he turns to the tax exemption of nonprofits,
however, he tends to treat the market as the norm in the second, evaluative sense, without
clearly identifying the difference or the reason for the shift. See infra notes 285-90 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Hanstnann's analysis.
Hansmann, supra note 17, at 843-45.
4s
	 at 843 (footnote omitted).
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ability to police producers by ordinary contractual devices." His
generic term for this problem is "contract failure." 49
Hansmann identifies three basic forms of contract failure. 5°
The first, which he calls "separation between the purchaser and the
recipient of the service," 51 is symptomatic of donative nonprofits.
This situation prevails, in Hansmann's view, with respect to "the
most traditional of charities — namely those that provide relief for
the needy."52 Take, for example, the case of the typical donor of
CARE, who is in effect "financ[ing] a relatively simple service,
namely shipping and distributing foodstuffs and other supplies to
needy individuals overseas."53 The problem, as Hansmann sees it,
is that:
If CARE were organized for profit, it would have a strong
incentive to skimp on the services it promises, or even to
neglect to perform them entirely, and, instead, to divert
most or all of its revenues directly to its owners. After all,
few of its customers could ever be expected to travel to
India or Africa to see if the food they paid for was in fact
ever delivered, much less delivered as, when, and where
specified.'"
49 Id. at 845.
5° Hansmann does not treat these three kinds of contract failure as exhaustive; indeed,
he identifies two others, voluntary price discrimination, id. at 854-59, and implicit loans, id.
at 859-62. He uses the former to explain patrons' contributions to performing arts organi-
zations and the latter to explain alumni donations to colleges and universities.
Hansmann has been criticized on the grounds that these two other forms of contract
failure tend to diminish rather than enhance the contract failure theory's explanatory power.
See j. DouGLAs, supra note 9, at 98 ("Hansmann decorates this basic theme with subsidiary
arguments that are often insightful but occasionally over-ingenious."). Voluntary price dis-
crimination, however, is a particular instance of the public goods problem. Implicit loans, on
the other hand, do seem to lack the common characteristic of contract failure, an information
asymmetry that suppliers may exploit to the disadvantage of their patrons. See infra notes
107-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of both voluntary price discrimination and
implicit loans.
51 Hansmann, supra note 17, at 846.
52 Id.
as M. (footnote omitted).
54 Id. at 847. This is only a problem, of course, if donors are interested not just in making
themselves feel virtuous, but also in feeding the hungry. Gordon Tullock points out that if
donors' concerns are restricted to the former, they lack any incentive to monitor delivery of
goods, Tullock, Information Without Profit, in PAPERS ON NON-MARKET DECISION MAKING 141,
142-44 (Thomas Jefferson Center for Political Economy (1966)). We may assume, with
Hansmann, that at least some significant subset of famine relief donors are interested not
only in feeling virtuous, but also in doing good. See R. WOLFF, THE PovEirry OF LIBERALISM
178-80 (1968) (answering the argument that "[a]ny desire or interest, the definition of whose
object includes reference to actual states of affairs, can be perfectly adequately satisfied by
an object in whose definition are substituted references to the subject's beliefs about those
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In the face of this inability to monitor the performance of a for-
profit, the donor is likely to turn to a nonprofit, which is legally
forbidden to pay out any of its receipts as "profits" and is thus less
likely to skimp on the promised service. 55
The second form of contract failure occurs in the case of what
economists call "public goods,"56 goods with two distinct character-
states of affairs" (emphasis in original)). Moreover, Tullock acknowledges that appearance
and reality are not entirely unrelated. Even donors interested primarily in purchasing per-
sonal satisfaction are likely to suffer the disutility of embarrassment in discovering that their
chosen donee organization is fraudulent, as opposed to merely wasteful. Tullock, supra, at
144.
53 Hansmann, supra note 17, at 847. Something analogous may occur when the payor is
the government. The government may lind it advantageous to subsidize a large variety of
goods like health care, housing, and education through the exemption subsidy rather than
to provide them directly. The ultimate recipients of this largess are likely to be relatively
numerous, dispersed, disparate, and hence difficult to contact for purposes of directly mon-
itoring output. Moreover, the outputs themselves are likely to be highly varied, requiring
multiple kinds of expertise if monitored directly. The government, therefore, may find it
cost-effective to do its policing indirectly, through the imposition and enforcement of non-
profit status. Here the contract would be with the providers themselves, probably a smaller
group than the recipients, and the form of monitoring would be more standardized, auditing
for fairly familiar forms of self-dealing and similar abuses of nonprofit status.
Estelle James offers a less generalized—or more cautious—form of this monitoring-cost
reduction theory of governments' preference for nonprofits:
flbn some industries such as education that are characterized by many small
enterprises, providing services rather than countable objects, monitoring each
one by the government would be very costly. The one-way term subsidy or grant
rather than the reciprocal term purchase suggests the difficulty in measuring
quid pro quo. Nonprofit status assures the government that its subsidy will
indeed be used to increase inputs providing some of the services in question,
not simply distributed as profits.
James, The Nonprofit Sector in Comparative Perspective, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note
2, at 397, 408 (emphasis in original). As James notes, this is not to deny that fears of for-
profit abuse enter into the preference for nonprofit firms. The point is that "Whey enter
... not because of the attitude of many small donors but, rather, because of one large donor
with the power to set certain basic contractual terms—the government." Id. (footnote omitted).
Moreover, James's research suggests that this is true not only of the United States government,
but of others as well, in both developing and industrialized nations. Id. at 398.
Hansmann himself offers such an explanation of the requirement of nonprofit status
for tax exemption and other governmental benefits:
[O]ne important reason that statutes providing subsidies and special preferences
require that the recipient organizations be nonprofit is presumably that these
statutes are providing donations of a sort to these organizations, and seek the
fiduciary restraints of the nonprofit form for the same reasons of contract failure
as do other donors.
H. Hansmann, What is the Appropriate Structure for Nonprofit Corporation Law? 22 (Yale
University Institute for Social and Policy Studies Program on Nonprofit Organizations Work-
ing Paper No. 100, Sept. 1985).
Hansmann, supra note 17, at 848-54.
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istics. First, the good is no more costly to provide to many than to
one, because each can enjoy the good simultaneously without inter-
fering with the others' enjoyment. Second, once the good has been
supplied to one, it is not feasible to exclude others from enjoying
it as well. Thus, in the case of radio broadcasts, it is no more costly
to send transmissions to everyone in a given area than to a single
person, and it is difficult to ensure that only those who pay for the
broadcast will receive it. These conditions lead to an underprod-
uction of public goods by private firms, even though demand for
them may be high.
Radio stations avert the "free-rider" problem by relying on
advertisers rather than listeners for their financing.57 Some people,
however, are willing to pay for advertisement-free radio and other
public goods. But if they try to buy them from for-profit firms, they
will not be readily able to ensure that what they pay goes for greater
output, rather than for higher profits at the same level of output.
Thus, they are inclined to "buy" from a nonprofit, which is forbid-
den to pay out any "profits." Listener-sponsored radio stations are
for this reason invariably nonprofit, and, more generally, nonprofits
tend to dominate the non-governmental provision of public goods. 58
The third form of contract failure occurs in connection with
what Hansmann calls "complex personal services." 5° Some
services — health care and education are Hansiinann's examples —
may be so complex that the purchaser will be unable to monitor
quality effectively at a reasonable cost, even though the service is
being supplied directly to the purchaser. In particular, purchasers
may worry that the marginal dollar they spend for the service is
not being used to improve the quality of the service, but rather to
increase distributable profits. Here again, Hansmann maintains, this
risk is lessened in the case of nonprofits, where such distributions
are forbidden. 6°
" Id. at 848-50.
58 Id. at 850-51.
" Id. at 862-72.
40 Id. at 862-63. Krashinsky notes that nonprofit production is only one of several
alternative ways of dealing with consumers' difficulty in monitoring quality of output. One
is professionalism; another is governmental regulation. And Krashinsky identifies several
institutions in the market itself that function to relieve consumer uncertainty about quality:
lwjarranties, liability laws, insurance against liability (with the accompanying role of insur-
ance companies to minimize risk), reputation, franchising, department stores (which can
serve as middlemen for consumers) and so on." Krashinsky, Transaction Costs and a Theory of
the Nonprofit Organization, in THE'ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 33, at
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Thus, in each of the three forms of contract failure he identi-
fies, Hansmann maintains that the nonprofit form, with the non-
distribution constraint as its essential characteristic, gives consumers
the assurance that their difficulty in evaluating output will not be
exploited to enhance distributable profits. To draw from this the
further conclusion that in such cases nonprofits are the most effi-
cient suppliers, however, requires two further premises. Both of
them are questionable, and Hansmann makes only one of them
clear.
The clearer premise is that possible inefficiencies inherent in
the nonprofit form do not offset the efficiency advantage of the
nondistribution constraint in preventing skimming. Ironically, the
problem is traceable to the nondistribution constraint itself, which
precludes control of nonprofit organizations by those who are en-
titled to share in their net revenues. Elimination of equity owners
may be a mixed blessing. Removing control by anyone with a per-
sonal pecuniary interest in the bottom line also removes a potentially
important cost-control mechanism. Without equity owners looking
over their accounts, if not their shoulders, nonprofit managers lose
an important incentive to minimize costs. 6 ' Hansmann's theory, if
114, 116-17. Hansmann too is aware of such alternatives, and he discusses the multiplicity
of factors that influence when nonprofit production is likely to predominate. Hansmann,
supra note 17, at 868-72; Hansmann, supra note 5, at 30.
Several empirical studies have been made of whether the complex goods form of contract
failure does in fact account for consumers' patronage of commercial nonprofits. One con-
cluded that the results of telephone inquiries sampling consumer recognition of, and attitudes
toward, nonprofits suggest "some divergence from the Hansmann theory." Perlmut, Consumer
Perceptions of Nonprofit Enterprise: A Comment on Hartmann, 90 YALE L.J. 1623, 1626 (1981).
Hansmann counters that, given his view that contract failure is less significant in commercial
nonprofits than in donatives and the fact that the interviews did not select for patrons of
nonprofits, the responses tend to confirm his hypothesis. Hansmann, Consumer Perceptions of
Nonprofit Enterprise: Reply, 90 YALE L.J. 1633 (1981). Hansmann is similarly sanguine about
two other studies, one on nursing homes, Weisbrod & Schlesinger, Public, Private, Nonprofit
Ownership and the Response to Asymmetric Information: The Case of Nursing Homes, in THE ECO-
NOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 33, at 133, and the other on child care, J.
Newton, Child Care Decision-Making Survey—Preliminary Report (1980) (unpublished
manuscript; Yale University Institute for Social and Policy Studies Program on Nonprofit
Organizations). Hausmann, supra note 5, at 32-33.
61 See Hansmann, supra note 5,. at 38; Hansmann, supra note 17, at 878. Nonprofit firms
have evolved mechanisms to address this problem, see Fama & Jensen, supra note 33, and
the empirical data on the degree to which nonprofit managers succumb to this problem is
mixed. See Steinberg, Nonprofit Organizations and the Market, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra
note 2, at.118, 127-30. For-profit firms themselves, of course, are not immune to problems
in the separation of ownership and control. Set A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN COR-
PORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); Steinberg, supra, at 129. For a summary of recent
theories on the departures of for-profit management from profit maximization, see Clarkson,
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not explicitly sanguine on that score, assumes arguendo that non-
profit management will overcome the temptations of waste, or
worse, at least to the extent that losses from waste attributable to
lack of scrutiny by equity owners do not exceed gains from the
reduced incentives to increase distributable income by skimming.
The less explicit premise also involves the policing of perfor-
mance. Hansmann argues that the nondistribution constraint as-
sures patrons of nonprofits that their payments will be used for
their intended purpose, not diverted from increased production to
above-market profits. The nondistribution constraint itself, how-
ever, is not self-policing. As Hansmann points out, it operates as a
standardized contract enforced by the government.° For this ar-
rangement to be more efficient, the government's monitoring costs
must be less than both individual patrons' monitoring costs in the
transaction with for-profits and the individuals' efficiency gains in
the nonprofit transaction. If either condition is not met, the use of
nonprofits would represent not an efficiency gain, but merely an
externalization of patrons' monitoring costs onto a third party, the
government and, indirectly, the public.°
Thus, it is important to remember that, though the superior
efficiency of nonprofits in industries exhibiting contract failure is
plausible, and perhaps probable, it rests on premises that are none-
theless unproven. For purposes of this paper, however, I, with
Hansmann, will accept those premises. Their factual accuracy is
entirely compatible with the reservations I raise below about the
contract failure theory.
III. A RESPECTFUL HERESY — THE ROLE OF ALTRUISM IN
NONPROFITS
Hansmann's model is a profoundly powerful analytic exercise.
It tends, however, to overlook the role of altruism in nonprofits.
This omission weakens the descriptive power of Hansmaim's theory
and leads him, as we shall see in section V, to restrict the scope of
nonprofit tax exemption unduly. In this section, we shall examine
the role of altruism in nonprofits by adding to Hansmann's two-
variable descriptive framework a third factor, the locus of the ben-
Managerial Behavior in Nonproprietary Organizations, in ECONOMICS or NONPROPRIETARY OR-
GANIZATIONS, supra note 33, at 4,4-5.
62
 Hansmann, supra note 17, at 853.
63 See Elliman, supra note 33 at 1015 (suggesting that state enforcement of charitable
trusts is often inadequate because states are unwilling to bear costs of monitoring).
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efits that nonprofit organizations provide." My approach is to con-
sider the locus of benefits in each of Hansmann's four categories of
nonprofits: donative entrepreneurials, donative mutuals, commer-
cial entrepreneurials, and commercial mutuals. Combining this
third factor with the mode of finance and the locus of control reveals
that there are ten different species of nonprofits, which fall into
two broad genera, altruistic organizations and mutual benefit or-
ganizations."
A. Donative Entrepreneurials — The Easy Case for Altruism
Donative entrepreneurial nonprofits provide the most intui-
tively clear illustrations of the role of altruism. Accordingly, in
discussing these organizations 1 try to distinguish a kind of altruism
that will be less readily apparent in other species of nonprofits, a
kind of altruism that Hansmann's contract failure account system-
atically ignores.
64
 I am hardly the first to note the importance of altruism in the nonprofit sector.
Altruism has frequently been cited as a central aspect of one kind of nonprofit, the charitable
organization. Ellman, supra note 33, at 1021 n.51 ("It has also been said that the core feature
of charity is that it is not 'self regarding,' but 'other-regarding.'"); Sacks, supra note 28, at
519-20 ("To some . . . philanthropy is a working reflection of altruisin, of 'love of mankind,'
and therefore intrinsically inconsistent with private profit."). But prior accounts seldom
emphasize the altruistic aspect of commercial, as opposed to donative, nonprofits. This is
also true of a forthcoming study, HALL & COLOMBO, THE CHARITABLE STATUS OF NONPROFIT
HOSPITALS: TOWARD A DONATIVE THEORY OF TAX EXEMPTION. Furthermore, systematic dis-
cussions of the role of altruism in nonprofits have tended to focus on a subjective selflessness
that is hard to identify in particular cases and thus of limited utility as a criterion for
government policies toward nonprofits, as 1 indicate infra at notes 94-113 and accompanying
text. By contrast, I examine the entire spectrum of nonprofit organizations in an effort to
identify a more practicable definition of altruism.
65
 My ten-part taxonomy and its derivation from the three relevant factors are set out
graphically in an appendix. Without undertaking a detailed defense of the much-maligned
significance of classification, 1 take immodest comfort in the recent words of a fellow tax-
onomist:
Nature is full of facts, but any "album" for their arrangement must record
human decisions about order and cause. Thus, taxonomies represent the height
of human creativity, and embody our most fundamental ideas about the causes
of natural order.
Gould, Judging the Perils of Official Hostility to Scientific Error, N.Y. Times, July 30, 1989, at
E6. In the social, and sometimes even in the natural, sciences, see S. GouLn, THE MISMEASURE
or MAN (1981), classification schemes may reflect not only ideas of cause, but also matters of
policy preference. Thus, my taxonomy of nonprofits in terms of altruism is the prelude to
my policy analysis of the nonprofit tax exemption in section V, where I examine the possibility
of grounding part of that exemption on the altruism that I identify in this part as an essential
characteristic of certain classes of nonprofit organizations.
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1. Type I Organizations — Donative Nonprofits Operated for the
Benefit of Neither Donors nor Controllers
To see more concretely what Hansmann's theory omits, we
need to examine his conflation of donations and purchases, a re-
vealing peculiarity in the way he explains nonprofits as a solution
to contract failure itself. This peculiarity is most apparent in Hans-
mann's discussion of relief organizations like CARE, a donative
entrepreneurial that is his prototypical case of contract failure. 66
Somewhat counterintuitively, Hansmann speaks of those who
finance CARE's overseas relief operations as "purchasers," rather
than, as ordinary usage would suggest, as "contributors" or "do-
nors."67
 Hansmann's choice of terms is not accidental. As he says in
discussing another relief organization, the Red Cross:
[T]he contributor is in effect buying disaster relief. And
the Red Cross is, in a sense, in the business of producing
and selling that disaster relief. The transaction differs
from an ordinary sale of goods or services, in essence,
only in that the individual who purchases the goods and
services involved is different from the individuals to whom
they are delivered. 68
This difference, 1 would suggest, may ultimately be more significant
than any similarity; it is the essence of altruism.
Hansmann explains what he rightly calls "redistributive philan-
thropies" without reference to the problem that their donors are
evidently trying to address, i.e., what they perceive as inequities in
the distribution of goods and services, These inequities are not a
"market failure" of the kind identified by the descriptive mode of
neo-classical economics, which takes the existing distribution of re-
sources as a given." It can plausibly be characterized that way, as
a Hansmann, supra note 17, at 846-47.
07 1d. at 847,872-73,
" Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income
Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54,61 (1981); see also Hansmann, supra note 17, at 872-73.
69 IL IS, I should point out, possible to treat "maldistribution" as a problem within
traditional economic theory, very much along the lines Hansmann takes in his particular
examples. See Hochman & Rodgers, Pareto Optimal Redistribution, 59 Am. Ecox. Rcv. 542
(1969) for an effort to describe an optimal level of redistribution on the assumption that the
utility functions of the wealthy are interdependent with those of the poor, i.e., that the
wealthy feel themselves better off as the well-being of the poor increases. Under this theory,
those who are willing and able to redistribute their own wealth to others have, by definition,
a "demand" for redistribution, though there may be an undersupply, owing to the "free
rider" phenomenon.
A peculiarity of this approach, though not a technical flaw, is that, by definition, it
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Hansmann shows, but only at the cost of obscuring another prob-
lem. The problem in the minds of the donors is the existing distri-
bution of resources. They see a need for "relief services" on the
part of those whose very destitution means that they can have no
demand of the kind cognizable by neo-classical economic analysis,
that is, the ability as well as the willingness to pay for the product
in question. 7° From this perspective, the market failure identified
by Hansmann is derivative. It arises only when donors try to find a
means of alleviating what they perceive as a very different problem,
not a failure of the market to allocate resources efficiently, but a
fundamental flaw in the original distribution of resources that econ-
omists typically take as a given.
Another way to make this point is to turn Hansmann's CARE
example around, putting CA RE's donors on the supply side and its
excludes direct reference to the preferences of the poor, because they are not registered in
ability to pay. See Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV.
1393, 1397-98, 1414 (1988) (citing this peculiarity as a reason for testing the desirability of
public subsidization of disaster and poverty relief on the basis of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
rather than Pareto optimality, because the former allows benefits to the needy to offset costs
to the unwilling wealthy). Hochman and Rodgers themselves concede that 'log course, one
might personally feel the amount of redistribution dictated by the Pareto criterion will not
be 'enough,'" and they expressly decline to say that "society should necessarily follow only
the Pareto rule," Hochman & Rodgers, supra, at 556. See also Sugden, On the Economics of
Philanthropy, 92 EcoN. J. 341 (1982) (questioning empirical assumptions of Hochman and
Rodgers's model).
For our purposes, the critical point is that the analysis of voluntary redistribution as a
personal preference of the redistributors does not change the fact that it is a distinctive kind
of preference, a preference that makes others materially better off at the expense of the
redistributor. See infra notes 79-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the significance
of the fact that the redistributor may feel subjectively better off.
7" This distinction is put nowhere better than in the introductory chapter of R. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986). In describing the economist's concept of value,
Posner gives an example that, coming from anyone else, would seem a strawman:
Suppose that pituitary extract is in very scarce supply relative to demand and
is therefore very expensive. A poor family has a child who will be a dwarf if he
does not get some of the extract, but the family cannot afford the price .... A
rich family has a child who will grow to normal height, but the extract will add
a few inches more, arid his parents decide to buy it for him. In the sense of'
value used in this book, the pituitary extract is more valuable to the rich than
to the poor family, because value is measured by willingness to pay; but the
extract would confer greater happiness in the hands of the poor family than in
the hands of the rich one.
Id. at 11-12. Purchase by the wealthy family, however, is more efficient. Posner uses the
example to illustrate the limitations of economic efficiency as an ethical criterion, though he
insists that the limitations are "perhaps not serious ones, as such examples are very rare." Id.
at 12. Those who donate to CARE might dispute the rarity of such examples. "Surplus"
grain, for example, can fill government silos or the bellies of beef cattle in America, or it can
be put to arguably more pressing purposes here or overseas—"more pressing," of course, in
terms of some mode of analysis other than neoclassical economics.
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beneficiaries on the demand side. Economists' technical definition
of demand inverts the common sense assessment of the transaction.
That assessment makes CARE the vehicle by which its donors pro-
vide essential goods and services to those who need them but who
cannot afford to pay for them. According to this view, the demand
side is occupied by those who receive the organization's goods and
services, though allocation is made on the basis of something other
than ability to pay. Viewed from this perspective, CARE's donors
are on the supply side, providing CARE with the factors of pro-
duction necessary to produce its output, relief services. This is
clearest when the donation is in kind rather than in cash, as when
volunteers provide free labor. The donor is simply providing at no
cost a factor of production that CARE would otherwise have to
purchase. As Hansmann points out, CARE's basic inventory is pro-
vided in this way through the United States Government's Food for
Peace program." But donors are no less on the supply side when
their contribution is in cash; in that case, CARE simply receives the
most fungible of assets, money, and uses it to purchase other inputs
into the process of providing relief. 7 '
This re-characterization is not intended to suggest that Hans-
mann's demand-side account is inaccurate as far as it goes, or that
Hansmann's approach does not make a useful analytic point.
Rather, it is meant to show what Hansmann's approach omits, the
distinctiveness of transactions in which one party confers a benefit
on another without the expectation of a material reward.
"Redistributive philanthropies" like CARE and the Red Cross
are the most obvious, but by no means the only, kinds of donative
nonprofits through which donors may try to correct what they
perceive as a problem in the market's provision of goods or services
to others. Redistributive philanthropies are in an important sense
the most general form of altruistic organization. But for an element
of parentalism," one would expect an altruist to give money and
let donees buy what. they think they most need." Such altruism
71 flansmann, supra note 17, at 846 n.39.
72 As we shall see, infra notes 189-93 and accompanying text, donors' contributions are
sometimes better characterized not as providing particular variable inputs into the productive
process for free, but rather as investments of return-free capital.
73 I say "paternalism" rather than "paternalism" in part to avoid the latter term's con-
notations of officious intermeddling, but primarily to use a gender-neutral synonym. At least
in my own experience, concern for another's welfare combined with a claim of superior
insight into the other's needs can come from a parent of either sex.
" David D. Friedman makes this point, albeit with the traditional term. I). FRIEDMAN,
PRICE THEORY 494-95 ( 1981i). Friedman also suggests a second, related reason for not making
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would be truly and exclusively redistributionist. Even CARE and
the Red Cross are not purely redistributionist in this sense. They
provide relief largely in kind, though under circumstances when
there can be little doubt that the recipients would use monetary
payments to buy precisely the same kinds of basic goods and ser-
vices, if they were available. Many forms of philanthropy, on the
other hand, involve an essential element of parentalism, which takes
one of two basic forms.
The first form of altruistic parentalism seeks to encourage
greater consumption of a particular good or service. Altruists of
this ilk are of the view that at the prevailing market price (assuming
there is one), others are consuming too little of something—say,
health care or education—for their own good. 75 Altruists so per-
suaded would want to raise the level of consumption in either of
two ways. On the one hand, they might attempt to increase the
quantity of a good or service demanded by lowering its cost. Thus,
those interested in promoting education might contribute to the
college of their choice in order to defray the cost-of education and
presumably lower its price to the consumer. Or they might contrib-
ute to a scholarship program to subsidize individual students' pur-
chases of education at the institutions of their choice. Similarly, if
such altruists thought their fellow-folk were reading too few books,
they might contribute to public libraries.
On the other hand, they might attempt to increase demand,
perhaps by advertising. In this case the perceived problem would
not be that others do not have sufficient resources to buy at the
market price the goods the altruist thinks desirable, but rather that
they do not appreciate how important those goods are. Religious
observation is, in monetary terms at least, essentially free, but in
the minds of many it is woefully underconsumed. In economists'
terms, parentalists would seek to increase quantity demanded by
increasing consumers' demand. To accomplish this, they might, for
outright transfers of money. The transferor may not be concerned primarily with the trans-
feree's welfare, as perceived by either the transferee or the transferor. Instead, the transferor
may he concerned about the effect on others, including the transferor, of changing the level
of a transferee's consumption of a particular good. Thus, for example, a wealthy donor of
scholarships may he less concerned about the education of particular students than about
promoting a more educated society or attracting a better caliber of students to the transferor's
alma mater. Similarly, Friedman points out, the fact that the federal food stamp program is
not a cash transfer program may have less to do with feeding the poor than with promoting
consumption of agricultural products. Id.
75 Or for the good of still others. See D. FRIEDMAN, supra note 74, at 494-95.
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example, contribute to organizations that erect billboards urging
motorists to "Attend the church or synagogue of your choice."
Should altruists' fellow-folk heed these messages and attend a
service, they might hear of another problem that altruists seek to
correct: overconsumption, the concern of the second broad category
of parentalistic altruism. Overconsumption is a common theme of
sermons on several of the Seven Deadly Sins. Altruists' coins in the
collection plate may subsidize efforts to decrease demand for,
among other things: smoking, drinking, illegal drugs, pornography,
and commercial sex. Coins in the coffers of the American Cancer
Society and Mothers Against Drunk Drivers presumably advance
efforts at reducing vices and their more secular ill effects. Such
efforts frequently involve a classic public good that economists
would expect the market to undersupply — publicly disseminated
information about the health and safety (not to mention spiritual)
hazards of substance abuse. 76
in all donative entrepreneurial nonprofits like those in the
above examples, contributors do not receive adequate compensation
in money or money's worth, and the net receipts benefit some class
other than those who donate and those who control the donee
organization. But to recognize the altruism inherent in the way that
redistributive and parentalistic nonprofits address the perceived
problems of maldistribution and over- or under-consumption is not
to deny that there are sound and orthodox economic descriptions
of how those problems arise. Donations to subsidize or discourage
consumption can be described as a means of addressing problems
of external benefits and costs, respectively. Beyond that, even re-
distribution of wealth can be viewed as a public good for which
those with the wherewithal to indulge may have a demand cogniz-
able under neo-classic economic analysis. 77 But no matter how help-
ful the economic account of these problems may be, the contract
failure theory of nonprofits nevertheless overlooks the role of al-
truism in the donative nonprofit organization's form of solution.
76 See infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of the role of
altruism in nonprofits' provision of public goods. Note the implicit assumption here that
supporters of public awareness ads, such as those produced by the American Cancer Society
and Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), do not think of' themselves as being in need
of, or as benefitting directly from, the ads for which they pay. Instead, they buy them for
the benefit of others. Sec infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text for a general discussion
of other donative organizations that provide public goods. In this latter discussion, I remove
the other-regarding assumption,
77 See supra note 69 for a discussion of the idea that those with the ability to redistribute
wealth may have a "demand" for such redistribution.
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This emphasis on the altruism of donative nonprofits is not at
odds with contemporary economic analysis of altruism itself as a
self-regarding preference:7B The altruism I have identified need not
be subjectively pure. The donors I have described may be motivated
wholly or in part by a desire for fame, a good name, divine favor
(now or hereafter), or some other "selfish" concern. In this sense,
I have identified a "weak" form of altruism. What is distinct about
my donors is not that they give without gain, but that any satisfaction
they derive from giving is not in the form of a material quid pro
quo for their donation.
Other critics of the contract failure theory deny that altruism
may sensibly be seen as self-regarding, insisting instead on a
"strong" form of altruism. Indeed, one of those critics, James Doug-
las, argues that economists' denial of this "strong," or selfless, form
of altruism is a major flaw in the market-failure account of chari-
ties. 79 I agree that altruism is what the economic account critically
omits, but 1 find Douglas's account of "strong" altruism unpersu-
asive.
Douglas readily admits the explanatory power of economics,
with its focus on self-regarding preferences. He insists, however,
that some human motivation is wholly selfless, based on the follow-
ing argument:
Any of us seeing a child drowning will rush to try and
rescue him or her, certainly at the risk of getting our
clothes wet and quite probably, in many cases, at the risk
of our own lives. We may be under no legal obligation to
do so. We are not seeking our own welfare. On the con-
trary, we almost certainly incur some slight economic risk
and possibly a very large one. 80
Douglas is aware that the matter is subject to further analysis:
One can argue that the fact that we choose to save the
child's life proves that we prefer the moral gratification it
gives us to the cost of sending our clothes to the dry
78 Gary S. Becker, for example, treats altruists as people whose demand schedules are
peculiarly interdependent with those of others. When the latter enjoy what altruists give
them, altruists are themselves happier than had they kept the gift. G. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC
APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 282-309 (1976); see also D. FRIEDMAN, supra note 74, at 489—
96.
" J. DOUGLAS, supra note 9, at 63-67.
"a Id. at 65. Gladstone ups the ante; he offers for the same point the example of "the
fireman who returns repeatedly, beyond the call of duty, to rescue those trapped in a blazing
building." F. GLADSTONE, CHARITY, LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 31 (1982).
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cleaners. The concept of a preference function can be
extended to cover any observed preference, whether self-
seeking or altruistic, but only at the cost of tautology.
Economic actors will chose according to their preference
function, and their preference function is defined as what
they chooses'
Expressly to avoid this circularity, Douglas imports into his
analysis of charity Amartya Sen's "strong" concept of altruism. 82
According to Sen:
[W]e must distinguish between two separate concepts: (i)
sympathy and (ii) commitment. The former corresponds
to the case in which concern for others directly affects
one's own welfare. If the knowledge of torture of others
makes you sick, it is a case of sympathy; if it does not
make you feel personally worse off, but you think it is
wrong and you are ready to do something to stop it, it is
a case of commitment . . . . It can be argued that behavior
based on sympathy is in an important sense egoistic, for
one is oneself pleased at others' pleasure and pained at
others' pain, and the pursuit of one's own utility may thus
be helped by sympathetic action. It is action based on
commitment rather than sympathy which would be non-
egoistic in this sense. 83
In short, commitment, Sen's brand of strong altruism, involves
"altruistic choices that do not contribute to one's personal welfare
and may actually run counter to it." 84
The first thing to note about the drowning child and torture
examples is that they merely stipulate what an instance of strong
altruism would involve, self-sacrifice on behalf of another. They
hardly prove that any particular rescue actually involves such altru-
ism. How can we ever know that what prompts the rescue of a
drowning child is not the desire for social acclaim, even at the risk
of death, or the desire for a conscience clear of having refused
assistance, even if such a conscience must be purchased with one's
life? 85 At least since the time of Kant, ethicists have realized the
distinction between showing what a purely selfless act would be like
Al J. DOUGLAS, supra note 9, at 65-66.
82 Id. at 66.
" Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL.
& Pug. Arr. 317, 326 (1970).
84 1 DOUGLAS, supra note 9, at 64.
"See Gergen, supra note 69, at 1433 n.137.
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and showing that there has ever been, or will ever be, such an act. 86
Sen is aware of the difficulty of the latter, but neither he nor Douglas
has done more than the former."
as In Kant's classic formulation of the problem:
It is in fact absolutely impossible by experience to discern with complete cer-
tainty a single case in which the maxim of an action, however much it may
conform to duty, rested solely on moral grounds and on the conception of one's
duty. It sometimes happens that in the most searching self-examination we can
find nothing except the moral ground of duty which could have been powerful
enough to move us to this or that good action and to such great sacrifice. But
from this we cannot by any means conclude with certainty that a secret impulse
of self-love, falsely appearing as the idea of duty, was not actually the true
determining cause of the will. For we like to flatter ourselves with a pretended
nobler motive, while in fact even the strictest examination can never lead us
entirely behind the secret incentives ..
I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 27 (L. Beck trans., R. Wolff ed.
1969). This skepticism about human motivation was not, of course, original with Kant.
Millenia before, Jeremiah had lamented, "The heart is deceitful above all things, and des-
perately wicked: who can know it?" _Jeremiah 17:9 (King James). And modern psychology and
psychoanalysis have certainly lent credence to the doubters.
" As Sen notes, "[a] more difficult question arises when a person's choice happens to
coincide with the maximization of his anticipated personal welfare, but that is not the reason
for his choice." Sen, supra note 83, at 327 (emphasis in original). In such cases, he maintains,
the choice is based on commitment if it "would be unaffected under at least one counterfactual
condition in which the act chosen would cease to maximize personal welfare." Id. The
problem, however, is to prove that such a counterfactual condition exists. Sen concedes that
"[c]ornmitment in this more inclusive sense may be difficult to ascertain not only in the
context of others' choices but also in that of one's own, since it is not always clear what one
would have done had the circumstances been different." Id. Nor does he go on to indicate
how this alternative choice—even by one's self—would ever be clear,
Gergen recognizes at one point the dual motivation problem that bedevils Sen's suppos-
edly selfless commitment: "[a]cting out of commitment may be characterized as satisfaction-
seeking behavior, insofar as the act may be done to avoid feelings of guilt." Gergen, supra
note 69, at 1433 n.137. Yet at another point Gergen seems to ignore the problem of self-
deception that Kant and the prophet identify. He insists that "[i]n describing human behavior
it is important not to ignore personal experience, for perhaps the deepest and richest
understanding of human motivations can come front self-scrutiny." Id. at 1429. On that
theory, he recommends "[a]sk[ing] yourself if you give to charity out of a reasoned judgment
that the satisfaction of giving . . . matches that of other possible expenditures." Id. After
examining his own family's charitable giving, lie concludes that "[o]nly sometimes does the
description of' the act of giving as pleasurable in itself, or as performed in order to receive
another source of satisfaction, ring true." Id. He finds that gifts to social welfare charities
generally meet his standard of subjective purity. Id, at 1449.
But the higher motives he identifies are feelings of "obligation," "duty," "responsibility,"
and even "embarrassment" and "social pressure." Id. at 1429, 1449. As he himself points out
in criticism of Sen, avoiding feelings of guilt—feelings that might well accompany breaches
of perceived moral obligations—is itself satisfaction-seeking behavior. Id. at 1433 n.I37. The
avoidance of pain has always been an element of the hedonistic calculus, if sometimes less
explicitly than the achievement of pleasure. J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM 10 (0. Piest ed. 1957).
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Furthermore, to point out that cases like the drowning child
example do not necessarily involve strong altruism is not tanta-
mount to arguing in a circle. To ask whether a particular Samari-
tan's motives are at bottom selfish is simply to raise an empirical
question. One only begs the question when one derives the answer
from the premise that all actions are selfishly motivated. Nor is to
ask the question about the Samaritan's motives to deny that it might
be answerable, and answerable in the Samaritan's favor. It might
be possible both to know the Samaritan's motives, and to know that
they were pure. It may be true, as Lord Justice Bowen quipped,
that the state of one's mind is as much a fact as the state of one's
digestion. 88 And no doubt there are times when the law must require
proof of the former."
It is hardly deniable, however, that the latter proof is in practice
generally shorter and more certain. In the background of this sec-
tion's descriptive account of nonprofits are the normative issues of
section V, in particular, the reasons for according nonprofits favor-
able tax status. For that purpose, I need to identify a characteristic
of some or all nonprofits that can be discerned by government
agents, not just the organizations themselves, at reasonable cost in
particular cases, as, for example, when an organization seeks tax
exempt status. At that point, policy makers are likely to discover (to
paraphrase the Prophet) that human institutions must be satisfied
with examining outer appearances, leaving things of the heart to
higher authorities. Thus, with an eye toward identifying a charac-
teristic of nonprofits that can serve as an objective basis for their
tax exemption, "weak" altruism seems the better candidate."°
Whether it is itself an adequate candidate under other criteria will
have to await the normative discussion in section V."'
For now, it is worth noting that a related concept is currently
serving in a closely allied area of law. "Weak" altruism, or something
very like it, is now one of the legal criteria of whether a gift is
charitable under the common law of charitable trusts and under
" Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. D. 459, 483 (1885).
" The fields of antidiscrimination and criminal law are obvious examples.
9° See Bittker & Randert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income
Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 305 n.15 (1976) (for purposes of analyzing federal tax exemption,
psychic returns to benefactors of public service organizations may safely be ignored).
9 ' One may well ask, for example, whether altruism is something deserving of preferred
tax treatment, even if it can be identified. See infra notes 362-80 and accompanying text for
a discussion of this point.
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federal tax law. The donor cannot derive a reciprocal material
benefit from the gift. Yet, as _John Simon points out:
[P]rivate benefits that are not directly realizable in material
terms (or contractually assured) do not count. . Nor
does the fact that the donor's motives are less than selfless
defeat the deduction; neither charitable trust law nor
charitable tax law requires subjective altruism, despite the
teaching of St. Paul: "And though I bestow all my goods
to feed the poor . . . and have not charity, it profited me
nothing."92
The reason that subjective motives do not count is the practical
problem to which I have already alluded: "[i]gnoring motive may
be a necessity for the tax system; the search for purity of charitable
92 Simon, supra note 26, at 86 (citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court has
recently held that a transfer without adequate consideration is a necessary but not sufficient
condition of a charitable contribution under section 170 of the tax code when the donor
receives some consideration in return for the transfer to charity. United States v. American
Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 116-18 (1986) (hereinafter ABE]. In assessing whether any
part of such "dual payments" qualifies as a charitable contribution, the Court adopted the
Service's two-pronged test:
First, the payment is deductible only if and to the extent it exceeds the market
value of the benefit received. Second, the excess payment must be "made with
the intention of making a gift."
Id. at 117 (quoting Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 105 (so-called "bazaar ruling")).
Significantly, for our purposes, the inquiry into intent under the second prong of the
test is not a search for the purely selfless motivation that characterizes Douglas's "strong"
altruism. To meet the second prong of the ABE test, a taxpayer claiming to have made a
deductible contribution need only show that she intentionally paid more than the market
price of the good or service she received in return, Id. at 118; see also Hernandez v. Com-
missioner, 109 S. Ct. 2136, 2143-46 (1989) (re-affirming ABE's emphasis on examining
external features of putative donations, rather than subjective motivations, to determine
deductibility under I.R.C. § 170). To apply the second prong more rigorously would run
afoul of another line of cases, cited with approval by the Court in ABE, which permit
charitable deductions for the full amount of a payment to charity when the donor receives
nominal, though not necessarily merely psychic, benefits in return. ABE, 477 U.S. at 117.
In a related context, that of determining whether a transfer may be excluded from
income as a gift under section 102 of the tax code, the United States Supreme Court has
mandated a limited examination of motive. Under Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S.
278 (1960), excludable gills must be motivated by "detached and disinterested generosity,"
which requires more than mere absence of common law consideration or legal obligation.
Id. at 285-86. Here again, however, the additional showing is short of a requirement of
"strong" altruism. Basically, the recipient must establish that the purported gift was not
motivated by expectation of material gain or desire to reward past services. See id. at 291-92
(evidence supported finding that transfer to Duberstein was "at bottom a recompense for
past services, or an inducement for him to be of further service in the future"). Nothing in
the opinion suggests further inquiry into the selflessness of the transferor's motive.
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intention would be an unmanageable task, even ignoring the com-
plications caused by psychoanalytic theory." 93
To ignore subjective intent, of course, is to put considerable
pressure on defining the forbidden reciprocal benefit, a concept
that cannot be defined with complete precision. Some attenuated
forms of personal benefit to the donor, even beyond the merely
psychological, are — and may have to be — ignored." Although it
may be difficult to predict what degree or kind of private benefit
will tip the scales in particular cases, it is nonetheless possible to
identify the factors that weigh into the balance. It is, of course,
equally possible to criticize the policy choices that lie behind even
some of the clearer decisions. 95 The point to be made here is that,
"Simon, supra note 26, at 86. See also Hernandez, 109 S. Ct. at 2143, ("This practice [of
focusing on the external aspects of a transaction] has the advantage of obviating the need
for the IRS to conduct imprecise inquiries into the motivations of individual taxpayers."). A
growing body of research, both theoretical and empirical, suggests that a significant moti-
vation of donors might be the quasi-coercive push of social pressure. For brief accounts of
this and other research on the motivations of donors, see Amos, Empirical Analysis of Motivations
Underlying Individual Contributions to Charity, 10 ATLANTIC E,CON, J. 45, 45-47 (1982); E. JAMES
& S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 25-26.
" See Simon, supra note '26, at 86:
Deductions are not lost because the donor enjoys memorialization on the front
of a building or at a testimonial dinner, enhanced college admission opportu-
nities for the donor's child or business relations for the donor, hopes for
salvation or at least the expectation of perpetual prayers, the shared benefits
that come with public goods like parks or cleaner air, or the general expectation
that somewhere, somehow, the giver will benefit.
95 Mark Kelman, for example, insists that most large-scale givers enjoy some measure of
reciprocal benefits from their donations, if only in the form of deference from domes,
respect from peers, or increased self-esteem. Reiman, Personal Deductions Revisited, 31 STAN.
L. REV. 831, 835 n.14, 844-49, 856-57 (1979), He also strongly implies that deductibility of
charitable gifts under these circumstances is inappropriate. In part, he thinks the deduction
inappropriate because it works against progressivity in the tax system. Id. at 880. But re-
gressivity at one point in the tax system does not logically preclude progressivity of the whole,
as I argue elsewhere, see infra text following note 324. There is, Kelman concedes, another
reason for his opposition. As he succinctly puts it in his conclusion:
My opposition to the [income tax deduction for a] charitable donation is bols-
tered by my sense that charitable donors are the same as everyone else in an
individualist culture: They use their money for their own relative benefit. Even
the most sincere altruist buys the scarce resource of looking altruistic.
Id. at 880 (citation omitted). Cf. Gergen, supra note 69, at 1408 ("If by 'looking altruistic' he
[Kelman] means being respected for acting charitably, one would guess that we are far from
exhausting our capacity for respect.").
Even if charitable donors are like everyone else in some respects—even in the respect
Kelman identifies—they are not necessarily the same in all respects. Reiman demonstrates as
much by identifying the distinct kinds of benefits—deference, respect, access, and self-
esteem—that charitable donors may receive under the present system without jeopardizing
their tax deduction. The policy question that he ignores is whether the tax system should
tolerate the receipt of such admittedly identifiable benefits as a possibly unavoidable cost of
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despite unclarity at the margin, the central concept of weak
altruism — a transfer without a quid pro quo — is not only intelli-
gible, but also operable, as a criterion for drawing distinctions with
important legal consequences.
For purposes of identifying a characteristic feature of nonprofit
organizations, the concept of weak altruism needs another degree
of refinement. Regard for others need not embrace the whole
world. Rather, it spreads in concentric circles from immediate family
to clan, tribe, class, and nation, perhaps to embrace all of human-
ity. 9" Moving outward along these expanding ripples of concern for
others, one eventually crosses the frontier of charity. That frontier
is defined somewhat differently in the lay and the legal parlance,
but both are clear on the essential point. Though charity may begin
at home, it is worthy of the name only after it has crossed the
threshold.•"
In part, this insistence on a degree of Samaritanism, especially
in the law, may be a crude proxy for both weak and strong altruism.
Gifts close to home are likely either to meet legal obligations of the
giver, as in the case of support of minor children, or to be motivated
by expected reciprocity from the donee, as in the case of gifts within
a close circle of friends. But in the more morally charged notions
of charity, something else is clearly going on. A kind of activity is
being singled out for approbation as inherently, not just instrumen-
encouraging philanthropy. Whether the charitable deduction is an effective or fair way to
encourage philanthropy is an open, and much debated, question. See generally Simon, supra
note 26, at 73-87; Brannon & Strnad, Alternative Approaches to Encouraging Philanthropic
Activities, in 4 FILER COMMISSION PAPERS, supra note 3, at 2361. And, as we shall see, one can
object to philanthropy itself, on practical grounds or as a matter of principle. See infra notes
366-79 and accompanying text for a more complete discussion of this point. None of that
is to deny, however, that philanthropy is distinctive or that a desire to encourage it is an
intelligible preference. •
" Sen makes this point in emphasizing that utilitarianism, with its universalizing emphasis
on the greatest good of the greatest number, is not the only alternative to egoism, even in
terms of scope. Sen, supra note 83, at 318-19, 344. As he observes, "between the claims of
oneself and the claims of all lie the claims of a variety of groups—for example, family,
friends, local communities, peer groups, and economic and social classes." Id. at 318.
97 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 375 comment b (1957) (trust for benefit of
relatives is not charitable). Just as the degree of permissible private benefit is difficult to
define, so too is the requisite degree of remoteness, in part owing to the complexity of
personal relationships. So, for example, the federal circuits have split on the issue of whether
parents may deduct gifts for support of their children as Mormon missionaries. Compare
White v. United States, 725 F.2d 1269 (10th Cir. 1984) (reversing denial of deduction and
remanding) and Brinley v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1986) (reversing denial of
deduction and remanding) with Davis v. United States, 861 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir. 1988)
(denying deduction "in a factual setting indistinguishable" from White).
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tally, desirable. And this seems to underlie the legal preference for
charity as well.
We need not linger over the distinctions between the lay and
the legal definitions of charity or, for that matter, over the precise
limits of either. At this point in our analysis, we need only remember
that charity is a subpart of altruism. To avoid confusion with the
legal concept of charity, which I shall take up again in section V, I
shall use the term "altruistic" to describe organizations that confer
benefits on persons other than their controllers or financiers. For
the most part these organizations will also qualify, at least in a lay
sense, as charitable, but I will use the broader term "altruistic"
except where the difference is critical.
In all the examples discussed above, the beneficiaries were
distinct from those who contributed to the organization, and both
the donors and the beneficiaries were distinct from those who con-
trolled the organization. Thus, in the case of CARE, the donors
place their contributions in the hands of a second group, CARE's
governing body, to be used to benefit a third group, overseas famine
victims. These three groups—donors, controllers, and beneficia-
ries—need not, however, be separate in all donative entrepreneu-
rials. The class of those who benefit from the organization could
conceivably coincide with the class of either those who finance it or
those who control it. Both these possibilities, donative entrepreneu-
rials that are run for the benefit of their donors and donative
entrepreneurials that are controlled by their beneficiaries, need to
be examined. In each, the element of altruism is somewhat different
from that in the donative entrepreneurials discussed above, and the
difference sheds additional light on the role of altruism in nonprofit
organizations.
2. Type 2 Organizations — Donative Entrepreneurials Operated
For the Benefit of Donors
The combination of the donor and beneficiary classes seems at
first impression to be inconsistent with the premise of donative
financing. The paradox may be resolved in either of two ways. The
first is through the public goods character of the benefits that do-
nors expect to receive. If the benefit expected is a classic private
good, the payment is not a donation but a purchase, and an orga-
nization supported by such payments is a commercial rather than
an entrepreneurial nonprofit. As Hansmann and others have
shown, however, quite often the goods produced by nonprofits are
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public goods. Hansmann's listener-sponsored radio is a classic ex- .
ample; viewer-supported television is another. One can imagine
such a broadcaster deriving its entire support from listeners who
contribute no more than what they deem tuning in to be worth to
them. Although no part of such a payment is intended to benefit
others, it necessarily has a spillover effect. Those willing and able
to pay for broadcasts unavoidably subsidize others who are unwill-
ing or unable to tune in other than for free."
Here, then, is a transaction different both from ordinary pur-
chases of private goods like automobiles and from contributions to
redistributive nonprofits like CARE. Unlike the former, the "pur-
chase" of public goods necessarily allows others to enjoy the same
good in the same way; unlike the latter, it may well involve provision
of a material good directly to the contributor. But because the donor
could have enjoyed the good without paying anything to the pro-
vider, it does not seem odd to think of the payment as a donation
rather than as a purchase."
Moreover, we have described the least intuitively altruistic kind
of payment to a provider of public goods. Our initial assumption
was that the donor gave no more for the broadcast she received
than the broadcast was worth to her. It is quite conceivable that one
might donate to the provider of a public good even though one
does not consume the good; perhaps some people who do not own
television sets nevertheless contribute to public television, on the
theory that those who do watch should have a wider range of
options.'"
The second resolution of the paradox of donor-benefitting
donative entrepreneurials lies not in the nature of the goods pro-
vided, but in the donors' relinquishment of control of the donation,
and the consequent uncertainty that the donor will individually
benefit from it. Consider a hypothetical hierarchical religious de-
98 Indeed, Hansmann comes to much the same conclusion with respect to a prominent
kind of patron.controlled nonprofit, trade association: "Since the services, such as political
lobbying, that such organizations commonly provide are public goods, they can be enjoyed
whether or not one belongs to or contributes to the organization, and thus contributions to
such organizations have the character of donations." H. HANSMANN, supra note 55, at 36
n.65.
99 It is, of course, possible to minimize this altruistic aspect. Gergen, for example, says
that "Fill altruism plays a part in giving to public television, it is only in suppressing the
tendency to freeride." Gergen, supra note 69, at 1443.
1 °° But see id. (suggesting that, by analogy to contributions to cultural organizations,
donations to public television probably come primarily from viewers).
May 1990]	 NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS	 535
nomination. Congregations in this denomination are controlled by
a priestess who is appointed by the church hierarchy and answerable
only to it. Local congregations are, however, essentially self-help
organizations. All funding for each parish comes exclusively from
the members of the parish and is used solely for their benefit.'°'
Some of these benefits are likely to be public goods; preaching is
an obvious example. But some are private goods, like individual
spiritual counseling and material relief in the event of sickness or
unemployment. If the individual member were assured of getting
such counseling or disaster protection in proportion to his or her
payment, one would be inclined to think that this transaction dif-
fered little from a purchase of psychotherapy services in the first
example'°' or an insurance policy in the second.'°3
 The difference
ic' Available evidence suggests that this funding hypothesis is realistic. According to
Gergen:
Churches are self-help charities: their supporters are also their primary bene-
ficiaries. Churches obtain over four-fifths of their income from members, mostly
in the form of relatively small contributions, and over four-fifths of church
income goes to operations and current expenses . . • Generally only a small
percentage of church resources—at most ten to twenty percent—are devoted to
nonsacramental functions, and some of these resources are devoted to services,
such as day care or family counseling, that benefit parishioners.
Gergen, supra note 69, at 1434-35 (footnotes omitted).
1°2
 This was essentially the view the United States Supreme Court took in denying
charitable deductions to individuals who paid "auditing" and "training" fees to the Church
of Scientology. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 109 S. Ct. 2136, 2143-46 (1989). In character-
izing the stock-in-trade of religious organizations as "supernatural intangibles," Veblen an-
ticipated by six decades the donors' best argument, the lack of a material quid pro quo. T.
VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISES IN RECENT TIMES 323-24 (1923)
(cited with evident amusement, if not approval, in Bittker & Randert, supra note 90, at 299,
343). The problem with this defense in the Hernandez case was that donors got individualized
attention in the here and now that was scrupulously denied to non-contributors. Hernandez,
109 S. Ct. at 2143-46.
10 ' See, e.g., Bethel Conservative Mennonite Church v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 352, 359,
aff 'd, 746 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1984):
[Pletitioner established a medical aid plan for its members and their dependents
only. The plan specifically provided that no membership fee was required so as
not to exclude any of petitioner's members from taking part in the plan. The
plan was funded by voluntary offerings collected from members at worship
services on the first Sunday of each month.
In affirming the Tax Court's decision upholding the exemption status of the church despite
the benefits to members under the plan, the Seventh Circuit noted that "the purpose of the
program unquestionably is to provide an organized means for the Bethel Mennonite com-
munity to implement the longstanding Mennonite belief in the pooling of resources for its
members' benefit regardless of the members' personal financial resources." Bethel Conservative Men-
nonite Church, 746 F.2d 388, 391-92 (7th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added). Cf. Shailer, Tax
Exemption of Charitable Organizations and the Deductibility of Charitable Donations; Dangerous New
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in our hypothetical church is that the connection between donations
and individual benefits is less certain. For one thing, individual
benefits are in the priestesses' discretion. And even if they were
automatic, they would depend on the level of others' contributions.
Thus, even if all are entitled to relief when sick, overall contri-
butions would limit the amount of relief the congregation could
give.
The altruism of such self-help organizations is clearly a matter
of degree. The more likely contributions are to be followed by a
predictable quid pro quo, the lesser the degree of altruism. More-
over, in multifunction organizations like churches, the link between
contribution and expected benefit will vary among different func-
tions. A church's child care program may be supported almost
entirely by tuition payments, whereas its relief work will probably
be supported by those least likely to be in need. The former pay-
ments are hardly lacking in a quid pro quo;'° 4 the latter much more
clearly so. Yet even in the latter, there is at least an arguable element
of self-help. A common tenet in many  religions, after all, is that
there, but for the grace of God, go I. Though saints may find
comfort in the belief that no sparrow falls by accident, we of lesser
faith will be ever tempted to cover the down side by strengthening
the safety net. And even if improving their own prospects is not
the donors' motivation to give, it is certainly a foreseeable result.
Yet at some point the prospect of reciprocity becomes thin. It could
be argued, for example, that we are all members of humanity, and
any gift that improves the lot of the race redounds to the donor's
benefit, at least potentially. 105 That argument, of course, takes
us back to an earlier point — some benefits to donors must sim-
ply be ignored as unimportant or overly remote 1 °6 if the definition
of weak altruism is to be workable. Here again, the heartland
of the definition is clear, even if the borders present difficult
cases.
Tests, 8 BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 77, 88 (1987) ("the church's medical plan, which was available
only to members and their dependents, operated like other medical plans").
104 Accordingly, the I.R.S. denies charitable contribution deductions for purported do-
nations by a parent to a child's school in an amount suspiciously equivalent to tuition. See
Rev. Rul. 83-104, 1983-2 C.B. 46 (particularly Situations 1 through 4).
IDS See, e.g., Douty, Disasters and Charity: Some Aspects of Cooperative Economic Behavior, 62
AM. ECON. REV. 580, 586 (1972) (analyzing disaster relief contributions as the price of a kind
of informal mutual insurance).
IDD See Gergen, supra note 69, at 1431 n.131 (criticizing Douty's view of disaster relief
contributions as involving too attenuated an element of reciprocity).
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3. Type 3 Organizations — Donee-Controlled Donative
Entrepreneurials
In Type 3 organizations, the role of altruism is clearer, as an
example will show. Assume that our hypothetical hierarchical de-
nomination decides to establish an overseas affiliate in an under-
developed part of the country. Assume further that parishioners in
the provinces are proud as well as poor. The parishioners' poverty
means that their branch of the church must be wholly financed by
the overseas parent. Clearly there is altruism in the contributions
by members of the overseas parent church; they receive no material
quid pro quo.
But the parishioners' pride means that they themselves insist
on running the affairs of their own congregations with minimal
interference from foreign priestesses. What effect does local con-
trol—donee control, in the example—have on the organization's
altruism? The answer turns on how we define altruism. We can
require only the donors' altruism, or we can insist on a measure of
altruism in the donees as well. If we choose the latter, we would
then look at whether control of the contributed goods is "socialized"
and whether the benefits provided are public goods. It is important
to note, however, that when we turn to the question of whether to
require altruism on the donees' part, we move from description to
prescription. Even without this extra measure of altruism, Type 3
organizations exhibit altruism in the fact that they are supported
by donors who do not materially benefit by their operation.
B. Donative Mutuals — Equally Clear Cases for Altruism
Donative mutuals are controlled by their contributors; bear in
mind that for our purposes "mutual" refers to the locus of control,
not to the locus of benefit. The role of altruism in the two members
of this category, Type 4 and Type 5, is essentially the same as in
Type 1 and Type 2, respectively.
1. Type 4 Organizations — Donor Control for Others' Benefit
CARE could quite conceivably be controlled by its donors but
still operate for the relief of the needy overseas. Similarly, a do-
mestic religious organization might be funded and controlled ex-
clusively by members whose donations are used only for overseas
mission or relief work. In both cases, unlike comparable entrepre-
neurial donatives, those who control the organization are those who
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finance it. But, like their entrepreneurial counterparts, these mu-
tuals are operated for the benefit of others.
2. Type 5 Organizations — Donor Control for Their Own
Benefit
As we saw in the case of Type 2 organizations, some donative
entrepreneurials are operated for the benefit of their donors. The
apparent problem of donors materially benefitting from their do-
nations is resolved if the organization either provides public goods
or provides private goods on a "socialized" basis. Recall that both
of these elements were present in the hierarchically controlled
church with congregations financed by members and operated for
members' benefit. The same elements could also be present if such
a church were organized on a congregational basis. In that case, the
congregations would be examples of mutual donative nonprofits
operated for the benefit of those who finance and control them.
C. From Donative to Commercial Nonprofits — Altruism in Education
and the Performing Arts
Weak altruism seems completely compatible with Hansmann's
general contract failure account of donative nonprofits. Signifi-
cantly, however, Hansmann's account of two important kinds of
donative nonprofits strongly implies that they lack any element of
altruism. I shall present Hansmann's critiques first, then my re-
sponse.
The first kind of donative nonprofits that lack altruism in Hans-
mann's account are performing arts organizations. According to
Hansmann, performing arts are not a traditional "public" good,
because "in general, the only people who derive any benefit from a
performance are those who are in the audience."°7 He admits that
"there is something to the argument that great cultural institutions
confer prestige on the city, the region, or the country as a whole,
and in this respect provide a public good." But he insists that "these
remote public benefits seem quite small in proportion to the private
benefits that a performance confers on its audience,"'" and he
concludes that "[s]urely these are not the most significant reasons
for donations to the performing arts."'" 9 Furthermore, contribu-
1 "7 Hansmann, supra note 17, at 855.
"Id. at 855 n.62.
1091d.
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tions to the performing arts, unlike gifts to CARE, do not for the
most part benefit a needy class; "it seems unlikely that the primary
reason that performing arts groups are nonprofit is to provide a
vehicle for the rich to subsidize the upper middle class.""° Hans-
mann thus offers an alternative explanation:
In this situation contributions are, in essence, a form of
voluntary price discrimination, or, in other words, a means
whereby different customers can be charged different
prices for the same service.. .. If everyone could be made
to pay for a production roughly what it is worth to him,
the total receipts for a production would be much higher
than if the price is set at the amount that represents its
worth to the member of the audience who values it least—
which is the result with a single ticket price for every-
body."'
Hansmann argues that the nonprofit form of organization assures
those who voluntarily pay more that the excess will be used to defray
the high fixed costs of production, not to increase investors' prof-
ItS. 112
Higher educational organizations are the second kind of do-
native nonprofits in which Hansmann expressly questions the role
of altruism. Hansmann notes that "[i]nstitutions of higher education
commonly depend heavily on voluntary private contributions to
cover their expenses."'" In explaining this, however, Hansmann
again discounts the role of subsidizing others (in this case, needy
students) and providing public goods like research. His theory is
that alumni, the source of most contributions, are in fact paying
back "implicit loans" that their alma maters made them at a time
when, owing to failures in the private loan market, they could not
borrow funds from other sources to finance their educations." 4
"" Id. at 855.
Id. at 856-57,
112 Id. at 858. Hansmann has offered a formal model of "voluntary price discrimination."
Hausmann, Nonprofit Enterprise in the Perfiirming Arts, 12 BELL J. EcoN. 341 (1981).
"3 Hausmann, supra note 17, at 860.
"-0 Id. The question of whether repayments of these "implicit loans" are in fact truly
donative transactions has important practical ramifications. Many educational organizations
are now conditioning student aid on the recipient's undertaking a putatively nonbinding
commitment to transfer a like amount to the institution at a later date. An important issue
for both the organizations and .the students is how extensive the latter's commitment under
such "moral obligation loans" can be without jeopardizing the deductibility of subsequent
"gifts" to the former under section 170 or the I.R.C. See Note, Moral Obligation Financial Aid
Programs, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1402 (1984).
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Thus, in his accounts of performing arts organizations and
higher educational organizations, Hansmann does not merely treat
payments for the benefit of others as a self-regarding preference,
as he does in explaining contributions to CARE. Rather, in explain-
ing contributions to arts and educational organizations, he discounts
altruism even in this "weak" form; contributors are not really sub-
sidizing others, but are buying the organization's output for them-
selves through the only means available. But for voluntary price
discrimination, New York's elite could not enjoy high-brow enter-
tainment; but for "implicit loans," impecunious students could not
finance their own private post-secondary education.
For several reasons, however, it would be wrong to conclude
that nonprofits in either the performing arts or higher education
are wholly lacking in altruism. This point is easiest to illustrate in
the case of the performing arts. Assume that patrons pay no more
through voluntary price discrimination than admission to nonprofit
performances is worth to them personally." 5 Even so, they are
necessarily conferring a benefit on others, and a benefit that they
need not confer in order to enjoy the same benefit for themselves.
Hansmann acknowledges that, "for those individuals who pay the
admission price for a given production, any increase in the quality
of that production is a public good."" 6 This public good aspect of
nonprofit performing arts presentations is, as Hansmann ably dem-
onstrates, made possible by voluntary price discrimination, by some
patrons' voluntarily paying more than the market price of tickets."'
This, then, is but a special case of the kind of altruistic provision of
public goods that we saw above in connection with listener-spon-
sored radio. " 8
Of course, some patrons of the arts may contribute beyond the value to themselves
of attending particular performances; a significant part of voluntary donations to performing
arts organizations may in fact be subsidies by the rich of the nearly rich or soon-to-be rich,
or efforts to provide "trickle-clown" benefits to the public at large. 1 ignore this possibility in
the text, however, to show that even without a conscious effort to benefit others, donations
to performing arts organizations involve an element of altruism.
' 16 Hansmann, supra note 17, at 858.
"7 Id. at 857-58.
118 See id. at 858 (noting that donors to performing arts organizations experience the
same kind of contract failure problem as donors to listener-sponsored radio). The federal
income tax treatment of donations to performing arts organizations also reflects its similarity
to gifts to listener-sponsored radio and viewer-sponsored television. Only the amount paid
that exceeds the fair market value of the ticket is treated as a charitable deduction. Rev. Rul.
67-246,1967–'1 C.B. 104, Examples I and 2. Similarly, with respect to contributions to public
broadcasting, the amount of a payment to a nonprofit organization is only deductible to the
extent it exceeds the value of "premiums"—teddy bears, T-shirts, and coffee mugs—received
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With respect to higher education, the element of altruism on
the donor's part is not quite so evident. A university degree, like
the Grand Tour that once complemented it, is essentially a private
good. Those who do not pay can readily be excluded, and providing
the same level of benefits to additional individuals incurs substantial
marginal costs. This is not to say, of course, that those who receive
the education (or the tour) do not add something in the way of
"spillover benefits" to the general cultural level of their society. But
the primary benefits go to the recipients themselves, and the market
can fairly readily set a price on those benefits. Those who pay for
their own higher education, either up front or through an explicit
or implicit loan, presumably get what they .pay for.
Arguably, however, they may have gotten something more.
They may have come to believe that opportunities for higher edu-
cation should be made available on the basis of something other
than ability to pay, and they may accordingly give to the college of
their choice. Similarly, and somewhat more parentalistically, those
who have had the benefit of, say, a liberal arts education may believe
that one cannot fully appreciate the value of such an education until
one has it. In their view, potential liberal arts students might be
inclined to opt for what the students myopically perceive to be a
more economically attractive alternative—employment in a fast-
food franchise, for example. To make the choice of the liberal arts
education marginally more attractive, alumni would subsidize it
through contributions that defray part of the cost. These alumni
may contribute to their alma maters not because they feel obliged
to pay off implicit loans, but because that is where they got the kind
of education they think others should have.
Whether donations to universities are in fact repayments of
implicit loans is a fairly straightforward empirical question. Presum-
ably at least some alumni contribute beyond any reasonable repay-
ment of principle and interest, and many universities receive sub-
stantial gifts from donors who are not alumni. Whether such
supererogatory gifts are purely motivated is of course a trickier
question. Some donors no doubt glory in having their names at-
tached, literally or otherwise, to ivied walls; others certainly seek to
bask in the reflected glory of their alma mater's faculty and future
in return. See Rev. Rul. 67-246, Example 4. In both cases, the basic principle is the same—
the gift portion of the transaction is that for which the donor receives no material quid pro
quo.
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alumni." 9 Here again, however, it must be borne in mind that all I
insist upon is "weak" altruism–in this case, payments for the benefit
of third parties without adequate consideration in money or mon-
ey's worth to the payor. For my purposes, and in the eyes of com-
mon law courts and the federal income tax authorities, reflected
glory is a tolerable taint.
This still leaves the easy empirical question unanswered. What
if, as Hansmann's hypothesis suggests, most putative donations to
institutions of higher learning are in fact repayments of implicit
loans? Even if the donors are in reality only purchasing private
benefits on an installment plan, the fact remains that the institutions
themselves are operating under the nondistribution constraint. In
a sense, then, Hansmann's explanation of these organizations, if
correct, shows them to be "commercial" nonprofits, nonprofits fi-
nanced not by gifts but by the sale of goods and services consumed
by the purchasers. 12° As we shall see in the next subsection, altru-
ism—albeit in a somewhat different form—plays a significant role
in commercial as well as donative nonprofits.
D. Commercial Entrepreneurials—Is There Altruism Here Too?
Altruism is not difficulr to find in donative nonprofits. In fact,
as the first part of this section showed, it is a little odd to describe
them without some reference to altruism. A donation in both the
lay and the tax law sense means a transfer without a material return,
which I have called "weak altruism." Many traditionally recognized
charities, however, derive their support not from donations, but
from ordinary sales of private goods of which the payor is the
consumer. In general there is no altruism on the demand side,
because commercial nonprofits receive their support from the sale
of goods and services to those who consume them, or to members
of their immediate families, as with day care. Yet this category
112 And, as we have seen, some view all donations as fundamentally self-seeking. Kelman,
for example, maintains that "[wlatching education be consumed is no less an act of con-
sumption than any other form of voyeurism." Kelman, supra note 95, at 849. He elaborates
this analogy in a footnote; "Since hiring a prostitute is clearly an act of consumption, hiring
a hooker and/or a John and watching them must be also." ld. at 849 n.59.
' 2° Even Hansmann partly explains institutions of higher education as entrepreneurial
commercial nonprofits that consumers patronize in order to avoid purchasing complex, hard-
to-evaluate, goods or services from for-profit firms, which have an economic incentive to
trade on consumer ignorance. Hansmann, supra note 17, at 866. As we shall see in the next
section, this explanation is simply a particular instance of Hansmann's general contract failure
account of entrepreneurial commercial nonprofits.
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includes many traditional charities; Hansmann gives as general ex-
amples nursing homes and community hospitals.m His two specific
examples, the National Geographic Society and the Educational
Testing Service, 122 are both charities under the federal income tax
law, and at least the first also fits fairly well within the lay meaning
of charity. We shall, therefore, have to look for altruism on the
supply side, beginning with Type 7 organizations, the commercial
entrepreneurials to which Hansmann devotes most attention.
1. Type 7 Organizations—Commercial Entrepreneurials
Operated for Patrons' Benefit
Hansrnann's contract failure theory accounts well for several
important classes of Type 7 organizations. The first of these are
suppliers of complex goods or services. As we have seen, purchasers
who are unable to evaluate the quality of what they purchase will
be inclined to seek nonprofit suppliers, which, given the nondistri-
bution constraint, have no incentive to skimp on quality to increase
profits. Thus, Hansmann maintains, we predictably find a prolif-
eration of nonprofit suppliers in health care, education, and care
for the young and the elderly.'"
One particular form of health care provider, hospitals, illus-
trates a second way of accounting for commercial entrepreneurial
nonprofits under the contract failure theory. Hospitals, Hansmann
points out, began as donative nonprofits that served essentially as
sick houses for the poor. Changes in medical science and the pro-
liferation of public and private health insurance have largely taken
hospitals out of the relief business. Few hospitals now receive sub-
stantial contributions, and few provide much indigent care. But
many remain nonprofit, in part, Hansmann suggests, from inertia.
Thus, at least some commercial entrepreneurial nonprofits are in a
sense anachronisms, fossils of donative nonprofits in environments
where one would now expect to find for-profits in the ascendancy.i 2"
At least two other classes of commercial entrepreneurial non-
profits can be explained consistently with the contract failure theory,
even though they cannot be comfortably subsumed under it. Mem-
bers of one of these classes are not really nonprofits at all, but
proprietary wolves in the sheep's clothing of nonprofit status. The
12L
	
supra note 17, at 842 (chart).
ins Id.
123 Id. at 862-68.
Id. at 867.
544	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 31:501
strategy of the de facto owners of these pseudo-nonprofits is to skim
off net profits in the disguise of payments for a factor of production
other than capital. The classic example is the doctor-controlled
nonprofit hospital in which net earnings tend to be directed to
increasing the salaries of medical staff.' 25
The other form of pseudo-nonprofit arises not because its con-
trollers want to siphon off net earnings in the guise of payments
for something other than capital, but because payment for some
other factor of production that they supply simply leaves no resid-
uum. Hansmann gives as examples a solo law practitioner and the
proprietor of a small, in-home day care center. In each case, the
entire earnings can reasonably be treated as salaries to employees,
not as a distribution of residual profits to owners.' 26
 Entrepreneurs
in such small scale, low capital intensity industries are thus indif-
ferent as to whether their enterprises are organized as for-profits
or nonprofits.' 27
 Thus, "[t]he nondistribution constraint that char-
acterizes the nonprofit form has real meaning only when an enter-
prise is of sufficient scale to develop large earnings that cannot
in Id. at 864-65, 868. Though this strategy would appear to be generally available to
nonprofit managers, it seems to be especially prevalent in certain industries, particularly
nursing homes and hospitals. See also Clarkson, supra note 61, at 17-18 (discussing theories
of physician-controlled hospitals). For a more general analysis of' the abuse of nonprofit
status by insiders, see id.; Etzioni & Doty, Profit in Not-For-Profit Institutions, PHILANTHROPY
MONTHLY, Feb. 1976, at 22.
' Hausmann, supra note 17, at 870-71. See also Krashinsky, supra note 60, at 117 (in
industry of small proprietorships and partnerships, difficult to control appropriation of all
net earnings as wages); Weisbrod, Private Goods, Collective Goods: The Role of the Nonprofit
Sector, in ECONOMICS OF NONPROPRIETARY ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 33, at 139, 167-68
(nonprofit firms that primarily produce private goods tend to be either affiliates of for-
profits, like trade associations, or "profit maximizers in disguise," which pay out excessive
compensation to non-capital factors of production); E. JAMES & S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra
note 8, at 9 ("the nonprofit versus for-profit distinction may not be very useful for small
break-even providers like many child-care centers"); Ellman, supra note 33, at 1038-39 (many
nonprofit consulting firms, like closely held firms generally, have no need to distribute
dividends; they prefer to pay out all earnings as compensation and perquisites).
This is not to say that such firms never embody altruism. Ellman points out that "a group
of individuals may plan to sell their professional services to deserving clients at favorable
rates." Ellman, supra note 33, at 1022, 1039. There is, moreover, evidence to support the
view that nonprofit entrepreneurs are frequently motivated by ideologically grounded con-
cerns 'Or others. See E. JAMES & S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 50-62; Rose-Ackerman,
Altruistic Nonprofit Firms in Competitive Markets: The Case of Day-Care Centers in the United States,
9 J. CONSUMER POLY 291 (1986). But, in light of the foregoing, separating the sheep from
the goats—not to mention the wolves—might be a serious administrative problem.
127
 Unless, perhaps, they are truly altruistic and wish to use their nonprofit status to
signal consumers that they are offering their services at below-market prices. Elliman, supra
note 33, at 1039.
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easily and plausibly be paid out simply as reasonable salaries to the
individuals who are in control of the enterprise." 128
But not all Type 7 commercial entrepreneurial nonprofits can
thus be explained either in terms of the contract failure theory itself
or in terms wholly consistent with that theory. Not all commercial
entrepreneurial nonprofits supply complex goods or services like
health care and education; some provide quite ordinary consumer
goods. Nor are all of these the relics of donative nonprofits that
have lost their contributors. And some of them operate in relatively
large-scale, capital-intense industries where, if those who founded
them had chosen, they might have retained a claim on true residual
earnings. Finally, some are truly nonprofit; though they generate
revenues over non-capital costs of production, those who control
them do not skim off the excess through inflated salaries or self-
dealing transactions. There is a residual class of commercial entre-
preneurial nonprofits that lies outside Hansmann's explanations.
Hansmann himself gives an example of such an anomaly:
[S]uppose—to take an extreme case—that several individ-
uals desire to organize a shoe store as a nonprofit
corporation. . . . They plan to observe the nondistribution
constraint scrupulously, never paying to themselves any-
thing beyond a reasonable salary for work performed for
the store. . . . The store's income will come exclusively
from the prices it charges for the shoes it sells. . .. In
short, the store will be a pure entrepreneurial commercial
nonprofit.'"
Such organizations do not exist only in law professors' hypo-
theticals. Cases involving organizations claiming exemption from
federal income taxation as charities provide several other examples.
In one case, a family of Presbyterian ministers founded a publishing
company for the promulgation of works of Calvinistic theology.'"
From a humble beginning on their dining room table, the organi-
zation eventually generated annual net revenues from book sales in
excess of $50,000 with sufficient regularity to attract the attention
of the I.R.S."' Another example is the Orton Ceramic Company.
123 Id. at 871 (footnote omitted).
133 Flansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. Rev. 497, 515 (1981).
130 Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 743 F.2d 148 (3d Cir.
1984).
131 Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 1070, 1075-77
(1982), aff'd, 743 F.2d 148, 150 (3d Cir. 1984),
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Mr. Orton, an academic and entrepreneur, had developed and
manufactured through a for-profit firm the pyrometric cone, which
by the time of his death had become recognized as the international
standard for measuring critical parts of the ceramic firing process.
In his will, Orton bequeathed the cone production operation to a
putatively charitable trust, with instructions that production be con-
tinued and that sales proceeds be used to further research and
continue production.' 32
Whether such examples of anomalies could be multiplied is, of
course, an empirical question. 133
 Whatever the answer, the impor-
tant point for our purposes is that examples do exist. That raises
another question: How does the contract failure theory account for
them?
In connection with his shoe store example, Hansmann phrases
the question as "[Iv]hy would the incorporators choose to structure
such an enterprise as a nonprofit corporation?"'" Significantly, this
question, unlike his basic query about the role of nonprofits, is not
phrased in terms of why purchasers would want to patronize such
a nonprofit rather than its for-profit competitors. Presumably this
is because none of the basic elements of contract failure is present." 5
Shoes are not public goods, their quality is easy for the purchaser
to evaluate, and the purchasers are likely to be the ultimate users
or at least to be in a position to know the ultimate users, as in the
'" 56 T.C. 147 (1971). Citing the significance of the cones in ceramic research, the tax
court majority recognized the trust's charitable status; a vigorous dissent relied largely on
the cases denying charitable status to non-denominational religious publishers. Id. at 164-
70. This was the Foundation's second victory over the I.R.S., which had unsuccessfully
challenged its charitable status before the enactment of the unrelated business income tax in
1950. See Edward Orton, Jr., Ceramic Foundation v. Commissioner, 9 T.c. 533 (1947), aff'd,
173 F.2d 483 (6th Cir. 1949).
'" See, e.g., The Schoger Foundation v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 380 (1981) (denial of
charitable tax exemption to organization that operated a nonprofit vacation resort).
134
 Hansmann, supra note 129, at 515.
135
 It may in part, however, be on account of the context in which Hansmann discusses
this example. That context is not his article explaining the role of nonprofits, but a later
article arguing in favor of a broadened definition of nonprofit purposes under state nonprofit
corporation codes to include examples like his shoe store. In particular, Hausmann uses the
shoe store example to present "in their clearest and starkest light," Hansmann, supra note
129, at 516, the issues that arise when incorporation under non-profit corporation statutes
is not open to all forms of lawful activity. In that context, a supply-side explanation may be
more appropriate. On the other hand, he explicitly takes his contract failure theory as the
basis for his later article, Hansmann, supra note 129, at 501-07. In neither article does he
attempt to explain such organizations in demand-side terms. Moreover, it is not clear how a
demand-side explanation could be extrapolated from the contract failure theory, for reasons
discussed infra at notes 136-37 and accompaning text.
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case of parents of small children. In any case, Hansmann offers his
explanations of the shoe store in supply-side terms:
Perhaps because (1) they are entering the business pri-
marily for the sake of enjoyment; (2) they have no capital
of their own, so that the most that they would be likely to
earn from such an enterprise under any form of organi-
zation would be a salary; and (3) they feel that the non-
profit form will help assure their customers that they are
charging no more than a fair price fOr the shoes they sell.
Or perhaps they are hostile to capitalism on ideological
grounds, feeling that it fosters exploitative relations be-
tween owners and workers. Or perhaps they are simply
acting on a whim.'"
This discussion neither explains the anomalies in terms of contract
failure nor gives another general explanation of them. Most signif-
icantly for our purposes, however, it fails to recognize their inherent
altruism. We will first look at each of Hansmann's proferred alter-
natives, then turn to the issue of altruism.
To argue that the shoe store founders "enter the business pri-
marily for the sake of enjoyment" may be to argue in a circle similar
to that of which the "strong" altruism theorists accuse economists.
If we assume that we do only those things that increase our overall
utility and if we equate utility with enjoyment, then by definition
everything is done "for enjoyment."
The second suggestion—that the shoe store principals saw in
their enterprise no opportunity for gain beyond a reasonable salary
because they had no capital to contribute—seems implausible as a
general explanation. Even in the shoe store example, this seems
unlikely. At least in theory, capital markets exist to fill this need; if
you do not have capital of your own, you can either borrow it or
sell part of the enterprise—more precisely, part of the entitlement
to its residual earnings—to equity investors. You must, however, be
able to offer a return on investment that, taking risk into account,
is at least as good as alternative investment opportunities. Perhaps
Hansmann's shoe store entrepreneurs cannot meet that condition,
either because, owing to the scale of their proposed operation, the
prospect of residual earnings beyond salaries and other operating
expenses is grim, or because, owing to the strength of competition
Hansmann, supra note 129, at 515.
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in the industry, returns to investment in that industry are not suf-
ficient to attract additional capital. 137
In the examples described above, however, neither condition
seems to have precluded genuine profits. Presbyterian and Re-
formed Publishing Company eventually earned profits far enough
in excess of reasonable expenses to arouse the suspicion of the I.R.S.
To be sure, at the outset the founders apparently did not foresee
these profits. But even if they had been more financially farsighted,
they might well have chosen nonprofit status anyway. Indeed, in
the case of Orton Ceramics, the organization was founded as a for-
profit and continued to earn net profits even after its founder's
death and its conversion to nonprofit status.
The problem with Hansmann's third alternative—that the shoe
store founders chose nonprofit status to assure customers that they
were getting a fair price—is the ambiguity in the idea of "fair price."
If by that he means a price reflecting the value the market places
on the use of particular resources to make shoes as opposed to other
products, then nonprofit status seems unnecessary. The market
itself gives that assurance in the absence of some form of market
failure that we have no reason to think is present here. If, however,
he means to distinguish "fair price" from "market price," then, as
we shall see, I think he comes close to the heart of the matter. He
does not, however, elaborate.
But he does give a hint. "Perhaps," he suggests, the founders
of the shoe store "are hostile to capitalism on ideological grounds,
feeling that it fosters exploitative relations between owners and
workers."'" Perhaps. But if the founders of Presbyterian and Re-
formed Publishing Company were incipient socialists, they certainly
published an odd form of literature as the vehicle for their views.
Though Calvinism is perhaps not inconsistent with alternative eco-
nomic arrangements, its compatibility with capitalism has at least
been more widely discussed. 139 A thorough-going distaste for capi-
t 3i There is another possibility. Returns on investment in other industries may be so
relatively high that these industries attract all investors seeking to maximize their returns.
This seems unlikely in the shoe industry today, but it may well have been the case at one
time in several industries, such as hospital care and education, in which nonprofits initially
predominated. In this situation, an initial infusion of donated capital may be essential. See
infra notes 215-16 and accompanying text for discussion of a similar situation in the history
of financing of public goods.
Hansmann, supra note 129, at 515.
' 39 See, e.g., M. WEBER, THE. PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE: SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (1904);
PROTESTANTISM AND CAPITALISM (R. Green ed. 1959).
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talism is an equally unlikely account of why Mr. Orton placed his
ceramic company on a nonprofit footing at his death.
Hansmann does pose a final possibility: maybe the shoe store
entrepreneurs were "simply acting on a whim."'" In some cases,
that may quite literally be true. But as a general explanation, whims
are unacceptably circular reasons; what, indeed, is a whim but the
absence of a reason? As Hansmann implies by putting whims last,
if a plausible affirmative reason can be offered, it should be ex-
plored. One such reason is the weak altruism I have identified in
connection with donative nonprofits.
A closer look at Hansmann's shoe store reveals an element of
altruism it shares with all Type 7 organizations, an element very
similar to the altruism in parentalistic donative nonprofits. In the
case of the shoe store, the founders may believe that, at the pre-
vailing market price, too few shoes, or shoes of insufficient quality,
are being consumed."' They know that, as a matter of elementary
economics, a drop in the price of shoes will, all else being the same,
produce an increase in the quantity demanded. The challenge, then,
is to offer their shoes at less than the market price for comparable
shoes."2
The market price, in order to keep for-profit firms in the
industry, must be high enough to cover the costs of all factors of
production, including a return on capital sufficient to keep investors
from turning to more lucrative alternatives. The founders might
lower prices in any of several ways while meeting all factor costs.
One way would be to make up the revenue shortfall with donations.
This is what some donative nonprofits are doing when they provide
goods or services free of charge; in giving away products they are
fully subsidizing consumption. Predictably, however, donations may
not be a feasible way to finance a nonprofit shoe store. In all like-
lihood, few prospective donors will share the founders' zeal for
subsidizing footwear consumption.
14° Hansmann, supra note 129, at 515.
14, Hansmatin explains tnanagers' employment and entrepreneurs' investment in non-
profit service firms that provide higher quality outputs than competing for-profit firms in
terms of their willingness to sacrifice higher monetary returns for the satisfaction of associ-
ating with a "craftsmanlike" output. Hansmann, supra note 17, at 899. As we shall see,
however, he does not find anything altruistic in this sacrifice. See infra note 148 for a further
discussion of this point.
' 45 If they succeed, they are likely to have to ration their output. See Rose-Ackerman,
supra note 126, at 293. They could sell their cheaper-but-as-good-or-better shoes to those
who satisfy some test of need, or they could set up their store in an area where all customers
are likely to be needy. See F. GLADSTONE, supra note 80.
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A logical alternative to increasing revenues is to reduce costs.
One way to reduce costs would be to increase operating efficiency,
to organize production in such a way that, for the same level of
factor inputs, there is a greater output. In a competitive industry
like shoe retailing, however, this probably will not succeed. Another
way to reduce costs would, of course, be to obtain factors of pro-
duction more cheaply than competitors. But a special break from
their landlord or their wholesaler would essentially be a donation
in kind, and we have already ruled out third-party donations. The
shoe store owners' own labor and any other factors they themselves
control is an obvious source; they could work for free or make
interest-free loans to the new enterprise. But suppose they are
unable or unwilling to make such sacrifices. Is there any other way
for them to underprice the market?
There is another way, if we modify one of our assumptions
slightly. Suppose there is one sacrifice the founders of the shoe store
can afford to make—they can decline to accept their entitlement as
entrepreneurs to any net profits the shoe store may generate. Or,
stated another way, they can organize the store as a nonprofit. If
there are any net revenues to be earned, then the price of shoes
can be dropped below the market by that much. Net  profits, of
course, are the market price of equity investment. By organizing
the shoe store as a nonprofit, its founders have in a sense avoided,
or at least reduced, the cost of one factor of production, capital.ms
I" In industries that require a relatively large initial infusion of capital (ceramic cone
manufacture, for example), founders obviously cannot rely on retained earnings. A nestegg
of capital must precede nonprofits of this feather. Nor are nonprofit entrepreneurs in such
industries likely to be able to , rely totally on the bootstrap of debt financing. In theory, as the
percentage of debt financing increases, the interest rate rises to reflect the growing risk that
the firm will be unable to meet its obligations. Predictably, this interest rate will consume all
likely net earnings well before the percentage of debt financing reaches 100. Hansmann,
supra note 68, at 73. Moreover, the bootstrap will probably snap even earlier, when the firm's
assets cease to be adequate security for additional loans. Id. In industries where initial capital
requirements are virtually nonexistent (selling flowers to motorists at stop-lights, for exam-
ple), the only earnings retained are likely to be foregone salary "plowed back" into the
enterprise. This, of course, technically violates our initial assumption of no donative financing,
because the founders are in effect contributing part of the wages to which they are entitled.
To get our altruistic commercial firm off the ground, therefore, we will probably have
to relax one of our initial assumptions a bit. The founders may have to attract an initial
infusion of donative financing, either through outright gifts or below-market loans. Or they
may initially have to provide some factor of production themselves at a below-market rate.
The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company founders, for example, initially worked
without salary, operated out of their home without paying themselves rent, and made sub-
stantial contributions. Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 743 F.2d
148, 151 (3d Cir. 1984). Significantly for present purposes, however, the relaxation of any
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In another sense, however, this was possible only through their
"contribution " of their entitlement to net revenues. Viewed from
either perspective, this much is clear: once the organization is set
up on a nonprofit basis, the net revenues that otherwise would have
been distributable to its founders are now committed to the pur-
poses for which the organization was created.'" Thus, the founders'
initial contribution of their potential earnings has an on-going as-
pect; the organization embodies their altruism. Moreover, as long
as it remains nonprofit, this element of altruism remains, even if all
other factors of production must be purchased at market prices.
Weak altruism offers an equally plausible account of the other
examples of commercial entrepreneurial nonprofits described
above. Closest to the shoe store example is Presbyterian and Re-
formed Publishing Co. The appellate court reviewing its creators'
purpose found no evidence indicating anything other than a desire
to promote consumption of a particular school of theological liter-
ature.'" Though prices were in most cases not set much, if any,
below those of for-profit competitors, net revenues were retained
for expansion of operations.' 46 In the ceramic cone case, the terms
of Mr. Orton's will provided that his foundation was to offer ceramic
cones at below the return-maximizing price explicitly to stimulate
of these assumptions suggests that commercial nonprofits must be more, not less, altruistic.
Not only must their founders forego entitlement to eventual profits, they may also have to
find or provide more direct forms of donative financing up front.
," The purpose need not, of course, be simply providing a particular good at the lowest
possible price relative to quality. The organization may also want to expand provision of its
product at a given price and quality. If so, it may use its net revenues for expansion rather
than solely to reduce the price it charges consumers. This seems to have been the strategy
of the controllers of Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, who used a substantial
portion of retained earnings to purchase a larger warehouse, Presbyterian Publishing, 743 F.2d
at 151. It may also have been the strategy of Intermountain Health Care, a regional health
care organization that apparently charged at or near market rates and used net revenues for
expansion of services and facilities. Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709
P.2d 265, 272-76 (Utah 1985). Expansion could permit the organization to achieve greater
economies of scale and thus to charge lower prices per unit in the longer run, but it need
not. It may simply be a means of providing the same good or service to a wider clientele at
the same price.
There is a darker prospect, however. If empire-building ambitions motivate nonprofit
managers, they may trade off operating efficiency for size, increasing size beyond the point
at which expansion begins to pay diminishing returns. This would result in a net increase in
the price consumers pay for the organization's product. Young, Entrepreneurship and the
Behavior of Nonprofit Organizations.' Elements of a Theory, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 33, at 161.
'" Presbyterian Publishing, 743 F.2d at 158.
' 40 1d. at 152, 156-58.
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consumption as a means of promoting research in Mr. Orton's
preferred field. ' 47
It is important, however, to note that the altruism that accounts
for these organizations is weak altruism. We cannot be sure that the
founders of commercial entrepreneurial nonprofits are not acting
ultimately out of a self-regarding preference, any more than we can
be sure in the case of contributors to donative nonprofits. God alone
(if anyone) knows whether the Craig family in founding Presbyter-
ian and Reformed Publishing Company and Carnegie in placing
organs in dozens of Presbyterian churches were trying to feather
their celestial nests or to further the interests of their fellowfolk.
All we can say with certainty is that both the founder and the donor
make a sacrifice in money or money's worth without material re-
ward. To assume—or insist—that each is taking his compensation
in another, non-material form is entirely consistent with the weak
form of altruism. 148
But, with respect to the founders of commercial entrepreneu-
rial nonprofits, can we say even that this much is invariably true? It
may well be objected that, although weak altruism is a plausible
account of the motives of nonprofit founders, it is no more neces-
sary an account than any of Hansmann's alternatives. As I said at
the outset, the founders of each of the organizations discussed may
have thought the good or service in question was being undercon-
1 " Edward Orton, Jr., Ceramic Foundation v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 147,199-50 (1971).
I" Thus, for example, in an appendix entitled "Signaling and Screening," HanSmann
posits that potential managers or entrepreneurs in a given service industry are of two types.
Hansmann, supra note 17, at 899-901. The first are "greedy"; they are "interested only in
money and will pursue whatever vocation [or, if they are entrepreneurs rather than managers,
whatever investment] pays the most." Id. at 899. The second are "craftsmanlike"; they are
"interested not only in money, but also in the quality of service produced by the institutions
they manage [or in which they invest]." Id. Each kind has equivalent opportunities for
employment, and in the case of entrepreneurs, investment, in other sectors. Id. The greedies
will thus work (or invest) in a nonprofit firm only if it offers compensation at least equal to
the expected monetary return on their labor or capital in alternative sectors. Id. The crafts-
person, on the other hand, will accept a lower monetary return if it is offset by a higher level
of quality. Id. This is, in Hansmann's terms, because "they take positive satisfaction in
operating a high-quality institution." Id.
Note, however, that whatever their subjective reason for accepting below-market com-
pensation may be, the fact remains that they do in fact accept it. This fact is all that "weak"
altruism insists on. As Weisbrod has observed,
One . . . element in a collective nonprofit's behavioral model appears to be the
preference of its manager entrepreneurs to accept lower-than-market returns
in exchange fir the utility from engaging personally in "public-interest," exter-
nal-benefit-generating activities. In effect, the manager-entrepreneurs of col-
lective nonprofits may be giving in-kind gifts.
Weisbrod, supra note 126, at 167 (footnote omitted).
May 1990]
	 NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
	 553
sumed, and they may have sought to remedy the problem by sub-
sidizing consumption. But, as Hansmann suggests, they may have
set up their organizations as hobbies, or as larks, or as thorns in the
flesh of capitalists. Undeniably, motives of nonprofit entrepreneurs
are notoriously varied and very often rnixed.' 49
 Is weak altruism,
then, just one among several plausible accounts of nonprofit entre-
preneurial commercial activity, an account that may be empirically
true in some cases but not necessarily true in any?
No. Whenever an organization with the potential to return
profit to its founders is set up on a nonprofit basis, the founders
have necessarily forgone that potential profit. Moreover, as long as
the organization continues to abide by the nondistribution con-
straint, its potential profits are available for subsidizing the pur-
chases of its patrons. This is not only true of the anomalous com-
mercial entrepreneurial nonprofits that are problematic for
Hansmann's contract failure theory, those that produce ordinary
private goods easily evaluated by the buyer. It is also true of those
that Hansmann's theory explains best, like hospitals, nursing homes,
and educational organizations, that provide complex goods and
services. Moreover, it is conceivable that such organizations could
exist in any industry in which the scale or capital-intensity produces
returns significantly above controllers' salaries.''')
But there are significant peculiarities about the inevitable altru-
ism I have identified, some theoretical, others practical. Unlike
Hansmann's contract failure theory, the weak altruism account does
not purport to be a causal explanation of why commercial entre-
preneurial nonprofits arise. Rather, and less ambitiously, it merely
points to a characteristic they share. But both entrepreneurial and
mutual donative nonprofits also share this characteristic, and it may
have important implications for their treatment under the federal
income tax.
Still on the theoretical side, it is important to emphasize the
relatively constrained conditions 'under which altruism is automatic
in commercial entrepreneurials. As I discussed earlier, there must
be the potential for the organization to return a net profit to found-
"9
 Dennis Young has extensively analyzed the motivations of nonprofit entrepreneurs
and has offered a detailed set of stereotypical motivation patterns. D. YOUNG, IF NOT FOR
PROFIT, FOR WHAT: A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR BASED ON ENTREPRE
NEURSHIP (1983); see also Young, supra note 144.
' 50
 See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919) (derivative
suit alleging, among other things, that Ford management was reducing distributions to
shareholders in order to benefit automobile consumers and others).
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ers above the costs of non-capital factors of production. Sometimes
the nature of an industry, or the structure of some firms within the
industry, will effectively preclude this possibility. As Hansmann
points out, this seems to be true of solo law practitioners and much
of the day-care industry.
On the practical side, this theoretically identifiable condition
may be difficult to identify and monitor in particular cases. The
requisite level of scale or capital intensity would have to be set
somewhat arbitrarily. The spectrum running from solo medical
practitioners through modest outpatient facilities to the Mayo Clinic
may have no radical breaks; the same may be true of the spectrum
that has struggling religious publishers on one end and large de-
nominational presses on the other. Once again, however, the ex-
tremes are fairly clear, as is the principle on the basis of which the
line in the middle would have to be drawn. Moreover, as we shall
see in section V, some nonprofits that clearly lie on the capital-
intense, large scale side of the line—hospitals, for example—are
being asked to justify their tax exempt status in terms of differences
from their for-profit counterparts.
2. Type 6 Organizations—Commercial Entrepreneurials
Operated for the Benefit of Non-Patrons
All the Type 7 organizations described above conferred their
benefits upon their customers in the form of below-market prices
subsidized by forgone profits. Hansmann's demand-side analysis of
entrepreneurial commercials suggests that customer benefit should
be their raison d'etre, on the theory that purchasers of complex
goods prefer to deal with nonprofits, which have no profit-moti-
vated incentive to overcharge. But Hansmann's nondistribution
constraint operates only negatively, to forbid the organization's con-
trollers from using such profits to materially benefit themselves, not
positively, to dictate those for whose benefit profits must be used.
Logically, the controllers could expend these profits to benefit
neither themselves nor the organizations' customers, but third par-
ties. These third parties might be consumers of a different good or
service provided by the same organization, as in the case of museum
gift shops that subsidize museum operations. Or they might be
consumers of the goods or services of another organization to which
the net revenues of the first are directed, like the students of New
York University's law school whose studies were in part underwrit-
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ten by the law school's pasta business.' 5 ' In either case, profits from
sales to the purchasers of the first product or service might be used
to subsidize those who consume the second.
Hansmann acknowledges this possibility and treats it as a threat
to the fundamental purpose of entrepreneurial nonprofits in at least
one context, that of the nonprofit hospital. Fairly commonly, he
points out, "profits derived from services provided to private-room
patients and to patients with relatively routine problems may be
used to help cover the costs of teaching, research, unusually expen-
sive forms of treatment, and services provided to indigent pa-
tients." 152 He finds several factors mitigating this departure from
direct consumer benefit—the benefitted class does not control the
organization and those who do control the organization do not
directly benefit.'" He notes, however, that the latter class—doctors
and hospital administrators—may indirectly benefit from cross-sub-
sidies, and he argues that in any case cross-subsidies are less prob-
lematic "if the patrons who are the source of the subsidy are aware
of its existence and have some choice about contributing to it." 54
These conditions of informed consent, he maintains, frequently do
not obtain in the hospital industry.' 55
As Hansmann readily concedes, however, these conditions do
obtain in other industries,'" and such cross-subsidization is fairly
common in nonprofits.' 57 Indeed, exploitative cross-subsidization
seems unlikely whenever the goods or services are easily evaluated
by the consumer and available from alternative suppliers.' 58 More-
over, cross-subsidization may involve an affirmative consumer pref-
erence. Consider an example. Assume that the Florida Museum of
Natural History and Tiffany's both have a Christmas catalogue, each
of which lists for the same price a reproduction mummy made by
C.F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 120,120-21 (3d Cir. 1951),
"2 Hansmann, supra note 129, at 560-61.
"2 Id, at 561.
15* Id. at 562.
152 Id.
156 Id. at 563.
122 EnMan, supra note 33, at 1027-28; we also, E. JAMES, CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION BY NON-
PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND EVALUATION (Yale University Institute for
Social and Policy Studies Program on Nonprofit Organizations Working Paper No. 30, 1982).
12" Ellman, supra note 33, at 1026-27. Ellinati argues that hospitals, on which Hansmann
bases much of his discussion of cross-subsidization, may well be a fairly unusual case, primarily
because a third party, either the government or a private insurer, frequently pays for the
services provided. Id. at 1031 n.72.
556	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 31:501
a particular artist. Also assume that the purchaser is not entitled to
a charitable deduction for any part of the purchase price paid the
museum.'" Finally, assume that the museum's catalogue sales rev-
enues are subject to federal income tax at the same rate as Tiffany's.
Why might some consumers prefer to buy the same item at the
same price from the museum? Quite rationally, they may prefer to
have the profits from the sale go to the museum, which they assume
will use them for subsidizing its museum operations and which, in
any case, is unable to distribute residual returns to controlling in-
dividuals.'"
3. Type 8 Organizations—Commercial Entrepreneurials
Operated for the Benefit of Controllers
Hansmann's discussions of cross-subsidization in both the hos-
pital and museum shop contexts explicitly assume that those who
control the organization do not use net receipts for their own ben-
efit.' 61
 Without this assumption, would it make sense to call such an
organization a nonprofit? In many respects, it would resemble a
garden-variety for-profit. Its revenues would come from commer-
cial, nondonative transactions and would be available for use by
those who control it. It lacks the obvious altruism of donatively
supported nonprofits; it also lacks the altruism characteristic of
Type 6 and 7 commercial nonprofits, in which controllers use sales
proceeds to benefit others. As we saw in connection with Type 2
organizations, however, altruism may lie in the socialization of assets
or the provision of public goods. And as we saw in connection with
Type 7 organizations, giving up entitlement to profits is in a sense
altruistic. The combination of these factors adds up to a measure
of altruism. An example of activities conducted within these con-
straints would be a church's Christmas bazaar that relied on sales
I" The reason for the denial of any charitable deduction is that the purchase price of
the reproduction mummy equals its fair market value, and thus contains no gift component.
See supra note 92 fur a discussion of the requirements fir making a tax-deductible gift.
' 60
 Hansmann offers a similar museum shop example and acknowledges both that pur-
chases from alternate, for-profit suppliers would involve a "profit" to cover an economically
competitive return on investment and that purchasers may consciously want to direct this
"profit" to charity. Hansmann, supra note 129, at 563. Hansmann views this as an innocuous
form of cross-subsidization on the theory that patrons implicitly consent or at least have
other alternative sources, though he expresses reservations about the tax exemption of their
receipts. Id. Ellman views the cross-subsidization in the case of museum shops as innocuous
because the transactions involve ordinary, easily evaluated consumer goods. Ellman, supra
note 33, at 1024-25.
161 Hansmann, supra note 129, at 561,563.
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to nonmembers to subsidize its members' benefits, if those benefits
either were public goods or were private goods distributed to in-
dividuals through a collective decision-making process.
E. Commercial Mutuals
—
Altruism and Beyond
In this category of nonprofits, Hansmann's fourth and last, the
mode of finance is the sale of goods or services, and the locus of
control is the purchasers. The locus of benefit issue divides this
category into two subspecies, commercial mutuals that operate for
the benefit of their patrons and those that operate for the benefit
of others. We will consider first the latter subspecies, which Hans-
mann tends to ignore.
1. Type 9 Organizations—Commercial Mutuals Operated for the
Benefit of Non-Patrons
Imagine a congregationally controlled church that operates a
book store where members can buy the great works of Calvinistic
theology. Like the controllers of Presbyterian and Reformed Pub-
lishing Company, the members of the church could use any net
revenues from the sale of books to expand their operation. Alter-
natively, like Hansmann's nonprofit shoe store entrepreneurs, they
could forego any such net profit by charging lower prices and thus
subsidizing the purchase of books. Or•—and this is the critical turn—
they could charge a market price, thus producing a margin of (non-
economic) profit that they could use to support missionary work or
a homeless shelter. If the members paid a competitive price for the
books, this would simply be another example of the "profit direc-
tion" we saw above in connection with museum shops. Books, in
fact, figure prominently in the wares of museum shops and, to
make the parallel closer, we can imagine a "church shop" that sells
not only books, but icons and other religious paraphernalia. The
key difference for purposes of the present analysis is that the mu-
seum shop is an entrepreneurial commercial; the church shop, a
mutual. The former sells primarily to others than those who control
it; the latter sells primarily to its members. The similarity is that
they both use the net revenues to benefit third parties; in that
respect, they are both altruistic.
Within the larger context of donative mutual nonprofits like
congregational churches, the use of such commercial operations to
tap members' willingness to direct profits for the benefit of others
is probably fairly common. Holiday bazaars for the benefit of the
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needy are an obvious example. Such operations need not, however,
be small, seasonal, or informal. The American Bar Endowment's
insurance program is an example of a large, lucrative, and highly
sophisticated operation that, but for these differences in scale, quite
resembles our church shop example.' 62
2. Type 10 Organizations—Commercial Mutuals Operated for
the Benefit of Patrons 163
Probably the more common locus of benefit in mutual com-
mercial nonprofits is, as Hansmann's discussion suggests, the pur-
chasers themselves. Hansmann has identified two distinct situations
in which purchasers might seek control. The first is simply the
"complex goods" form of contract failure. When, as we have seen
in connection with entrepreneurial commercials like hospitals, the
good or service provided is difficult for the purchaser to evaluate,
for-profit firms have an incentive to skimp, and purchasers will tend
to prefer nonprofit suppliers. According to Hansmann, organizing
the commercial provision of hard-to-evaluate goods and services in
a mutual, as opposed to an entrepreneurial, nonprofit gives patrons
an added measure of assurance that such information asymmetries
will not be exploited to their disadvantage.'" Thus, for example,
parents may seek this added assurance when they choose mutual
day care providers.' 65
Ira Ellman offers a significantly different account of mutual
day care.' 66
 According to Ellman, the parents who found a mutual
nonprofit day care center seek control of the organization not pri-
marily because they cannot monitor output, but rather because "it
would be difficult for the buyer to specify his preferences in ad-
vance, both because it would be administratively tedious to spell out
such detail in a contract and because the specific issues are difficult
62
 For a description of the program, see United States v. American Bar Endowment,
477 U.S. 105, 106-09 (1986). During the period in question, members of the American Bar
Association bought group insurance from the Endowment and contributed annual experience
rebates to the Endowment. The Endowment, a charitable organization exempt from federal
income tax under sections 501(a) and (c)(3) of the I.R.C., used the proceeds from the program
to underwrite research and law reform projects, primarily through grants to other charitable
organizations.
165
 As I describe in greater detail below, see infra notes 337-38 and accompanying text,
Type 10 Organizations overlap extensively with what Bittker and Randert call "mutual benefit
organizations." See Bittker and Randert, supra note 90, at 305.
' 64
 Hansmann, supra note 17, at 890-91.
165 Id.
166
 Ellman, supra note 33, at 1032-42.
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to anticipate." 1 " 7 Hansmann insists that this problem is just a special
case of contract failure,' 68 but Ellman seems to have the better view.
To be sure, one source of contract failure that Hansmann has
identified is consumers' inability, at reasonable cost, to "reach a clear
agreement with the chosen firm concerning the goods or services
that the firm is to provide and the price to be paid." 169 But Ellman's
point is not that there is no contract failure problem in the mutual
day care context. Rather, his point is that, in solving that problem,
mutual provision of the service is of far more importance than the
nondistribution constraint.
The nondistribution constraint primarily operates negatively,
to ensure that parents' payments are not siphoned off as extra
profits. It operates positively only to the limited extent of ensuring
that potential profits are in some way used within the day care
center. Thus, in Ellman's words,
The [entrepreneurial] nonprofit might spend more per
child on care, but do so in ways that the potential parent-
purchaser does not believe yield better day care. For ex-
ample, it might buy more expensive toys, but ones that
the parent thinks are undesirable; it might pay its staff
more, yet choose staff with a child care philosophy that
the parent opposes. In sum, the heightened fiduciary ob-
ligations called for by the contract failure model do not
serve the needs of parent-purchasers. 17"
According to Ellman, what the parents really want is "management
with good judgment and compatible values,"rn and to get what they
want, they need control of the service-providing organization. This
control is available through a mutual nonprofit, but not through
either a for-profit or an entrepreneurial nonprofit.'"
167 Id. at 1035. Ellman offers a similar explanation of social clubs. In that context as well,
according to Ellman, members are seeking to buy something that is hard to specify in advance.
Thus, "especially where members are concerned about intangible qualities, such as social
class, the members might be more confident that their goal will be served in a club run by a
member-chosen board than one run by outsiders seeking to maximize profits." Id, at 1046.
For a discussion of Hansmann's account of social clubs, see infra notes 173-74 and accom-
panying text.
1611 H. HANSMANN, supra note 55, at 19 n.32.
169 Hansmann, supra note 17, at 843.
170 Ellman, supra note 33, at 1034.
11 Id. at 1035.
172 This is not to say, however, that parents will not likely choose to operate under the
nondistribution constraint. They will, in Ellman's view, but not for the same reason as those
who found donative nonprofits. Donative nonprofits need the nondistribution constraint to
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Ellman's account of mutualized day care is an insightful cor-
rection of Hansmann's general account of commercial mutual non-
profits. It may, however, be limited to mutuals that produce know-
it-when-I-see-it products, goods or services the quality of which not
only lies in the eyes of the beholder, but cannot be adequately
described to others. This would leave Hansmann's theory intact as
to complex goods and services that the consumer is not personally
in a favorable position to assess, but that can be assessed by knowl-
edgeable experts in terms of objective criteria. Purchasers of day
care may place more confidence in their own judgment than in the
opinion of any conceivable body of experts; this is less likely to be
true of candidates for open heart surgery.
But mutual commercials, like entrepreneurial commercials, do
not always produce goods and services that are difficult for the
consumer to evaluate. Many produce garden-variety private goods
and services that are also available from for-profit suppliers. Hans-
mann's favorite example is social clubs, which provide many services
otherwise available from for-profit restaurants, hotels, and re-
sorts."3 Why do nonprofits arise in this context where the contract
failure theory would lead us to least expect them?
Hansmann concedes that such organizations are the one sig-
nificant exception to his contract-failure account of nonprofits. His
alternative explanation is that proprietors of highly exclusive clubs
have a degree of monopoly power that patrons try to avoid through
mutual provision of the same services. In any given geographic
area, Hansmann argues, social clubs will be stratified, with higher-
status individuals in higher-status, more exclusive clubs. This gives
the proprietors of the more exclusive clubs an opportunity to charge
assure their donors that equity investors will not skim off contributions; the founders of
mutual nonprofits, in F,Ilman's view, need the nondistribution constraint to ensure that they
themselves, not outside investors, control the organization. Id. at 1036-37.
Ellman does not explain why the desire to avoid interference by non-consumers in
management leads the founders of mutualized clay care providers to choose nonprofit status
rather than alternative means that might meet that concern equally well. They might, for
example, organize as a for-profit, restrict ownership of voting common stock to consumers
of the firm's services, and sell non-voting preferred stock to outside investors. A less distinct
but, for our purposes, more interesting alternative would be to organize as neither a for-
profit nor a nonprofit, but as a cooperative. This would allow cash rebated to consumer-
owners, not just the in-kind rebates that Ellman notes are available to members of mutual
benefit nonprofit organizations. Ellman, supra note 33, at 1037.
Ellman does mention that nonprofit organizations may enjoy more favorable tax status
and pay lower corporate filing fees, but he dismisses these advantages because they are "not
structural attributes of the nonprofit form ... ." Id. at 1036 n.80.
' 73 Hansmann, supra note 17, at 892.
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members a premium well above costs and thus to extract a monop-
oly profit by selling them their own high status. To avoid such
exploitation, members have an incentive to seek control of produc-
tion by organizing a mutual nonprofit.' 74
 Hansmann argues that
essentially the same phenomenon accounts for consumer coopera-
tives;' 75
 indeed, he maintains that nonprofits that arise in response
to the monopoly problem are the functional equivalent of consumer
co-ops.' 76
There is yet another explanation that accounts for some mutual
commercials, and perhaps for an aspect of all of them. This expla-
nation takes an important product of the organization to be the
mutuality of the enterprise itself, irrespective of any additional good
it purports to provide. Thus, according to Ellman,
For social clubs, the process of self-government itself may
be the goal. The meetings, elections, and discussions pro-
vide an occasion for socializing and a sense of joint enter-
prise, which might be the very thing the members seek to
buy.'"
And Hansmann concurs:
[T]he running of an organization may itself be a con-
sumption item of value to the organization's supporters.
The primary motivation for fraternal lodges, for example,
is probably just the camaraderie and diversion involved in
keeping them going; the ends ostensibly served by such
organizations often seem to be little more than an excuse
for setting them up. 178
Here again, we see that the primary purpose of some mutuals is
the benefit of their members in a way that hardly qualifies as al-
truistic."
'74 Id. at 893-94. Hausmann suggests that the same monopoly-avoidance phenomenon
may occur in other contexts that involve the key elements of exclusivity and stratification.
Other examples in the nonprofit area are hospital staffs and university faculties and student
bodies. Id. at 894.
For an elaboration of this and other circumstances under which consumer control of
production produces greater consumer welfare than purchasing from for-profit firms, see
Ben-Ner, Nonprofit Organizations: Why Do They Exist in Market Economies?, in THE ECONOMICS
OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, Supra note 33.
178 Hansmann, supra note 17, at 889-90.
17 " Id. at 893-94; H. HANSMANN, supra note 55, at 25.
177 Elltnan, supra note 33, at 1046.
178 Hansmann, supra note 17, at 891.
17D Moreover, we shall see infra at note 354 and accompanying text that mutualism can
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F. Type 10 Organizations as the Limiting Case of Nonprofit Status
Hansmann thus gives three plausible and compatible accounts
of why mutual commercial nonprofits arise; Ellman offers a fourth.
For the most part, these theories are complementary. 18° Moreover,
each of them takes account of a feature that distinguishes Type 10
organizations from all the other kinds of nonprofits we have ex-
amined: they arise and operate essentially for the benefit of their
members. Conversely, they lack an essential element of altruism in
any, of its various manifestations. First, Type lOs provide their
members with ordinary consumer goods, not public goods, payment
for which necessarily subsidizes others' consumption. Furthermore,
Type 10 organizations provide ordinary private goods without sig-
nificant elements of socialization; the level of goods and services
that members are entitled to receive is directly related to what they
pay, not contingent on either a collective decision-making process
or the level of others' payments. Finally, Type 10 organizations
involve no redistributive transfers, either in the form of donations
(as with Type 1, 3, and 4 nonprofits), foregone profits (as with Type
7), or cross-subsidization (as in Type 6).
Although they lack altruism, Type 10 organizations are never-
theless nonprofit, and in a way that casts important light on the
essence of nonprofit status. Here the non-distribution constraint is
at its weakest—net revenues are being used for the benefit of those
who control the organization. But this still means that the mutual-
ized day care center operates differently from a for-profit alterna-
tive, in two ways. The more obvious, but less significant, difference
is the form in which the organization's benefits are conferred with-
out compensation on its controllers. The nonprofit day care center
may only distribute benefits to its members, who are by hypothesis
be seen as a socially desirable attribute of Type 10 organizations, quite apart from the
satisfaction members derive from them.
18" As Hansmann points out, Ellman's basic disagreement with him is less about the role
of commercial mutual nonprofits than about the proper structuring of nonprofit corporation
statutes to ensure that they fulfill that role. According to Hausmann, commercial mutuals
that arise in response to contract failure should operate under the same strict fiduciary
constraints as donative nonprofits. constraints that basically mirror traditional charitable trust
law. According to Ellman, such strict constraints are an unnecessary impediment. In his view,
the members of commercial mutuals themselves will keep the managers in line. Nonprofit
corporation law only has to "ensure that the members actually control the corporation" by
"guarantee[ing] some minimal level of member democracy." Ellman, supra note 33, at 1041.
For our purposes, the critical point is that both Hansmann's and Ellman's descriptive accounts
emphasize that Type 10 organizations are designed and operated to benefit their members.
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its controllers, in kind.'" More or better day care is what these
members get. By contrast, those who control a for-profit day care
center are entitled to receive its net revenues in cash.
The second, and more significant, difference between mutual
commercial nonprofits and for-profits is in the locus of their ben-
efits. Both for-profits and Type 10 nonprofits are operated for the
benefit of their controllers; the interesting locus of benefit issue is
the relationship of their purchasers and their controller-beneficia-
ries. The ultimate beneficiaries of for-profit firms, their owners,
derive their net profits from sales to third parties. Any identity
between owners of a for-profit firm and purchasers of its products
is purely accidental; owners of a for-profit day care center may
place their own children in their company's care, or they may use
the profits from the firm to hire themselves nannies.
In Type 10 organizations, by contrast, the classes of purchasers
and controller-beneficiaries are necessarily the same. As in for-profit
firms, the net benefits ultimately come from purchasers of the good
or service the organization provides, in the form of the excess of
sales revenues over the cost of all factors of production. But in the
case of the Type 10 organization, these net benefits return to their
source. In that way, they are more like rebates than profits. Thus,
to return to the day care example, any excess of revenues over costs
redounds to the benefit of the parents who patronize the nonprofit,
rather than to owners, as in the for-profit.' 82
We have thus identified two differences between Type 10 mu-
tual commercial nonprofits and for-profits: first, the form in which
the controlling group receives net benefits and second, the relation-
ship between the controlling group and the organization's purchas-
ers. These two differences also provide useful criteria for compar-
ing Type 10 organizations and for-profits with two other forms of
organization, consumer cooperatives and producer cooperatives.'"
"I Ellman makes the same point in a somewhat different connection. Ellman, supra note
33, al. 1037. In his view, mutual benefit nonprofits share with donative nonprofits the
nondistribution constraint, but for a very different reason. For donatives, the nondistribution
constraint is part of a larger package of rules essentially designed to attract contributions by
barring self-dealing. For mutuals, the same constraint is part of a package of rules intended
to ensure consumer control, which for Ellman is the essence of mutual benefit organizations.
Id.: see supra note 172 fOr a further discussion of the nondistribution constraint in mutual
benefit organizations.
182 As we shall see in notes 343-47 and accompanying text, infra, it is this feature that
some commentators see as the basis of Type 10 organization's tax exemption.
1 10 This comparison takes us a bit afield of our primary focus, altruistic nonprofits, and
thus deserves an explanation. Hansmann and Ellman, from whose debate on mutual corn-
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Like Type 10 nonprofits but unlike for-profits, consumer cooper-
atives demonstrate an identity of controller-beneficiaries and pur-
chasers; consumer co-ops distribute their net revenues to patrons
in the form of either rebates or lower prices. The only significant
difference between consumer co-ops and Type 10 organizations is
the form in which these net revenues are distributable to patrons.
Consumer co-ops may make distributions in cash; Type 10 orga-
nizations must make them in kind.'"
Why, then, is the mutual nonprofit form chosen in some con-
texts and the cooperative in others? Hansmann suggests several
reasons. Because some mutual organizations may never have a need
to make cash distributions, the cooperative form would offer them
no advantages. Also, owing to the peculiar evolution of cooperatives
in this country, the laws of some states may not permit certain kinds
of activities, including social clubs, to be organized on a cooperative
basis. Finally, the nonprofit form may in some cases confer tax
advantages. 185
Producer co-ops, by contrast, much more closely resemble for-
profit firms. Both may make cash distributions to their controller-
beneficiaries; in this they resemble consumer co-ops. The critical
difference between consumer co-ops and Type 10 nonprofits on
the one hand and producer co-ops and for-profits on the other is
the relationship between their patrons and their controller-benefi-
ciaries. The classes of patrons and controller-beneficiaries are sep-
mercial nonprofits I have derived much of my own discussion of this kind of nonprofit,
differ sharply on the descriptive issue of the extent to which these organizations serve the
same functions as cooperatives and on the normative issue of the degree to which they should
he governed by similar fiduciary standards. Ellman, supra note 33, at 1047-49; EI. HANSMANN,
.supra note 55, at 29-36. Ellman is essentially agnostic about the role of consumer cooperatives.
Ellman,supra note 33, at 1097. Hansmann describes them as essentially a monopoly-avoidance
mechanism. Hansmann, supra note 17, at 889-90.
I take up the descriptive issue here to place nonprofits—both altruistic and mutual
benefit—in a larger institutional context as groundwork for my discussion below of a different
normative question, the basis for the tax exemption of nonprofit organizations..
S" This is a slight oversimplification. It is an oversimplification because, as Hansmann
points out, sonic state statutes allow cooperatives to make distributions of net revenues to
contributors of capital. Hansmann, supra note 17, at 889. But it is only a slight oversimplifi-
cation, because such statutes usually limit the rate of return to capital investors. ld. Thus, as
Hansmann concludes, "the typical [consumer] cooperative is a limited-profit enterprise so
far as investors of capital are concerned; earnings in excess of the amounts distributable to
investors must be reinvested or returned to patrons." Id.
185 Id. at 893. The last of these reasons for choosing nonprofit status—tax advantages—
raises two further questions: first, why should mutual nonprofits enjoy an advantageous tax
status; and second, why should they enjoy a more advantageous status than cooperatives, if
the two are functionally so similar? I address the first of these issues in section V.
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arate in both producer co-ops and for-profits and identical in both
consumer co-ops and Type 10 nonprofits. Like for-profits, producer
co-ops derive their revenues from sales to a class of purchasers who
are not necessarily coterminous with the class of those who receive
the benefits of the organizations' net profits. Just as an owner of a
for-profit day care center need never purchase its child care ser-
vices, so a member of the Maui Macadamia Marketing Cooperative
need not eat cocktail nuts. 186
G. Summary—A Taxonomy of Nonprofits in Terms of Altruism
In this section we have seen that adding a third factor, the locus
of benefits that nonprofits provide, to Hansmann's two factors,
means of finance and locus of control, produces a ten-part division
of the nonprofit world. That world consists of two hemispheres,
mutual benefit nonprofits and altruistic nonprofits. The defining
characteristic of mutual nonprofits (Type 10) is the sale of private
goods to members.
By contrast, the essence of altruistic organizations is the con-
ferring of uncompensated benefits. The role of altruism is clearest
in donative organizations that benefit a class other than their mem-
bers, whether control is in the hands of donors themselves (Type
I" What then, distinguishes for-profits front producer co-ops, if they are alike in terms
of the two criteria 1 have identified? First of all, 1 do not mean to suggest that these two
criteria capture all relevant distinctions among non-altruistic organizations. To suggest a
more complex classification scheme would he beyond the scope of ibis paper; I address the
various differences of non-altruistic firms primarily to cast light on the nature of altruistic
firms. There is, however, one salient difference between for-profits and producer co-ops that
warrants mentioning here. For-profit firms seem generally to involve a relatively greater
degree of vertical integration. See Krashinsky, supra note 60, at 123 (discussing trade associ-
ations as a form of partial vertical integration to perform limited functions).
One plausible reason for this partial vertical integration, which nicely complements
Hansmann's monopoly avoidance theory of consumer co-ops, is that producers sometimes
face monopsonists at the distributional phase. If this is true, then the adage that farmers buy
at retail and sell at wholesale, I.R.S. Exempt Organizations Handbook (I.R.M. 7751)
§ (44)12(1) (1989), would more accurately be phrased in terms of their buying from monop-
olists (or oligopolists) and selling to monopsortists (or oligopsonists). See Baumer, Masson, &
Masson, Curdling the Competition: An Economic and Legal Analysis of the Antitrust Exemption for
Agriculture, 31 L. REV. 183, 185 (1980); Porter & Schully, Economic Efficiency in Cooper-
atives, 30 J. L. & Econr. 489, 489 (1987); Comment, Agricultural Cooperatives: Price-Fixing and
the Antitrust Exemption, 11 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 537, 537-38 (1978). Ben-Ner has explained a
different kind of producer cooperative, "an organization controlled by member-workers who
share profits among themselves," differently: "workers own and control capital in order to
increase their welfare by internalizing the conflicts of interest between labor and owners of
firms." Ben-Ner, Producer Cooperatives: Why Do They Exist in Capitalist Economies?, in THE.
NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 2, at 434.
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4), beneficiaries (Type 3), or third parties (Type 1). Altruism can
also be found in both entrepreneurial (Type 2) and mutual (Type
5) donatives that benefit the donors themselves, but only under very
special circumstances. Either the benefits must be in the form of
public goods, as with listener-sponsored radio, or individual donors'
receipt of benefits must be independent of their gifts, as in the case
of needy congregants who receive their churches' relief without
regard to their own contributions. Even though, in the latter case,
the benefits provided are private goods, the provision is "socialized."
Altruism is not limited to donative nonprofits. Entrepreneurial
commercials—commercials not controlled by those who purchase
their products—can confer uncompensated benefits either on their
own customers, in the form of lower prices or higher quality (Type
7), or on third parties, in the form of cross-subsidization (Type 6).
Genuinely nonprofit hospitals are examples of the former; NYU's
operation of the Mueller Macaroni Company illustrates the latter.'"
As we saw in the case of Type 8 organizations, an entrepreneurial
commercial can also use the proceeds of its sales for the benefit of
its controllers. But for such an organization to be altruistic, the
benefits would have to be either public goods or socialized private
goods. Finally, mutual commercial organizations exhibit altruism if
9they use the proceeds from their sales to member-controllers to
benefit others, as arguably occurs on a small scale in church bazaars
and a large scale in the American Bar Endowment's insurance
program (Type 9).
IV. THE NEED FOR ALTRUISTIC ORGANIZATIONS
The previous section examined the role of altruism in a range
of nonprofit organizations. Focusing on the locus of benefits they
provide, I identified nine kinds of altruistic nonprofits and com-
pared altruistic nonprofits generally with other nonprofit organi-
zations, and with consumer co-ops, producer co-ops, and for-profit
firms. With respect to donative nonprofits, we had little difficulty
discovering altruism on the demand side, in the fact that those who
pay for the goods that such organizations provide are willing to let
others enjoy them. To discover the role of altruism in commercial
nonprofits, however, we had to look to the supply side, to the
potential profits foregone by the founders of the organization. And
we saw that even donative nonprofits can be characterized as supply-
"7 C.F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 120, 121 (3d Cir. 1951).
May 1990]
	 NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
	 567
side phenomena, with ordinary donors giving fungible dollars that
organizations use to purchase various factors of production.
In this section we will look at several other supply-side aspects
of altruistic nonprofits, aspects that occur in all categories of altruis-
tic nonprofits. The first of these is the altruistic supply of capital;
the second is the integration of altruistic undertakings, both hori-
zontally and vertically. These supply-side phenomena shed helpful
light on the importance of the kinds of altruistic nonprofits we have
already examined, those engaged in the provision of goods and
services. In addition, they also illuminate the role of private foun-
dations, altruistic nonprofits whose principle role is to provide cap-
ital to other nonprofits rather than to produce goods and services
themselves.
The purpose of this section, however, is neither to give a com-
prehensive supply-side account of altruistic nonprofits nor to ex-
plain the mainsprings of altruistic supply.' 88 It is, rather, to show
how altruistic organizations help overcome several obstacles that
individual altruists face. Thus, having in the last part seen that
many different kinds of nonprofits embody altruism, we will in this
part examine why the institutional role of altruism is important.
Beyond that, we will see why the two other sectors of modern
western economies, the governmental sector on the one hand and
the private for-profit sector on the other, do not provide adequate
institutional vehicles for altruism. This discussion is a critical foun-
dation for section V, in which we examine the policy bases for
granting altruistic nonprofits favorable tax treatment.
A. General Supply-Side Phenomena
To understand the importance of altruistic institutions, it is
necessary to look at two of their supply-side aspects in some detail.
1. Altruistic Provision of Capital
Hansmann's CARE example is a useful starting place for ex-
ploring the altruistic supply of capital. Consider more closely the
components of what the altruistic purchaser from CARE is really
paying for. As Hansmann points out:
I88
 For more ambitious efforts along these lines, see E. JAMES & S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra
note 8, at 25-26; ALTRUISM, MORALITY AND ECONOMIC THEORY Part III (E. Phelps ed. 1975);
Amos, Empirical Analysis of Motivations Underlying Individual Contributions to Charity, 10 ATLAN-
TIC ECON. J. 45, 45-47; Young, supra note 144.
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All nonprofit organizations, just like profit-seeking orga-
nizations, ultimately must cover the full economic costs of
all resources they consume, including .both the cost of
labor and all other variable inputs and a reasonable return
on any capital employed in their activities. There is no
magic by which a nonprofit can produce a service at a
lower cost than can a for-profit firm. 189
The disaster relief industry is no exception. Transporting foodstuffs
overseas certainly requires the use of a fair amount of capital in the
form of ships and warehouses, whether these are owned by the
nonprofit relief organization itself or by for-profit firms that per-
form discrete parts of the delivery process on a contractual basis.
As Hansmann explains, "[c]apital, like these other factors of pro-
duction [labor and supplies], is necessary to produce the organiza-
tion's services, and must be paid for in the absence of sufficiently
generous gifts of capital." 1 °0
The contract failure theory does not deal with donated capital
or with those who provide it. That theory, by Hansmann's own
description, is essentially a demand-side account, an explanation of
why purchasers of certain goods and services prefer to buy from
nonprofits. We have already seen that CARE's provision of goods
can be viewed from the supply side by comparing CARE's donors
to free suppliers of the variable inputs of production and CARE's
recipients to purchasers to whom production is allocated on the
basis of need rather than ability to pay. The founding of CARE is
even more readily re-characterized in supply-side terms; the more
appropriate comparison of CARE's initial funders is not to consum-
ers of shipping services, but to Aristotle Onassis. In Hansmann's
demand-side characterization, what the prospective customers of
both for-profit and nonprofit carriers are considering is a purchase.
Viewed from the supply-side, by contrast, CARE's initial funders,
like the Greek Tycoon, are considering an investment. But what a
different kind of investment it is. Putting complex issues of psy-
chology aside again,I 9 ' the available evidence suggests that Onassis
159 Hansmann, supra note 17, at 880.
19° Hansmann, supra note 129, at 564 (emphasis added). This point was well put in a
dissenting opinion in Utah County: "A for-profit hospital, unlike a nonprofit•hospital, must
necessarily price its services to make a profit on its investment if it is to stay in business."
Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265, 285 (Utah 1985) (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
' 91 For a fuller account—or a less curt dismissal—of issues of mental states and motiva-
tion, see supra notes 78-90 and accompanying text.
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invested his capital where he thought (apparently with a fair degree
of accuracy) it would pay him the highest monetary return. CARE's
funders "invest" in a shipping concern that, as a matter of law, can
pay no dividends whatsoever. We cannot, as we have noted before,
be sure what their subjective motives are, much less whether they
are wholly selfless. But we can be sure that they are not going to
receive a market return on their investment, 19  which thus manifests
at least weak altruism. This altruism enables firms with donated
capital to work a kind of magic; they can produce a given good or
service more cheaply than an equally efficient for-profit firm be-
cause they can avoid the cost of one factor of production, capital.' 93
2. Integration
The case of CARE also provides insights into another supply-
side phenomenon that Hansmann's contract failure theory does not
'"2 As the Virginia Supreme Court noted in connection with gifts to nonprofit hospitals:
"The citizens who contributed to the hospitals can never get a return in money from their
contributions. The charters of the corporations do not permit it, and the donors do not
expect it." City of Richmond v. Richmond Memorial Hosp., 202 Va. 86, 91, 116 S.E.2d 79,
82 (1960).
193 It is thus possible and, for some analytic purposes, useful, to distinguish between, on
the one hand, those who "purchase" particular goods and services for others from organi-
zations like CARE arid the Red Cross and, on the other, those who provide free capital to
such organizations. The distinction may, indeed, have practical importance to the organiza-
tion in its fund-raising activities. See Elnan, supra note 33, at 1014 n.37. Some contributors
may prefer to pay for the delivery of food rather than for the capital improvements necessary
to get the food delivered, and thus may be especially responsive to an appeal that indicates
how much food a particular contribution will provide. See Hansmann, supra note 17, at 846
n.40.
Some donations to colleges are for "annual funds" that cover current expenses; others
arc made in explicit response to capital fund drives of the school or are earmarked for
specific capital improvements by the donor. Some contributions to religious membership
organizations are designated for feeding the hungry; others are expressly for fellowship halls
and activity busses, stained glass windows and air conditioning units. See Bittker & Randert,
supra note 90, at 313-14 (comparing the Church of Gospel, which supports mendicant
missionaries, with the Church of the Adoration, which underwrites basilicas and reliquaries).
We should be careful, however, not to make too much of the dichotomy between altruistic
"purchasers" and altruistic "investors." Many coins in the collection plate and many checks
to the alumni office are for no designated purpose. Rather, donors make such donations
with the implicit expectation that the donee organization will use them as it sees fit for its
announced purposes. Some relief organizations—Save the Children, for example—indicate
in their promotional material that contributions go primarily to provide infrastructure and
community development rather than short-term relief. Endowed chairs and scholarships are
in some ways hybrids, analogous to long term investments with earnings committed, respec-
tively, to covering current expenses and to purchasing current output. The critical point is
that both altruistic "purchasers" and altruistic "investors" are donors; their common altruism
lies in the Fact that they are making a payment to an organization for the benefit of third
parties.
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address, the need . of nonprofit organizations' founders to integrate
both horizontally and vertically. In describing why those who wish
to provide disaster relief would rather patronize a nonprofit firm
than a for-profit, Hansmann ignores a logically prior question: why
does each of them not simply put together a private relief expedi-
tion? The fairly obvious answer is that the costs would be prohibi-
tively high for many prospective donors acting individually. That
raises the more interesting question of how these costs can be low-
ered. At least a partial answer is horizontal integration. The aggre-
gate costs of a joint effort will predictably be far less than the sum
of the costs of individual efforts, for several reasons. Fixed costs—
locating the needy foreigners, procuring any necessary export doc-
uments, and researching the relative merits of competing shipping
lines, for example—can be shared. In addition, pooling resources
may make economies of scale obtainable, One secretary, for exam-
ple, could make the same arrangements for a large shipment of
rice by many donors as for a small shipment by a few, and for-profit
carriers may well offer more favorable rates per bushel than per
bowl.
Altruistic entrepreneurs may find vertical integration advan-
tageous as well, just as for-profit entrepreneurs do. The controllers
of CARE, for example, may find not only that they can ship a larger
volume at a lower per unit cost, but also that they can save by
owning and operating their own cargo vessels rather than contract-
ing with for-profit shippers. Presumably contract failure of the kind
Hansmann describes for CARE's potential donors is not a significant
factor in that decision. CARE can have its agents in the port of
disembarcation to ensure that the goods are not only delivered, but
also delivered "as, when, and where' specified."'" The decision,
rather, will turn on whether CARE has the necessary capital and
whether it can operate ships more cost-effectively than it can con-
tract out for that service. The latter would depend on the relative
cost of CARE's operating the ships and the alternative investments
available for CARE's capital. It would make little economic sense,
for example, for CARE to operate its own ships if it could invest
the same capital in government bonds and purchase a higher vol-
ume of equal quality shipping services from for-profit firms, which
would be the case if for-profit firms were in fact more efficient.' 95
194 Hansmann, supra note 17, at 847.
199 This assumes, of course, that CARE is in fact devoted to producing the greatest
amount of relief service at the least cost. It is by no means certain, as the behavior theorists
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To return to an earlier point, similar considerations might lead
CARE to consider partial horizontal integration—jointly owning
and operating a transport ship with Save the Children, for exam-
ple. tss
B. The Need for Distinct Vehicles for Altruistic Investment
We have thus seen that altruistic investors may have economi-
cally sound reasons for seeking to integrate their activities on behalf
of others. To be cost-effective, altruism sometimes needs an insti-
tutional form. We shall now consider whether it needs a distinct
form or whether for-profit firms on the one hand or government
on the other provides an adequate institutional vehicle for individ-
ual altruism.
1. The Problem with For-Profit Firms
In section III, we saw that nonprofit and for-profit firms often
provide the same kinds of goods and services. In this section, we
have seen that all firms, whether nonprofit or for-profit, must cover
point out, that this is in fact how nonprofits invariably operate. See sources cited in note 8,
supra. Thus, for example, if CARE's principals were motivated by the empire-building aspi-
rations that Young has identified, see Young, supra note 144, at 167, 181, they might invest
in tangible assets like ships even if vertical integration were not a cost-effective measure
judged by the criterion of output maximization.
195 In a related vein, Michael Krashinsky emphasizes that both nonprofit and for-profit
firms are a response to transaction costs associated with uncertainty. He notes that "[On
simple microeconotnic theory, there are no transaction costs and, as a result, no need for
any organizations." In that frictionless world, contractual devices suffice to bring factors of
production together. But:
Of course, in an uncertain world, continual contracting and assembling of
factors is expensive. Uncertainty makes contracts expensive by requiring a
provision for complex contingencies and by opening the way for opportunistic
behavior when unanticipated contingencies occur.... [V]ertical integration may
then become an attractive. In other words, transaction costs are significant and
give rise to for-profit firms as way to reduce those costs,
Krashinsky, supra note 60, at 115 (citation omitted), These costs, according to Krashinsky,
are primarily among factors of production. He criticizes Hansmann and other market failure
theorists of nonprofits for describing the transaction costs that nonprofits characteristically
address—transaction costs between producers and consumers, and among consumers—as
"unusual and requitting] special treatment." Id. at 115. He himself, however, seems to agree
that these latter kinds of transaction costs are distinguishable from those that typically give
rise to for-profit firms, and he offers no reason why they do not warrant separate, if not
"special," treatment.
The point is that, quite aside from the role Hansmann shows nonprofit firms play in
addressing distinct demand side problems between producers and purchasers, such firms
also have a critical role in the cost-effective provision of goods and services altruistically.
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the cost of capital as a factor of production and that both for-profit
and nonprofit firms are frequently more efficient means of orga-
nizing production than simple contractual devices among individ-
uals. These similarities raise a question: Could for-profit firms serve
as an adequate vehicle for altruistic investment?' 97
Before we attempt to answer this question, we must first ex-
amine what such investments would be designed to achieve. Unlike
ordinary investors,' 98
 altruistic investors are not concerned with
receiving the maximum return on their capital themselves. Rather,
an altruistic investor wants to provide a firm with cost-free capital
in the expectation that the firm will pass this cost savings on to the
consumers of its output in the form of lower prices or higher quality
at the same price. Thus, for example, our altruistic alumni donor
wanted to put liberal education within the budgets of the next
generation of students. The question is whether altruistic invest-
ments in for-profits can be structured to ensure that this pass-
through occurs. What the altruistic investor needs is an enforcible
commitment from the managers of the for-profit firm that they will
use the impUted return on her donated capital to subsidize con-
sumption.
In some industries, the feasibility of such an arrangement with
for-profit firms may be moot. There will likely be no for-profit
entities at all, and little likelihood of creating them, in industries
that exhibit the demand-side contract failure that Hansmann de-
scribes. Prospective for-profit suppliers of famine relief and listener-
sponsored radio simply will not be able to give ordinary donors the
necessary assurances as to the ultimate destination of their gifts.
The donated dollars such organizations need to cover their variable
costs will for that reason go to CARE and to nonprofit broadcasters.
The matter stands somewhat differently, however, in industries
affected by Hansmann's third form of contract failure, which results
from the sale of complex goods and services. As Hansmann points
out, nonprofit organizations that supply such products frequently
197
 Hansmann considers the converse question—under what conditions could nonprofit
firms serve as vehicles for ordinary investment?—in Hansmann, supra note 129, at 564-67.
' 91
 "Ordinary investor" is perhaps not the logical term to contrast investors who seek to
maximize return to themselves with those who let others use their capital without expectation
of personal return. But the terms that better underscore the contrast with altruism—"selfish"
and "egoistic," for example—carry too tendentious a connotation of moral disfavor. And
"ordinary" does have something positive to recommend it on purely descriptive grounds.
Most of us, most of the time, are concerned with investing for our private gain rather than
for the good of unrelated others.
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have for-profit competitors, presumably because some consumers
feel themselves able to evaluate such goods well enough to buy them
from for-profits. To reach those who, lacking this confidence, pa-
tronize nonprofits, suppliers of cost-free capital would presumably
have to operate through nonprofit firms.
But what if the altruistic capital suppliers are indifferent to this
characteristic of the consumers they subsidize? They may want to
subsidize not just unsophisticated consumers of complex health care
services, but all consumers. Beyond that, what if, as in the case of
the founders of Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company'"
and Orton Ceramics, 2" they wish to subsidize the consumption of
ordinary consumer goods that anyone can evaluate? Why, in these
circumstances, cannot altruistic capital suppliers work through for-
profit providers? Any such arrangement, of course, would present
monitoring problems similar to those of Hansmann's separation-of-
purchaser-from-consumer form of contract failure. Yet these prob-
lems are more serious for capital suppliers, for several reasons.
Consider the case of a prospective capital donor to a school.
She basically wants to subsidize the students' educations through a
one million dollar capital infusion to the institution. Education is
essentially a private good, and its quality is relatively easy to monitor,
if not by students themselves, then by their parents, high school
guidance counselors, and accreditation bodies. The donor's general
wish is that students be the actual beneficiaries of her gift, but she
is indifferent as to whether the subsidy comes in the form of low-
ering present costs or increasing quality at the same cost. Indeed,
she is even willing to have the money benefit the students fairly
indirectly, as by the enhanced reputation the school will acquire if
its faculty are encouraged to publish with inducements like bonuses
and research leaves. Her only condition is that the subsidy continue
in perpetuity; in other words, that the recipient spend only the gift's
income, not its principal. In a nonprofit school, of course, this would
be a fairly routine—not to say unappreciated—addition to endow-
ment.
If given to a for-profit school, by contrast, this donation would
present several problems for the donor. Some of these are common
to the kind of donors Hansmann describes in his contract failure
account of donative nonprofits; others are peculiar to donors of
' 99
 Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 743 F.2d 148,151 (3d
Cir. 1984).
2°°
 Edward Orton, jr„ Ceramic Foundation v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 147,149-50 (1971).
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capital. Like the donor to CARE, the school donor faces the pros-
pect of having her entire donation siphoned off as additional profits
to the donee organization's ordinary investors. The skimming prob-
lem for the school donor, however, has an on-going aspect. Not
only must she ensure that her donation is not initially skimmed; she
must also ensure that each year the real or imputed income from
that donation goes to the appropriate recipients.
The solution to the first of these problems seems easier in the
case of the school donor. She can minimize the risk that the capital
itself will be paid out as increased profits by requiring that it be set
aside in a separate account. This, however, only ensures that capital
is not skimmed, not that its income is passed on in the form of
lower prices or higher product quality. For-profit investors may
simply withdraw an equal amount of their own capital and continue
delivering the same quality and quantity of education, at the same
price. Unless the donor takes steps to prevent this, she will in effect
have given the school's ordinary investors an annuity equal to the
present value of the return they will make on the capital in its
designated use.
There are, of course, steps that can be taken to prevent this,
but none of them is entirely satisfactory. The donor could, for
example, require that her capital contribution be spent on an ad-
dition to the physical plant that she is reasonably certain the for-
profit management would not otherwise undertake. 20 ' This would
prevent ordinary investors from withdrawing an equal amount of
their own capital. But it would still not ensure that the return on
her capital would go to students rather than to ordinary investors,
who might simply charge the same price for a service that they can
now provide at a lower cost. Moreover, expansion of the physical
plant may not be what the donor believes the institution needs to
undertake, and it might in fact be inefficient as well. In economic
parlance, marginal returns on adding more plant at the existing
level of other factors of production may have diminished to the
point at which each dollar of additional plant is now producing less
than an additional dollar of output.
Alternatively, the donor could require that income from the
endowment be spent in a way that necessarily subsidizes consump-
tion, as by providing scholarships. In this way, the capital gift to the
201
 See Ellman, supra note 33, at 1014 n.37.
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school in effect becomes a series of ordinary gifts to particular
students. Instead of buying output for a third party from time to
time, as the ordinary donor to CARE does, the capital donor who
establishes a scholarship fund will have set up a mechanism to do
the same thing automatically and perpetually. As Hansmann sug-
gests in connection with the CARE case, this will work as long as
the donor (or her agents) can monitor the delivery of the good or
service to the third party at reasonable cost. In the case of free
tuition to students at domestic institutions, the monitoring costs
should not be unduly high. 202
But even so, this may be a decidedly second-best solution. If
the school already provides some scholarships, perhaps to enhance
its reputation by "buying" capable but indigent students, the donor's
funds may simply displace funds that were already being spent on
free education, resulting in no increased output. 2" The donor could
perhaps solve this problem by getting a commitment from the in-
stitution to maintain its own funding at prior levels. 204 But even if
this worked, a more fundamental problem would remain. What the
donor primarily wants may be a flexible usufructuary gift to be
applied for the benefit of students in the way that those best suited
to know student needs at any particular time think best. What is
more, the donor may think that those with the best insights into
student needs are those who govern the school. A donor of this
mind needs to be able to make the kind of general endowment gift
that we have seen would create severe monitoring problems if the
donee organization were a for-profit firm.
I have chosen the school example because education is an in-
dustry which provides essentially private goods and yet one in which
general purpose donative capital financing—endowments—is com-
mon. Hospitals provide a similar example, though in that industry
endowments now play a less significant role than formerly. Analyt-
ically similar problems would arise in any industry in which for-
profit firms supply a good or service that donors would like to
202 Hansmann has shown that subsidies through for-profit firms present fewer problems
where the subsidizer can deal directly with the ultimate recipients, as by providing them with
redeemable coupons for the good or service subsidized. Under such a•voucher system, the
dunces themselves can monitor delivery. Hansmann, supra note 17, at 848. This does, of
course, impose on donors the cost of locating and dealing with the ultimate donees.
m° El!man, supra note 33, at 1013-14.
2" See infra notes 233-34 and accompanying text for a further consideration of this
possibility in connection with private foundations.
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subsidize with capital contributions. As we saw in connection with
our discussion of Type 7 organizations, this could in principle in-
clude any capital-intense industry. 205
Thus, if altruistic individuals want to obtain the advantages of
integration that we discussed above, they will find that for-profit
firms do not provide an adequate institutional vehicle. Moreover—
and significantly, for our purposes—for-profit firms will pose prob-
lems not only in industries affected by the kinds of market failure
Hansmann describes, but in all industries, at least for general pur-
pose capital grants.
2. The Problem with Government
The government is a fairly obvious alternative to private, for-
profit suppliers in the case of at least one of the three primary
forms of contract failure Hansmann identifies, the problem of pub-
lic goods, goods that tend to be under-supplied in the market be-
cause their producers cannot prevent those who do not pay for
them from enjoying them. Lighthouses and national defense are
classic examples. Government, unlike for-profit firms, has a means
of addressing the free-rider phenomenon—levying taxes to pay for
collective-consumption goods. Indeed, this is a widely accepted role
of government. 206
 Moreover, government's acceptable role now in-
cludes not only this efficiency-justified job, but also at least a mea-
sure of wealth redistribution as well. And modern governments
supply a number of goods and services that have little or no public
good, or collective consumption, component. Is government, then,
an adequate alternative to nonprofit organizations as an institutional
outlet for altruistic supply?
Part of the answer lies in how the goods to be provided by
government are chosen. Burton Weisbrod has developed a theory
of when government will supply public goods, and to what extent. 2°7
2" See supra note 150 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of capital
contributions on returns.
206 See P. SAMUELSON AND W. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 712-15 (12th ed. 1985).
Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three-Sector Economy, in
THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 33, at 21.
Following Weisbrod, I draw no distinction between two distinct forms of government
provision: actual production by the government itself and government purchase from a for-
profit producer. Weisbrod, supra, at 23. For the government failure theory, the critical
element of both these approaches to government provision is that the government finances
the production. Id.
For an explanation of why Weisbrod's theory is only a partial answer to the question
posed in the text, see infra notes 211-19 and accompanying text.
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In a democratic polity, the decision-making process will be by ma-
jority vote. Thus "[g]overnment will supply a quantity and quality
of any commodity that is determined by a political voting pro-
cess.7"" If this supply is financed by conventional taxes, voters will
probably be unable to equate the amount of tax they pay with the
amount of benefit they derive from additional increments of gov-
ernmentally-provided goods. 209 Accordingly, the result of their col-
lective decision-making will be to provide public goods at the level
of quality and quantity that satisfies the demands of the median
voter. 210 Voters who prefer different levels, whether higher or
lower, will thus be left dissatisfied with governmental provision of
public goods. 2 "
These dissatisfied voters face several options, the most feasible
of which may be to form a nonprofit firm. 212 Such suppliers will
not be immune to the problems of producing public goods, in
particular the problem of free-riders. But, in the absence of a
2" Weisbrod, supra note 207, at 23.
49 Weisbrod's model makes this probability an explicit assumption, id. at 23, and notes
that it will not hold true in at least one reasonably likely scenario, that of vote trading or
logrolling. See also Hausmann, Economic Theories, supra note 5, at 29 n.4 (pointing out the
possibility of logrolling and similar devices, but suggesting it is unlikely to work well in the
case of "extremely intense or idiosyncratic demands for public goods."). He argues, however,
that the practical effect of such behavior is reduced by "the combination of information costs,
strategic behavior (transaction costs) and, in most instances, legal prohibition (against 'selling'
votes)." Weisbrod, supra note 207, at 23. For an argument that it is these and other transaction
costs that best account for "government failure," see Krashinsky, supra note 60, at 125.
21°
 Weisbrod explicitly indicates that the quantity demanded by the median voter can
be zero." Weisbrod, supra note 207, at 30. It is thus misleading to say, as one of his critics
has, that he "assumes agreement about the nature of the good and that the disagreement
[among voters] is quantitative—how much of it people are willing to pay for in taxation." J.
DOUGLAS, supra note 9, at 120. This is an accurate reading of Weisbrod only if the quantitative
disagreement is meant to include no provision at all. This does not seem to be Douglas's
point, for he goes on to suggest that Weisbrod's model cannot account for the emergence in
the nineteenth century of redistributionist relief organizations when a majority of voters did
not favor government relief programs. Id.
2]]
	 supra note 207, at 23-24.
212 They can emigrate, id. at 27, but that is a dramatically costly alternative. They can
organize production by a lower-level governmental unit, as is frequently done with parks
and libraries. But this may be relatively expensive, especially if the lower-level unit is not
already in place, and in any case•some voters' demands may still be unmet. They can seek
substitute goods from private suppliers, but such substitutes may be either poor substitutes
for the public good or prohibitively expensive. Id. at 27-29.
As Weisbrod is careful to note, the sequence in which these alternatives is presented is
merely for expositional convenience; he does not mean to suggest that this is in fact the
order in which alternative sources of suprantedian levels of public goods are sought. Id. at
26-27, 30. According to Weisbrod, it is more likely that "all of these organizational forms
for satisfying consumer demands are simultaneously operative." Id. at 27.
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supplier better able to address those problems, nonprofit suppliers
may offer the best available alternative. 2 "
Weisbrod's government failure theory is stated in demand-side
terms; those who seek more of a public good than the median voter
turn to nonprofit suppliers. It is important to note, however, that
the financing of these nonprofit suppliers will be by contributions.
As we have seen, even those who "pay" for public goods in an
amount equal to the benefit they expect to receive are exhibiting
weak altruism because they can enjoy the same benefit without
paying. This fact returns us to the supply side. Weisbrod does not
directly address why those willing to pay for public goods beyond
the level supplied by government do not do so by contributing to
the government rather than to nonprofit firms. Weisbrod's theory
tells us why government does not finance more of a particular public
good than the median voter wants, not why those who are willing
voluntarily to finance more do not choose to do so through govern-
mental entities. 2 "
Part of the reason may be chronological. As Weisbrod points
out:
It is likely . . . that the governmental sector will not be the
first to respond to consumer demand for collective goods.
The reason is that demands by all consumers do not gen-
erally develop simultaneously, and so the political decision
will at first determine a zero level of governmental pro-
vision, leading undersatisfied demanders to nongovern-
mental markets. 2 "
As evidence of this, he cites the priority in sixteenth century Eng-
land of nonprofit suppliers in virtually the entire range of non-
military public goods now deemed to be governmental responsibil-
ities. 2 " Sometimes this threshold of majority demand may never be
crossed, government will not produce any of a particular good or
service, and subsidized supply will perforce be by nonprofits. But
when the threshold is crossed, is there any reason for nonprofit
suppliers to exist alongside parallel governmental suppliers?
One explanation of private nonprofit supply looks to several
inherent characteristics of government as an institution. James
2 " Id. at 30.
214 Sometimes, of course, they do contribute to governmental entities, as the cases of
public television and public universities indicate.
215 Weisbrod, supra note 207, at SO (emphasis in original).
216 1d. at 33-34.
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Douglas has identified what he calls "categorical constraints" on
governmental provision of goods and services, constraints that, in
his view, derive from legal and political pressures on governmental
agencies to provide goods and services uniformly within their juris-
dictions. This tends to produce not only standardized provision,
but also bureaucratic overlays to ensure equality of treatment to
similarly situated recipients. 217 Private nonprofit suppliers, by con-
trast, offer greater opportunities for diversity, experimentation, and
informality. Whether or not these asserted advantages are real, it
seems highly probable that some altruistic suppliers will think they
are, and will accordingly choose to contribute capital to nonprofit
organizations even when governmental organizations providing
similar goods and services are available. 218 Beyond that, some al-
truistic suppliers may prefer non-governmental suppliers less out
of a confidence in their ability to overcome any inherent problems
in government provision than out of a belief that limiting the role
of government is itself a desirable goal. 219 As we have seen, this
perspective became national policy under President Reagan.
Weisbrod's government failure theory of the role of nonprofits
admittedly sheds no direct light on the role of government as a
supplier of ordinary consumer goods, as opposed to public or col-
lective consumption goods, although he does point out that govern-
ments produce both kinds of goods. 22° It would be consistent with
his theory, however, to maintain that government subsidizes private
goods at the level demanded by the median voter, leaving some
demand for subsidized supply unmet. Those who attempt to meet
that additional demand by altruistic supply would have many of the
same reasons for preferring nonprofit outlets as those who choose
to contribute to the supply of public goods. And, as a practical
matter, they are likely to find fewer existing government suppliers
in place even if they were willing to operate through them.
217 Douglas, Politial Theories of Nonprofit Organization, in "DIE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra
note 2, at. 43, 46-50; J. Douci.As, supra note 9, at 114-41; see also Krashinsky, supra note 60,
at 125 (formation of nonprofits may have less to do with government's unwillingness to
respond to demands beyond those of the median voter than with various transaction costs
of government provision).
20 Others have identified this and related advantages of nonprofit over governmental
provision. See, e.g., liansmatin, supra note 17, at 895; E. JAMES S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra
note 8, at 69-77.
For a classic statement of this perspective, with a call for the private nonprofit sector
to challenge and replace the state as the ensurer of public welfare, on the strength of
Goldwater political ideology and upbeat anecdotes, see R. CORNUELLE, RECLAIMING THE
AMERICAN DREAM (1965).
220 Weisbrod, supra note 207, at 30-31.
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C. Private Foundations
In the first part of this section, we saw some compelling reasons
for altruists, particularly altruistic suppliers of capital, to give or-
ganizational form to their efforts. In the second part of this section,
we saw why neither for-profit firms nor government provide en-
tirely adequate institutional forms for this purpose. To avail them-
selves of the advantages of horizontal and vertical integration, al-
truists need their own special, separate organizations. In this
subsection we will look at one form of altruistic organization, the
private foundation, that performs a role distinct from the altruistic
organizations we have examined thus far.
Hansmann's four-part typology of nonprofit organizations and
his contract failure theory of why they arise focus primarily on
"operating" nonprofits, those that produce goods and services. He
explicitly leaves to one side private charitable foundations, which
he describes as being "for the most part . . . philanthropic inter-
mediaries that produce no goods and services of their own. "221 This
subordination of foundations is entirely appropriate in an account
that asks why certain goods and services are produced by nonprofits
rather than by for-profits or, more precisely, why purchasers prefer
to buy certain products from nonprofits rather than from for-
profits. But in an account that focuses on the role of altruism in
nonprofits and that looks at least preliminarily at the role of altruis-
tic nonprofits on the supply side, private foundations must figure
more prominently. We will look first at Hansmann's treatment of
private foundations, then at private foundations as supply-side phe-
nomena, as we did with operating organizations in the previous part
of this section.
1. The Contract Failure Account of Private Foundations
Hansmann's brief account of private foundations subsumes
them under the general terms of contract failure as applied to
donative nonprofits like CARE, organizations that provide subsi-
dized services to recipients with whom the donor is not in direct
contact. According to Hansmann:
If a wealthy individual wishes to turn over part of his
fortune to a relatively autonomous organization that will
itself choose the ultimate recipients of his largesse, he
241 Hausmann, supra note 17, at 837 n.15.
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obviously will want to impose some form of nondistribu-
tion constraint upon that organization. 222
This brief account overlooks several salient differences between the
typical private foundation and organizations like CARE, differences
that make the contract failure theory a rather procrustean fit for
private foundations. On the other hand, a closer look at private
foundations shows them to be compatible, if occasionally eccentric,
bedfellows for the operating nonprofits we have already covered
under the supply-side altruistic account.
Hansmann is quite right in pointing out that private founda-
tions are charitable intermediaries, rather than primary producers
of goods or services like operating nonprofits. 223 He fails to note,
222 /d. at 848 n.41.
223 Without qualification, the term "private foundation" covers more ground than 'I
intend to in this section. For my purposes, and in ordinary parlance, a private foundation is
a charitable organization with two distinctive characteristics. First, it is funded and controlled
primarily by a single donor, family, or company. B. HOPKINS, TIIE LAW or TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS 429 (1987); Council on Fotindations, Private Foundations and the 1969 Tax
Reform Act, in 3 FILER COMMISSION PAPERS, supra note 3, at 1557. Second, it is a charitable
intermediary; its primary activity is not the active conduct of a charitable program, but the
financing of the charitable programs of other organizations through grants or loans. The
complex definition of private foundation by exclusion in section 509(a) of the E.R.C. is
designed to cover these organizations, but is probably both over- and under-inclusive.
Private foundations in the lay "sense in which I use the term are to be distinguished from
three related kinds of altruistic nonprofits: company l'oundatidns, community foundations,
and private operating foundations. Private operating foundations may be supported and
controlled by a single donor, but they must engage in the active conduct or a charitable
program. To meet the statutory definition of private operating foundation, they must expend
85% of their income in the conduct of such a program. I.R.C. § 4942(j)(3) (1988); Treas.
Reg. § 53.4942(h)-1(c) (as amended in 1983); see Ylvisaker, Foundations and Nonprofit Organi-
zations, in Tile NONPROFIT' SECTOR, supra note 2, at 360. They generally exhibit the first
distinctive feature of private Foundations, private control and support, but not the second,
extensive grant-making. Under the federal income tax laws they are treated for most, but
not all, purposes like grant-making private foundations. The most significant difference is
that they are not subject to the minimum distribution requirement of section 4942 of the
I.R.C.
Community foundations, by contrast, exhibit the second characteristic of private foun-
dations but not the first. They are generally grant-making organizations, but "are character-
ized by multiple sources of funding, boards of directors selected to reflect public interests
and concerns of their communities, and a local or regional focus in their giving." Council on
Foundations, supra, at 1560. On account of the more public flavor of their focus, support,
and governance, they are classified as public charities for federal tax purposes and are thus
free of the more rigorous regime applicable to private foundations. Id.; see also Ylvisaker,
supra, at 361 (describing basic characteristics and noting recent proliferation of community
foundations); cf. B. HOPKINS, supra, at 447-48 (community foundations are designed pri-
marily to attract large donations from a small number of donors, though they may qualify
as public charities if they attract sufficient public support).
Company foundations, finally, are private foundations in the lay sense of the term; they
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however, that this intermediary role gives rise to problems of con-
tract failure at two distinct points: first, between the initial donor
and the private foundation; and second, between the private foun-
dation and its own grantees. The response to the risk of contract
failure differs at each juncture, and the response at both junctures
differs from that in the other contexts Hansmann describes.
Between the donor and the foundation, contract failure of any
kind is unlikely to be a serious problem during the donor's lifetime.
For one thing, a private foundation is rarely "relatively autono-
mous" of the donor. More typically, it is the donor's charitable alter
ego, with its long-term aims set by her and implemented by her
hand-picked lieutenants. 224 For another, the stake of the private
exhibit both of the features identified above and are subject to the full range of rigorous
private foundation regulation under the Internal Revenue Code. It is their historical devel-
opment and their governance that distinguish company foundations from the classic individ-
ual or family foundation. The notion that corporations themselves, as opposed to their
shareholders as individuals, could engage in philanthropy developed relatively long after the
theory of private foundations as a vehicle for individual philanthropy. Ylvisaker, supra, at
375, Furthermore, the trustees of corporate foundations, even when not identical with
corporate management, nevertheless operate within the corporate framework, "ultimately
having to satisfy the shareholders that what they do is in the best interests of the corporation."
Id. at 361, 363; see also Baker & Shillingburg, Corporate Charitable Contributions, in 3 FILER
COMMISSION PAPERS, supra note 3, at 1853, 1862-63. This is probably in part a function of
the fact that most company foundations lack large endowments and depend on annual
distributions from their corporate parent, Council on Foundations, supra, at 1561, another
feature that distinguishes them from the classic private foundation. Cf. Baker & Shillingburg,
supra, at 1859 ("By using a foundation, the company can contribute in profit years and build
up a small corpus which is available to supplement smaller contributions in lean years.");
Useem, Corporate Philanthropy, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 2, at 340, 345 (use of
company foundation permits a company not only to engage in a degree of counter-cyclical
giving, but also "to shield a portion of its gifts from internal management pressures . .").
224 Thus, according to W. NIELSEN, THE BIG FOUNDATIONS 279 (1972):
Among the big foundations there are only a few cases where a donor's resources
have been transferred to an independent philanthropic institution not heavily
influenced by his descendants or interconnected with his company or
companies. .. . The typical situation is one in which the donor has children as
well as other relatives, and in which he has been the dominant shareholder of
one or at most a few enterprises, the control of which upon his death passes to
his foundation or to his family or to a combination of both. This results in a
triple interlinkage which is both intimate and enduring. As to the choice of the
foundation's governing board, Nielsen discovered that founders usually restrict
themselves to family members and close business or personal acquaintances.
Aside from being personally known by the donor, the primary criterion is
reliability in maintaining family control.
Id. at 314.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 struck hard at the !inks between foundations and their
founders' corporations, see I.R.C. § 4943 (1988), but left links with their families essentially
intact. See infra notes 271-74 and accompanying text for further discussion of private
foundations and the 1969 Act.
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foundation founder, unlike that of the small scale donor to CARE
and other operating nonprofits, is usually large enough to warrant
a substantial investment of additional resources in scrutinizing her
creature's activities. The challenge faced by the donor to a private
foundation is not, as Hansmann suggests, finding a trustworthy
organization that will dispense the donor's bounty to charitable
objects of the organization's choice and not to its autonomous con-
trollers. Rather, the donor's challenge is to create and control an
organization that is the institutional embodiment of the donor's own
altruistic impulses.
Even though the founder of a private foundation is thus un-
likely to experience contract failure between herself and her orga-
nization, she still faces problems of contract failure on another
front. Not only must the private foundation founder assure that
her creature does her charitable will; the foundation itself, as in-
strument of that will, needs some means of assuring that its grantees
in turn toe the line. The founder of a private foundation can take
small comfort in the fact that the managers of her organization do
not siphon off her beneficence in illicit dividends or self-dealing
transactions if they make grants to other organizations that do. The
grant making methods of private foundations offer a solution to
the problem of contract monitoring that tends to confirm the gravity
of that problem as Hansmann describes it for small scale individual
donors.
Implicit in Hansmann's contract failure account of relief or-
ganizations like CARE is the possibility that, but for excessively high
monitoring costs, individual donors might be able to enter into
contracts with for-profit firms to supply services like disaster relief
to third parties. 225
 Moreover, in his account of why donors to lis-
tener-sponsored radio prefer nonprofit suppliers, Hansmann ex-
plicitly explores the possibility of contractual arrangements with for-
profits. He finds that such contracts could provide essentially the
same protections to donors as nonprofit status, but at a prohibitively
high cost in individual negotiation and enforcement efforts. 226
Thus, in his view, "Nile advantage of the nonprofit form . . . is that
it economizes on contracting and enforcement."227
 The nonprofit
form is in effect a common contract, of which the government acts
as a single centralized monitor. 228
223
 Hansmann, supra note 17, at 847.
226
 Id. at 853.
227 Id,
228
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Unlike small-scale individual donors, private foundations may
not find the costs of negotiating and monitoring individual contracts
with for-profit suppliers prohibitively expensive. Rather, their size
and expertise may enable them to achieve economies of scale in
precisely these functions. These potential economies of scale for
private foundations may thus be an exception that proves the gen-
eral rule articulated by Hansmann, that tailoring of arrangements
with donees is prohibitively costly. 229
And these advantages may help private foundations in dealing
with nonprofit grantees as well. The nondistribution constraint en-
sures at most that donated funds will not be diverted into private
pockets. It does not guarantee that the funds will not be indirectly
used for a legitimate purpose of the donee organization other than
that which the donor intended. If an organization provides two or
more goods or services—disaster relief and community develop-
ment, for example—it is difficult for donors who designate one
program to ensure that their contribution results in a net increase
in the organization's expenditures for that program. A fifty dollar
contribution earmarked for famine relief may simply allow the relief
organization to divert fifty of the dollars it would otherwise have
used for that purpose to an irrigation project. Thus, contributions
earmarked for one purpose, even if scrupulously set aside, may
simply free the organization to use an equivalent amount of its own
funds for other purposes. 2"
A donor can avoid this problem by giving to an organization
that has a single purpose,"' but even then donated funds may be
mismanaged or used inefficiently. Choosing organizations with like-
229 Hansrnann may exaggerate these costs somewhat. The context in which he discusses
contractual alternatives to the nondistribution constraint, the provision of public goods like
listener-sponsored radio, is perhaps a worst-case scenario. As he points out, when the good
or service to be subsidized is undifferentiated from products that the for-profit organization
is already supplying with other income, any contractual alternative to the distribution con-
straint will have to involve a cap on the organization's total distributions to its owners.
Hausmann, supra note 17, at 851-52. This kind of comprehensive scrutiny may not be
necessary, however, when incremental units of output are more easily traced to particular
increases of input, as would be the case when the output is a private good. A donor may not
know whether his dollar paid to a lighthouse operator is being used to increase output unless
he looks at the entire income and expenditure statement, but the underwriter of hospital
care or discrete research projects need only look at the donee organization's grant receipts
and expenditures.
"° Ellman illustrates the same phenomenon with an example that hits closer to home—
donated dollars intended for undergraduate aid in effect flowing into research on nonprofits.
ElImam, supra note 33, at 1013-14.
"I Id. at 1014 n.37.
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minded management also helps, but at the cost of either careful
screening in the case of entrepreneurials or donor participation in
governance in the case of mutuals. 232
 In addressing the fungibility
of dollars problem, small-scale donors encounter a kind of contract
failure in the nonprofit realm itself; negotiating and enforcing an
agreement with donee organizations as to specific uses of funds may
be prohibitively costly.
Larger private foundations, by contrast, may be able to over-
come these cost barriers by achieving economies of scale in grant-
writing and oversight.2" This kind of monitoring almost certainly
lets them see how cost-effectively the grantee operates, how much
bang it gets with a given amount of granted bucks. Beyond that,
such monitoring may also permit foundations to ensure that partic-
ular grants effect real increases in the grantee's expenditures for
targeted programs, as, for example, by tracking compliance with
requirements that grantees increase their pre-grant levels of expen-
diture for those programs in the amount of the grant. 254
2. Private Foundations and the Altruistic Supply of Capital
The contract failure theory thus ignores the fact that private
foundations present and address the contract failure problem at
two analytically and practically distinct points, the founder's grant
to the organization and the organization's subsequent grants to
252 1d. at 1035.
265
	 points out that both private foundation and government grants often include
restrictions similar to the contractual alternatives to the nondistribution constraint that Hans-
Mann considers. Ellman, supra note 33, at 1016; see Hansmann, supra note 17, at 851-53.
254
 Federal tax law has not left private foundations to their own devices in the matter of
monitoring grants. Under the Tax Reform Act of 1969, a private foundation is subject to
stiff penalty taxes for grants to organizations other than public charities unless the foundation
exercises "expenditure responsibility" for the grantee's use of the funds. See I.R.C. § 4945
(1988); Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5 (as amended in 1973). In broadest outline, these provisions
require that private foundations make reasonable efforts and establish adequate procedures
(I) to see that grants are spent only for their designated purposes, (2) to obtain documentation
from the grantee on grant expenditures, and (3) to report to the I.R.S. on grant expenditure.
Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5(b)(1).
These measures probably work reasonably well to ensure that grantees comply with
grants' terms. They do not, however, seem to address the fungibility of dollars problem,
since they require monitoring only of the use of the granted money, not the grantee's other
resources. The steps the foundation must take to ensure that its grant is used for the specified
purposes do not necessarily ensure that the organization's total expenditures for that purpose
will increase by the amount of the grant. Instead, as we have seen, the organization may
simply reduce its own funds otherwise directed to that purpose by the amount of the grant.
Further, in the case of for-profits, the amounts so diverted are available for distribution to
the organization's owners as additional profits.
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operating organizations. There is, however, a more fundamental
reason why Hansmann's contract failure theory is an inadequate
account of private foundations. Recall that Hansmann's theory, by
his own description, is essentially a demand-side account, an expla-
nation of why purchasers of certain goods and services prefer to
buy from nonprofits. We have already seen that the founding of an
altruistic operating nonprofit like CARE is essentially a supply-side
phenomenon. Those who contribute capital to such an enterprise
are in a sense providing it with cost-free capital. The same is true
of the founding of a private foundation, with this difference: private
foundations are not in the business of producing a particular good
or service. Rather, their function is to finance the production of
goods and services by others. 235
In that respect, they function as nonprofit banks, sometimes
quite literally. Thus, for example, the Internal Revenue Code's
restrictions on overly risky investments by private foundations con-
tain an exception for "program related investments." These are
investments the primary purpose of which is to accomplish charit-
able purposes and no significant purpose of which is the production
of income or the appreciation of property. 236 A private foundation
might make a loan at below market rates to a minority-owned small
business in a decaying urban area for encouraging economic de-
velopment or to a disadvantaged individual for college education. 2"
The recipients of these loans, of course, are quite free to borrow
money for such projects from for-profit lenders. But the market
rate of interest, reflecting the level of risk, is likely to be discour-
agingly, if not prohibitively, high. This is not to say that in such
cases the market has failed; 238 one function of capital markets is to
2" Defenders of private foundations have frequently noted this financing role. As one
sympathetic report put it, "foundations have the particular characteristic of serving as sources
of available capital for the private philanthropic sector of our society in all its range and
variety." Council on Foundations, supra note 223, at 1560; see also Simon, Charity and Dynasty
Under the Federal Tax System, 5 PROB. LAW. 1 (1978).
2]6 1.R.C. § 4944(c) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(1) (1972).
227 These illustrations are taken, with some compression, from Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-
3(b) (1972) (examples (1) and (9)). For other examples, see B. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 556 (1987).
238 Some important instances of private foundation financing do involve elements of
market failure. As we have already seen, see supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text,
liansmann argues that students are frequently unable to finance their education through
loans from for-profit lenders because of the difficulty of using human capital as collateral.
Furthermore, many of the goods that will presumably How from the program related in-
vestments described above are essentially aspects of community development, a classic public
good.
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indicate which investments are excessively risky relative to alterna-
tives. The point to note here is that, even when functioning with
theoretical perfection, the for-profit capital market ignores benefits
that are of essential concern to altruistic_ investors, benefits that
accrue in any number of ways to persons other than the investors
themselves. The most sophisticated analysis of the risk of default
on student loans will never reveal that a mind is a terrible thing to
waste, for that is a matter not of fact, but of something more like
faith.
The more typical mode of private foundation finance, outright
grants free of any obligation to repay either principal or interest,
can also be compared to banking. 259 In an important sense, however,
the banking analogy distorts private foundations' essential role;
banks are hardly in the business of giving away money. The more
helpful comparison, for purposes of identifying the role of private
foundations in the altruistic supply of capital, is to the ordinary
investment activities of the wealthy individuals who create private
foundations. For our purposes, ordinary investors can be said to be
engaged in two essential functions. The first and most obvious we
have already seen—they are, by definition, investing capital to pro-
duce the highest rate of return. 24" Having earned the money, they
must then decide what to do with it; a necessary correlate of earning
money is the second function of ordinary investors, disposing of it.
Basically, they have two choices. They can re-invest the money,
adding it to their. other capital, or they can spend it. In their phi-
lanthropic activities the founders of private foundations perform
essentially the same functions. Not surprisingly, then, large-scale
philanthropists and ordinary investors face similar needs to inte-
grate their functions and to place those functions in distinct entities.
3. The Advantages of Integration
The advantages of integration that private foundations offer
are not essentially different from those that their founders can
achieve as individuals with respect to their two parallel functions,
earning income and disposing of it. This is especially true with
respect to the former function. The wealthy foundation philan-
thropist, like a well-heeled ordinary investor, will want expert advice
on where to get the highest return on investment. Founders of
"9 See Steinberg, ,supra note 61, at 123.
"° See supra note 198 and accompanying text for a discussion of ordinary investors.
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private foundations usually want their philanthropy to operate in
perpetuity, paying out to operating organizations the income from
their invested endowment rather than the principal of that endow-
ment.24 ' Both ordinary investors and private foundation founders
can buy this kind of advice from others. Or they may find it cost-
effective to perform certain investment assessments in-house, rather
than by contracting them out to otherwise independent agents.
Indeed, private foundations have traditionally exhibited a range of
degrees of vertical integration of their investment activities. 242
In performing their second common function, disposing of the
ultimate returns of their investments, the foundation philanthropist
and the ordinary investor face another common problem—whom
they shall benefit, and how. The objects of their bounty will, as we
have seen, lie along a spectrum that runs from the donors them-
selves, through family and personal acquaintances, past third cous-
ins and anonymous compatriots, to neighbors in the most Samaritan
sense. At whatever point on the spectrum they decide to spend, the
wealthy enjoy a substantial degree of discretion, discretion that need
not involve any more expert consultation in altruistic matters than
in others. Decisions as to expenditure of philanthropic dollars, every
bit as much as those for personal consumption, can be based on
personal preference and predilection and can be ad hoc and idio-
syncratic, if not eccentric. Such, indeed, was the character of tra-
ditional philanthropy.
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, attitudes toward
the adequacy of conventional modes of philanthropy had begun to
change. Even among the wealthy themselves, faith in the sympto-
matic and palliative remedies offered by traditional philanthropy
gave way in the face of the dislocations associated with America's
rapid urbanization and industrialization. Concerned about these
dislocations and appalled by the prospect of socialism, the more
philanthropic—or frightened—of the great industrialists cast about
for a private sector alternative to extensive governmental interven-
"' According to John Simon, "Iwlith few exceptions, foundations do not receive their
funds as true legal endowments—that is, funds burdened by a restriction on expenditure of
capital—but many foundations (and most big ones) treat their funds that way." Simon, The
Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations, in TIIE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 2, at 67, 80
n.24. Given the extensive degree of control generally maintained by donors during their
lives, it seems safe to assume that this is how they want things.
242 See Ylvisaker, supra note 223, at 364 (until recent concerns about ethical investing and
program-related investments, investment decisions were "handled conventionally by desig-
nated trustees, financial officers, and portfolio managers").
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tion. 245 The solution they hit upon was the private charitable foun-
dation.
One of the touted virtues of this new philanthropic vehicle was
its reliance on a staff of experts to assist in the selection of worthy
grantees. 244 Moreover, the grants were not to be directed at the
symptoms of poverty and disease, but at their root causes. 245 Both
Carnegie, the chief theoretician of the new form of philanthropy,
and Robert De Forest, the Wall Street lawyer who engineered the
prototypical Russell Sage Foundation, were anxious to turn their
expertise in industrial organization to the social problems that, in
their own and their contemporaries' perception, the largely indis-
criminate philanthropy of the past was not addressing. 246
In the first half of this century these views gained wide cur-
rency,247 but they were probably more frequently accepted than
implemented. Other than the philanthropies of Carnegie, the Rock-
efellers, and a very few others in their mold, most of even the larger
private foundations remained largely ad hoc, ameliorative, family-
centered operations.248 And probably most smaller foundations
have both narrower purposes and much smaller staffs. 249
243 Hall, A Historical Overview of the Private Nonprofit Sector, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR,
supra note 2, at 3, 10-11.
244 Id. at I1.
243 In an era that harkened to the rhetoric of self-help, if not social Darwinism, education
was an early and obvious favorite. See infra note 251 for a further discussion of private
foundations' interest in education.
246 Hall, supra note 243, at 12; Bremner, Private Philanthropy and Public Needs: Historical
Perspective, in 1 FILER COMMISSION PAPERS, supra note 3, at 89, 100 (describing Carnegie as
"fearful of impulsive generosity"); see also Council on Foundations, supra note 223, at 1558
(footnote omitted) (noting that the private foundation philanthropy of Carnegie, Rockefeller,
and their ilk "sought . . . to turn the weapons of systematic investigation, experimentation,
and research to the attack on many different kinds of human need"); Bremner, supra, at
101-02 (quoting John D. Rockefeller speech in which he explicitly called for organizing
philanthropy along the lines of big business).
247 Ylvisaker, supra note 223, at 374-75.
243 W. NIELSEN„supra note 224, at 273-74; see also Ylvisaker, supra note 223, at 374 (many
foundations do not conform to Carnegie-Rockefeller model). For foundations that do not
follow the orthodox rhetoric of innovation and experiment, the stodgier side of banking may
be an apt analogy:
The majority of them can be compared to bankers, waiting for loan applications
to be presented; and like any careful banker, they tend to give preference to
the applicants who are familiar, who can present good credentials, and who are ,
generally "sound."
Nielsen, supra note 224, at 275. Nielsen also notes that the founding of many private
foundations seems to reflect the abandonment, not the application, of organizational skills
demonstrated in the donor's for-profit undertakings. Id, at 312-13,
242 See Ylvisaker, supra note 223, at 363-64.
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4. The Need for Separate Organizations
The founders of private foundations are thus able to achieve
economies of scale in their essential functions, investing and grant-
making, without combining .
 with others. They can either perform
their investment function themselves or farm it out to others. With
respect to disposing of income, economies of scale are important
both in identifying grantees and in monitoring grants. But founders
of foundations frequently have large enough personal estates to
reach these economies on their own; 25° all the great foundations
are founded on the wealth of an individual or at most a family. 25 '
This raises two vital questions. First, why would wealthy phi-
lanthropists need or want a separate organization? Since private
foundations tend to be their founders' philanthropic alter egos, why
do their founders not simply do it themselves? Second, if there is a
need for a separate organization, why would a for-profit or govern-
mental entity not be adequate? We have already addressed these
issues in connection with operating altruistic organizations, orga-
nizations like CARE and colleges that are engaged in providing
goods and services themselves. Large-scale philanthropists also need
separate organizations, but for reasons that are somewhat different.
A tempting answer to the first question is tax advantages. The
foundation population virtually exploded in the high tax era fol-
lowing World War II, no doubt in large part because the deducta-
25° Indeed, some wealthy philanthropists simply hire professional staff to assist them in
their grant making, without creating a separate legal entity. Ylvisaker, supra note 223, at 361
n.3.
25 ' The need to achieve economies of scale in grant-making and monitoring may limit
the size of private foundations other than those with very restricted scopes or very devoted
founders. Below that threshold, donors may be able to achieve partial horizontal integration
through community foundations that are formed to administer separate funds jointly. See
supra note 223 for a further discussion of community foundations. Furthermore, though
they may not need to integrate for these purposes, even the largest foundations occassionally
find pooling of resources a helpful way to deal with problems too vast for their individual
resources. This was the case, for example, at the beginning of this century in the collective
efforts of northern philanthropists to address the deficiencies of southern education. John
D. Rockefeller's General Education Board, founded largely in response to this problem, had
all the earmarks of a corporate joint venture; Itibe General Education Board was closely
associated with the Southern Education Board, serving in effect as an interlocking directorate
or holding company for vast philanthropic interests." C.V. WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW
SOUTH 403 (1971) (footnote that describes the relationships of these and other organizations
concerned with southern education omitted). In the present era of dramatic cuts in govern-
mental relief programs, it is not surprising that foundations are once again joining forces to
stretch their resources. Ylvisaker, supra note 223, at 366-67 & n.20.
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bility of charitable donations made philanthropy marginally less
costly. 252 But though the combination of high tax rates and the
charitable deduction generally spurred giving by wealthy, high-
bracket taxpayers, there is less reason to think that it particularly
encouraged use of the private foundation vehicle. Moreover, many
of the larger foundations antedate the origins of federal income
and transfer taxation. And even if there were no tax advantages to
using the private foundation form, there would still be a significant
reason for donors to establish distinct nonprofit entities as instru-
ments of their grant making. That reason lies not in taxes, but in
life's other certainty, death.
Facing the prospect of death, the wealthy have two basic choices
as to the disposition of their accumulated assets. 2" They can either
leave it to friends, family, or other acquaintances, or they can place
it in the hands of charity. 254 Either way, death separates donors
from donees, even more dramatically than the continental distances
of the CARE example. In many cases, however, the donee can police
the transfer. Unlike the intended recipients of CARE packages, the
intended objects of decedents' bounty frequently know what to
expect—they may well have the decedent's will in hand. Further-
more, administration of outright legacies to particular individuals
and to designated charities is relatively uncomplicated. 255 The only
necessary institutional arrangement, the decedent's probate estate,
arises virtually automatically at death and lasts in the normal course
252 See infra note 270 for a discussion of the development of foundations in the era
following World War 11.
2" A third logical possibility—taking it with them—enjoys less appeal today than it did,
apparently, in the time of the pharaohs. The decline in the popularity of this alternative is
probably attributable to factors other than an increase in decedents' concern for those they
leave behind. -
45'' In what follows, 1 imply that all private foundations are established at death in the
legal form of a charitable trust. In fact, most are probably established during the founder's
life in the form of nonprofit corporations. Analyzing them as testamentary charitable trusts
has the heuristic value of facilitating comparison with other ultimate dispositions of individual
wealth. Furthermore, I mean to suggest that the prospect of death is a primary reason for
establishing all private foundations, even those that are created and funded inter vivos.
Finally, the differences between charitable trusts and charitable nonprofit corporations, while
by no means insignificant, see M. LANE, LEGAL HANDBOOK FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
15-21 (1980); P, TREUSCH, TAX EXEMPT CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 35-45 (3d ed. 1988),
can safely be ignored in this context.
23 ' The following account of the process of estate administration is highly compressed
and, perhaps, a bit stylized. For a fuller, but still general, account, see W. MCGOVERN, S.
KURTZ, & J. REIN, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 575-709 (1988) (Chapter 14, Probate and
Administration).
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only until the decedent's assets can be expeditiously disbursed. 256
The decedent's personal representative, who administers the estate,
is frequently someone other than the estate's beneficiaries, present-
ing risks of diversion. But the personal representative acts under
fairly direct supervision by the probate court and, in all probability,
by the objects of the decedent's bounty, be they charities or individ-
uals. The personal representative's fees are likely to be fixed by
contract, if not by statute, and to be based on fairly readily moni-
tored factors like time worked or value of assets administered. This,
together with the high degree of scrutiny, makes it possible to
employ for-profit firms for this function.
But decedents are not always satisfied with outright transfers;
frequently they indulge the urge to exercise continued control from
beyond the grave. Both basic forms of disposition, charitable and
private legacies, leave considerable room for such control, and both
illustrate the need for special institutional arrangements beyond
those involved in outright testamentary gifts. The private trust of-
fers testators an extraordinarily flexible means of influencing not
only who gets their property after death, but also when and how
that property can be enjoyed. Private trusts routinely provide, for
example, that specified percentages of principal and income be paid
to particular individuals at designated ages or at the occurrence of
events like marriage, graduation from professional school, or pur-
chase of a personal residence. And trust provisions can be tailored
to avert anticipated problems; fortunes need no longer be at risk
for bowls of porridge. 257 Despite some notable opposition in the last
century, "spendthrift" provisions can now be used in most American
jurisdictions to protect the improvident from themselves. 258 As long
as the relevant conditions, triggering events, and amounts are stated
in objective terms and the method of determining administrative
2'6 The case of Jarndyce and farndyee in C. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE, is a notable, though
fortunately fictitious, exception.
2" For one that was, see Genesis 25:29-34.
258 The redoubtable John Chipman Gray of the Harvard Law School railed against
spendthrift trusts in J. GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY (1St ed. 1883).
Victory, however, went to the other side. On the current majority position, see generally W.
MCGOVERN, S. Kuirrz, & J. REIN, supra note 255, § 8.7, at 339-53; 2A A. Scow, THE LAW
OF TRUSTS §§ 151-163 (W. Fratcher 4th ed. 1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 149-
162 (1959). For an account of the tension between the right of free testation and the right
of free transferability, see Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth
Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1985). For a briefer account, especially of Gray's role, see J.
DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 239 (2d ed. 1988).
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fees is specified in advance, a for-profit firm will be entirely suitable
as administrator of these arrangements. Indeed, that is precisely
what trust companies and bank trust departments do.
The future is, of course, notoriously difficult to anticipate.
Penitent prodigals may return to find forgiving parents dead; 259
model offspring have been known to undergo striking changes of
character upon coming into their inheritances even while their
ancestors live. 26° This problem is compounded by the fact that
decedents can exercise postmortem control of the distribution of
their wealth through private trusts for several generations. 26 ' Rather
than try to anticipate all contingencies that might occur under such
long-term trusts, testators sometimes try to build flexibility into their
diapositive devices. The cost of flexibility toward the beneficiary,
however, is discretion in the administrator, discretion that the tes-
tator may well not wish to delegate to a stranger. Such reluctance
may have nothing to do with a fear that for-profit administrators
will skim off excessive returns for themselves. Rates can be specified
in advance, and individual beneficiaries or their legal guardians are
practically positioned and legally empowered to police them
through the modern equivalents of the courts of equity. Rather, the
reluctance stems from the testator's inability to specify desires in
advance in sufficient detail. For their part, institutional trustees may
dislike the role of surrogate parent, preferring more definitive ad-
ministrative standards. Accordingly, testators sometimes place such
discretion in the hands of reliable family members or personal
friends, who serve as co-trustees or advisory committees with power
to make certain designated discretionary decisions.
Those who wish to leave their wealth to charity face a similar
situation. They can simply leave their wealth outright to charity, or,
somewhat more elaborately, they can establish a trust naming par-
ticular charities as beneficiaries of income or principal, at specified
times and in stated amounts. As in the case of private trusts, for-
259 For the standard happier ending, see Luke 15:11-32.
2" See, e.g., W, SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF KING LEAR.
261 The allusion, of course, is to the venerable Rule Against Perpetuities. In its classic
formulation, the Rule provides that "[n1° interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not
later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the instrument." J.
GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942). The practical effect of the
Rule is to permit "a man of property ... [to] provide for all of those in his family wflom he
personally knew and the first generation after them upon attaining majority." 6 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY 24.16 (1952).
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profit firms can and do make quite satisfactory trustees of such
arrangements.262 The only significant difference is that the policing
of the fiduciary is done by charitable institutions rather than indi-
vidual beneficiaries and is supplemented, at least in theory,263 by
the state's supervisory authority over charitable trusts.
Like ordinary testators, however, those who leave their wealth
to charity may want to exercise more subtle forms of control or to
ensure less easily stated goals. Moreover, the identity of ultimate
donees is likely to be even more uncertain than in the case of private
trusts; the very pOint of the classic private foundation is to allow
flexibility in the choice of donees over time. In the case of charitable
bequests, the problem of distant horizons is compounded. Charit-
able trusts are not subject to any durational limit; in theory, they
can last forever. 264
 The private foundation offers an institutional
means by which wealthy testators can ensure that their charitable
goals are pursued in their absence by a body of administrators hand-
picked by the testators and, if the testators wish, replaced according
to a prescribed procedure.
Here again, the problem is not that for-profit corporate ad-
ministrators are more likely to defalcate. Indeed, individual trustees
would seem to have equal incentive, and greater opportunity, to
abuse their position—equal incentive, because they too are entitled
only to adequate compensation for services rendered, and greater
opportunity, because corporate trustees are subject to scrutiny by
their own internal bureaucracies and to serious market as well as
legal discipline in case of abuse. And governmental monitoring is
no more difficult in the case of corporate trustees. Whatever the
identity of the trustee, the agreement between the donor and the
trustee for administration of the corpus is essentially a limited re-
turn arrangement, compliance with the terms of which can be po-
liced through accountings and audits. In this respect Hansmann is
right in the passage quoted at the outset of this subsection; the
founder of a private foundation "obviously will want to impose some
form of nondistribution constraint." 265
 But that constraint will be
262
 Hansmann, supra note 17, at 853 n.53.
263 See supra note 27 for a list of sources discussing the supervisory function.
264
 G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 351 (rev. 2d ed. 1977); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 365 (1959); 4A A. Scam supra note 258, § 365, at 109. John Simon
has argued in an unpublished manuscript that charities are not so much exempt from the
Rule as simply outside the scope of problems that the Rule is intended to address.
265 See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text for a further discussion of Hausmann's
ideas about private foundations.
May 1990]
	
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS	 595
essentially the same as the one imposed on the corporate trustee of
a private trust for the benefit of identified individuals who can do
their own monitoring. The trustee is to use the corpus as directed
by the senior and in return is to be paid according to a statutory or
contractual schedule.
There are several reasons for this similarity between private
and charitable trusts. First, almost any disposition one makes at
death is altruistic, because the transferor by definition is not around
to enjoy the fruits.266 The question is whether the benefits conferred
by the decedent's transfer of wealth fall far enough from home to
be characterized as charitable. Also, to the extent that the legacies
are not outright, but subject to conditions, they involve an element
of parentalism, whether the beneficiaries are defined as narrowly
as one's children or as broadly as humanity. Finally, and most fun-
damentally, the issue of future disposition in both cases cannot be
stated in terms of willingness and ability to pay; it must be stated
in terms of some other criterion like need or merit. Sometimes these
other criteria can be quantified: the son or daughter whose medical
expenses exceed income, the student with SAT scores in the ninety-
fifth percentile. When they cannot, the transferor may prefer in-
dividual trustees whose hearts are known to be in the right place,
even though corporate trustees are no more likely to have their
hands in the till.
Thus when beneficialies themselves are not in a position to
monitor administration, in the case of charitable trusts, as in the
case of private trusts, government assumes a supervisory role. It is
conceivable that an agency of the state could perform investment
and disbursement functions as well. But there is no particular need,
as individuals and for-profit firms are readily available. Moreover,
the latter may well perform more cost-efficiently than the govern-
ment because they have an incentive to keep their own costs down
when they are compensated on a fixed-fee or salary basis. Finally,
donors' inclination to want trustees they know and trust personally
may reduce the appeal of governmental administration.
The government's monitoring role in charitable bequests does,
however, come at a cost. The state allows resources to be set aside
266 The transferor may, of course, look forward to others' enjoyment of her largesse
after she is gone or derive present pleasure from the prospect of future monuments to her
memory. Perhaps from some vantage point in the Hereafter she can also look back (and up
or down) on such things. For reasons given elsewhere, however, these intangible benefits can
for our purposes be ignored.
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in perpetuity only for publicly approved purposes. In this sense,
charitable trusts and their modern progeny, private foundations,
are a peculiar hybrid of private property and socialism. As Professor
Simes said of the charitable trust in his classic lectures on public
policy and the dead hand:
On the one hand, it is for the public benefit. Because of
the public interest, the attorney general enforces it. Relief
is provided by it to those who are the recipients of its
bounty from the harsh, economic laws of an individualistic
society, just as is furnished by the instrumentalities of the
welfare state. But on the other hand, it gives full scope to
the control of the dead hand, far beyond that which is
possible anywhere else in the law. By this device, the vanity
of the dead capitalist may shape the use of property for-
ever. 267
Perpetual existence is not, of course, the only benefit governments
confer on these hybrid institutions. In section V we shall examine
more closely a more active form of governmental benefit, the ex-
emption of their income from federal taxation. Before turning to
that, however, we need to look briefly at whether private founda-
tions do in fact earn their immortality in the way that Professor
Simes outlines.
5. The Ideal, the Real, and the Law
In our examination of private foundations, we have essentially
taken their role to be that advanced by their advocates. Private
foundations, in this view, are the Daddy Warbucks, if not quite the
Heavenly Fathers, of philanthropy. Their critics, however, have
argued since the days of Carnegie and Rockefeller that though
private foundations have exhibited paternalism aplenty, they have
not always lived up to their loftier ideals. 268 Even private founda-
tions' staunchest advocates admit that the proliferation of private
2'' L. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 110-11 (1955). See also Weisbrod, supra
note 207, at 147 ("Combining an activity traditionally identified with governmental activity—
provision of collective goods—with an attribute of private activity, the absence of legal
compulsion to pay for benefits, nonprofit collective-goods firms may be thought of as hy-
brids.").
2" For a brief history of the criticism of private foundations in the United States, see
Hall, supra note 243, at 12, 18-21; Nielsen, supra note 225, at 5-7.
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foundations in the post-World War II era owed much to tax
incentives269 and led to abuses. 27°
This is not the place to scrutinize, nor am I the person to
defend, private foundations' track record. Yet, because my account
depends so much on the ideal, I cannot entirely avoid the charge
that it diverges rather sharply from the real. For my purposes the
critical confluence of the two lies in the watershed year 1969, when
the critics of foundations' performance gained ascendancy in Con-
gress and secured amendments to the tax code strictly regulating
the private foundation. 271 Those provisions subjected foundations
engaging in the most egregious perceived abuses to graduated pen-
alty taxes culminating in forfeiture of all their assets and loss of
their federal tax exemption. 272 Most significantly for our purposes,
the 1969 Act mandated that private foundations pay out annually
a statutorily determined minimum amount either for the active
conduct of charitable purposes or to organizations engaged in such
activities.273 This latter provision in effect made the capital-provid-
ing ideal of private foundations' apologists the legal standard for
their operation. Under the 1969 Act, if a private foundation is to
operate in accord with federal law, it must practice at least that
much of the role its advocates preach. 274
2" Council on Foundations, supra note 223 at 1558; see also Hall, supra note 243, at 17
(noting that the relatively high federal income and transfer tax rates of the post-war era
encouraged the formation of many private foundations that were "little more than tax
dodges").
27° See, e.g., Council on Foundations, supra note 223, at 1558 (citing the investigations of
Rep. Wright Patman of Texas):
Investigations in the 1960s revealed that some persons had set up foundations
more for personal advantage than for public benefit. Some, it was found, were
benefiting friends and relatives; others were being used to maintain control of
companies; some were hoarding assets and making almost no return to charity;
and in a few damaging instances it appeared that foundation grants had been
made to advance partisan political interests.
See also B. HOPKINS, supra note 237, at 429 ("More serious criticisms of private foundations
are that they further various tax inequities, are created for private rather than philanthropic
purposes, and do not actually achieve charitable ends."); Hall, supra note 243, at 17
("[W]ealthy families were quick to recognize the utility of the foundation as a device for
maintaining dynastic control over firms.").
271 For a detailed political account of the 1969 Act's private foundation provisions see
Nielsen, supra note 224, at 7-26.
272 The new legislation imposed on private foundation managers higher fiduciary stan-
dards than those applicable to public charities, I.R.C. § 4941, precluded private foundations
from owning controlling interests in business enterprises, and regulated or forbade a laundry
list of unpopular private foundation activities, I.R.C. § 4943.
271 1.R.C. § 4942 (1988).
274 It is, of course, a different matter to claim that private foundations are in fact
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Moreover, that role necessarily involves weak altruism. Found-
ing grants to private foundations are but a special case of gifts for
the benefit of others without expectation of material return. An
essential purpose of the 1969 Act's private foundation provisions
was to plug loopholes that had previously allowed founders and
their families to draw off illicit private benefits from their purport-
edly charitable creatures. Founders' motives in creating a private
foundation, even one meant to operate within the strict letter of
the new law, may, of course, be anything but altruistic in the strong
sense of pure selflessness. Founders of private foundations, no less
than donors to operating nonprofits—no less, for that matter, than
saints and martyrs—may be motivated by vainglory or fear or any
of the other "wrong" reasons that impel people to do the right
thing. Here again, the point for our purposes is that the founders
of private foundations part with something objectively valuable
without material return, if they operate within the law.
These founders may, as we have seen, retain a considerable say,
directly or through their appointees, in the use of their donated
property. It is this very voice—tolerated not only by applicable legal
standards, but also by the theory of private foundations' proper
role—to which a more radical school of foundation critics object.
Their complaint is not with abuses of private foundation's role as
philanthropic financiers. Their complaint is with that role itself,
particularly with the amplified voice it gives the wealthy in public
affairs. 275 A strong case has been made that, under Rawlsian notions
of justice, this enhanced position of a wealthy few is more than
offset by the benefits private foundations confer on the public at
large, particularly in view of the public's capacity, as seen in 1969,
to alter dramatically the legal regime applicable to private founda-
tions.276 This debate cannot be resolved here, but it takes us to the
threshold of a larger, and. logically anterior, issue: even if, as I have
tried to show in this part, certain kinds of nonprofit organizations
play a critical role in the altruistic provision of goods and services,
operating within the limits of the new law. Some commentators have so concluded, however.
See B. HOPKINS, supra note 237, at 429 ("[N]early all of the abuses—perceived or otherwise—
involving private foundations were eradicated as a result of the enactment of the Tax Reform
Act of 1969.").
275 Simon identifies and answers this criticism in Simon, supra note 235. See also B.
HOPKINS, supra note 237, at 429 (noting that private foundations are "chastised for being
elitist, playthings of the wealthy, and havens of 'do-gooders' assuaging their inner needs by
dispensing beneficience [sic) to others").
276 Simon, supra note 235.
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do such organizations merit special treatment under the federal
income tax? That issue is the subject of section V.
V. POLICY ANALYSIS—THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX EXEMPTION OF
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
In section III we saw that the nonprofit sphere can be divided
into nine types of organizations that exhibit altruism in one form
or another and a tenth type of organization that, although genuinely
nonprofit, is in no significant sense altruistic. We saw in section IV
the need for altruism to take an institutional form, both to achieve
economies of scale and to ensure continuity over time. In this section
we turn to the normative issue of why—or whether—altruistic or-
ganizations' income should be exempt from federal income taxa-
tion. We will examine three existing theories of the federal income
tax exemption, beginning with Hansmann's theory that the exemp-
tion is a means of helping nonprofit organizations overcome prob-
lems in acquiring capital for expansion. We will then compare Hans-
mann's theory with the traditional view that the exemption is a
subsidy for favored activities and the view advanced by Boris Bittker
and George Randert that the exemption merely reflects technical
difficulties in defining nonprofits' income.
For purposes of this examination, it is useful to distinguish four
basic kinds of income a nonprofit organization may have. These
categories are hardly airtight; indeed, each of the three exemption
theories implicitly conflates them at some points and explicitly col-
lapses them at others. The categories are nonetheless useful, how-
ever, because they point to real differences between sources of
nonprofit revenue, differences that are now reflected in different
tax treatment and over which policy analysts disagree. The first of
these is gift income, revenues received without a quid pro quo. The
second is exempt function income, revenue derived from the sale
of the goods or services the provision of which is the organization's
reason for being. Passive or investment income, the third, is second-
generation revenue, revenue generated by investing in passive ve-
hicles like stocks, bonds, and rental property. The final category is
unrelated business income, income generated by the active conduct
of a trade or business that is not functionally related to the activity
for which the organization was founded, except as a means of
raising revenues to support that activity. 277
xlv I.R.C. § 512 (1988) (defining unrelated business taxable income); id. § 513 (defining
unrelated trade or business).
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To get these categories firmly in mind, consider again Mr.
Orton's Ceramic Foundation. 278 The revenues received from the
sale of ceramic cones, the production of which was the primary
purpose of the Foundation, are exempt function income. In the
unlikely event that another ceramics afficionado donates money to
the Foundation, these receipts would obviously be gift income. If
this gift were used to buy stock in GM or Dow-Corning, the divi-
dends earned would be passive income. If, instead of investing the
donation in stocks, the Foundation were to purchase a local pizzeria
franchise and operate it to generate additional revenues to support
its ceramics research, those revenues would be unrelated business
income.
We will first examine how the three policy theories deal with
the gift, exempt function, and passive income of altruistic organi-
zations. Discussing these three categories of altruistic income to-
gether reflects their essentially identical treatment under the tax
code. Next, by way of contrast, we will examine the treatment of
these income categories with respect to mutual nonprofits, the ex-
emption of which is less expansive than, and based on different
grounds from, that of altruistic nonprofits. We will then turn to
unrelated business income, which is generally taxable even when
received by altruistic organizations. In the background of these
discussions is a question: Could the exemption of altruistic organi-
zations' income in each of its various forms be considered simply a
subsidy of altruism? In the final part of this section, we will examine
that question more directly.
A. Altruistic Organizations' Gift, Exempt Function, and Passive Income
In the first part of this section, I begin with Hansmann's ex-
emption theory, then compare it with the traditional subsidy theory
and with Bittker and Randert's technical definition theory. By at-
tending to Hansmann's criticisms of the other theories, 1 derive
from them a synthesis that is an alternative to Hansmann's theory.
Before we turn to the substance of the various exemption the-
ories, however, a terminological note is in order. We have already
examined in considerable detail the parameters of my term "altruis-
tic nonprofits." To avoid confusion, we now need to identify and
2T"
	
Orton, Jr., Ceramic Foundation v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 147 (1971). For
discussion of the Orton case see supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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distinguish the comparable terms the other theorists use. For Hans-
mann, the critical term is "nonprofit," because the tax exemption
of all nonprofits, whether they be what I call altruistic or mutual,
stands or falls together under the contract failure theory. Accord-
ingly, in examining his theory, I will use the more inclusive term.
The traditional subsidy theory and Bittker and Randert, on the
other hand, focus on a particular kind of nonprofit organization
that is roughly similar to my altruistic nonprofit. The traditional
subsidy theory is concerned primarily with justifying the exemption
of organizations that qualify for exemption under section 501(c)(3)
of the tax code, organizations subsumed under the general heading
of "charity."279 Bittker and Randert use the term "public service
organization" to describe a class roughly coterminous with the tax-
law class of charities. 28° For reasons that will become clear below,
both the tax law concept of charity and Bittker and Randert's public
service organization substantially overlap with what I have identified
as altruistic organizations. Accordingly, in discussing the traditional
subsidy theory and Bittker and Randert's technical definition the-
ory, I will let the theorists speak in their own terms, pointing out
differences between the classes of organizations they discuss and
the altruistic nonprofits I have identified only where the differences
are significant.
1" There is, alas, one further level of terminological complexity. For purposes of section
501(c)(3), the term "charitable" has two overlapping meanings. The first, broader meaning
subsumes all the purposes listed in 501(c)(3). In this sense, all organizations exempt under
that section are collectively referred to as charities. "Charity" in a second, narrower sense
refers to a residual subcategory of those purposes exempt under section 501(c)(3) but not
specifically listed there. See Exempt Organizations Handbook (1RM 7751) (1989) ("The term
'charitable' refers not only to one of the purposes for which exemption is recognized under
IRC 501(c)(3), but is also the generic term for religious, charitable, educational, and scientific
purposes under that section."). To avoid confusion, I will use "charity" in the first, broader
sense except as otherwise indicated.
"" The only apparent difference is that, in their illustrative list of public service orga-
nizations, Bittker and Randert include two categories, social welfare organizations and polit-
ical parties, that are allowed to engage in lobbying and political campaign activities. Bittker
& Randert, supra note 90, at 305. Section 501(c)(3) forbids organizations exempt under its
provisions to engage in any political campaign activity and in more than an "insubstantial
amount" of lobbying. These restrictions are arguably extraneous to the central, purpose of
section 501(c)(3) and difficult to justify on any grounds. See Clark, The Limitation on Political
Activities: A Discordant Note in the Law of Charities, 46 VA. L. REV. 439 (1960). Lobbying and
political campaign activity, at least when conducted by fairly broad-based membership or-
ganizations, are public goods like those that many charities provide. Perhaps for that reason,
the income of social welfare organizations and political parties receives favorable treatment
under sections 501(c)(4) and 527 of the 1.R.C., respectively.
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1. Hansmann's "Capital Formation Theory" 28 '
Hansmann's theory of the proper policy basis for the tax ex-
emption for altruistic and other nonprofits rests on his theory of
why nonprofits arise in a capitalist economy in which for-profits are
the norm. As we have seen, Hansmann argues that nonprofits tend
to arise in contract failure situations as the most efficient suppliers
of goods and services. From this it is tempting to conclude that
nonprofits should be encouraged by the indirect subsidy of a tax
exemption to develop in industries identified as exhibiting contract
failure. Hansmann insists, however, that this inclination not be in-
dulged without further analysis:
[fit is not obvious why a subsidy is needed to encourage
nonprofits even where their development seems appro-
priate as a response to contract failure. Why can consum-
ers not he trusted to select nonprofit rather than propri-
etary producers on their own in those situations in which
nonprofits are to be expected to offer more reliable ser-
vice? And, if there are cases in which consumers cannot
in fact be trusted to make such a decision wisely, is not a
tax subsidy a remarkably indirect response to the prob-
lem? Should not proprietary producers be outlawed en-
tirely—or at least put under severe regulatory restraint—
where they are obviously unsuitable but are likely to attract
consumers nonetheless? 282
Hansmann maintains that there is a less immediately apparent,
but ultimately more satisfactory, reason for exempting the net rev-
enues of such nonprofits from income taxation. This encourage-
ment is needed because nonprofits, by definition forbidden to dis-
tribute net profits, are barred from a primary source of capital for
expansion, equity investment. Moreover, they are likely to be unable
to expand to an optimal size using either borrowed capital, donated
capital, or retained earnings. 2" The exemption of their income
281 This exemption theory is set out in Hansmann, suprä note 68.
282 Id. at 70-71 (footnote omitted).
299
	
at 72-74. In a similar vein, Powell and Friedkin suggest, on the basis of several
empirical studies, that
the fundamental differences between nonprofit and for-profit organizations
does not turn so much on intrinsic differences in organizational form or capa-
bility, or even on legal criteria that distinguish nonprofits from for-profits, as
on differences in the availability of resources and the constraints associated with
their acquisition.
Powell & Friedkin, Organizational Change in Nonprofit Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR,
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from taxation is an appropriate and effective form of encourage-
ment, because it helps offset this disadvantage in access to capital
by increasing nonprofits' ability to retain net earnings for expan-
sion.284
 if this is how nonprofits will use their enhanced net reve-
nues, 285
 and if we accept the implicit normative premise that, other
.supra note 2, at 180, 181. According to HanSnrann, however, the limit on availability of
resources to nonprofits is not. an independent factor, but rather' a function of the nonprofit
constraint, the essential legal and economic difference between for-profits and nonprofits.
Empirical research on the effect of capital constraints on the responsiveness of nonprofits
to changes in demand is inconclusive., Hansmann, supra note 5, at 38-39; Steinberg, supra
note 61, at 133-34.
a Hansmann, supra note 68, at 72-75. Cf. Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care,
Inc., 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985). In Utah County, in response to the dissent's argument that
denial of property tax exemption to two components of a nonprofit hospital network would
result in higher costs to patients, the majority argued that "[t]he far more logical assumption
is that growth of the MC system would possibly be slowed ... ."Id. at 276 (emphasis in original).
2"s they will so use them depends on at least two critical variables. The first we
have seen before, see supra note 61 and accompanying text, and Hansmann makes it explicit
again here, Hausmann, supra note 68, at 70 n.57: nonprofit managers, who are not subject
to scrutiny by equity owners, may exert themselves less than their counterparts in for-profit
firms to minimize costs. Nonprofits are tints preferable on efficiency grounds to fi•-profit
alternative suppliers only when this efficiency kiss is more than offset by the efficiency gains
the contract failure theory predicts. Id.
Turning to the second variable, waste in this form is not the only alternative to using
the tax subsidy for expansion. Hansmann maintains that nonprofit firms can use the increased
retained earnings attributable to their tax exemption in either of two ways. They can increase
present production, by purchasing increased amounts of variable inputs to combine with
existing levels of capital, or they can increase future production, by investing in additional
capital. How they decide between these two will, he asserts, depend on their relative pref-
erences fur present and future production.
All this assumes that nonprofits arc selling their product zit the prevailing market price.
As Hausmann points out in a fbotnote, however, there is another option open to them: "they
can sell their service, not at the market price, but at a lower price that is at or below the level
that just covers variable costs plus depreciation, and hence accumulate no earnings with
which to acquire additional capital for purposes of expansion." Id. at 78 n.74. Hansmann
declines to explore that possibility, "in part because, in a sense, it does not really add anything
new to the problem." Id. The below-market pricing can, he maintains, simply be viewed as a
subsidy in the amount of the underpricing, which in effect adds that much to the firm's cost
of providing the subsidized good. Id. Yet in undertaking that subsidy, the firm has elected
to increase its costs contrary to the dictates of economic efficiency. The fact that this contra-
efficiency behavior is open to all firms receiving the subsidy of tax exemption raises the
possibility that the subsidy will in many cases not be used for capital expansion, the use that
Hansmann asserts to justify the subsidy. Moreover, as we shall see below in notes 294-301
and accompanying text, infra, Hansmann rejects the notion that nonprofits should be sub-
, sidized to provide socially desirable goods below cost.
Hansmann himself has provided empirical evidence in support of his capital-formation
hypothesis. Analyzing state tax exemptions, he found that the market shares of nonprofit
firms tend to be greater where the value of their tax exemption, i.e., the rate at which they
would he taxed if not exempt, is greater. Hansmann, The Effect of Tax Exemption and Other
Factors on the Market Share of Nonprofit Versus For-Profit Firms, 40 NATI, TAX J. 71 (1987).
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things being equal, efficient allocation of resources is to be encour-
aged, then this is an entirely appropriate conclusion. 286
Hansmann goes on, however, to draw the more dubious con-
clusion that the exemption should apply only to those nonprofits
that arise in response to the kind of market failure he has identified.
Hansmann concedes that "WI' nonprofit firms could be demon-
strated to have important efficiency advantages over for-profit firms
under identifiable conditions other than contract failure, similar
reasoning could justify granting tax exemption to nonprofit firms
in those circumstances as well."287 This statement has several im-
portant implications. In the first place, despite his concession that
there may be other forms of "efficient" nonprofits than those he
has recognized, the tenor of his writings suggests that he believes
the canon is essentially closed. Hansmann is willing to concede that
some traditionally exempt charities that do not fit his efficiency
criteria—in particular, those providing education, hospital care,
nursing care, and day care—should continue to be exempt because,
in "a significant fraction of these industries, . . . a substantial subset
of consumers feels more comfortable patronizing a nonprofit." 288
But Hansmann would continue the exemption only "[u]ntil we have
better data suggesting that these consumers are mistaken,"289 and
others would be even less generous. 29°
In the second place, and far more significantly, Hansmann
implies that a defense of the charitable exemption can only be made
in terms of economic efficiency. He reaches that position, however,
only after making a considerable effort to show that neither of two
286 It is not, however, a conclusion that has gone unchallenged. James Bennett and
Gabriel Rudney propose taxing receipts from the sale of any product unless (I) more than
50% of the .cost of production is financed by gifts or grants, as opposed to sales receipts or
' investment income, and (2) the subsidized product is "directed at a specific recipient group
or purpose deemed charitable." Bennett & Rudney, A Commerciality Test to Resolve the Com-
mercial Nonprofit Issue, 36 TAX NOTES 1095, 1097-98 (1987). The first requirement would
mean that virtually all commercial nonprofits would be subject to tax on their exempt function
income. Moreover, with respect to all nonprofits, 141 investment earnings except exempt
interest [presumably under provisions applicable to all taxpayers .] are taxable revenues under
the commerciality test." Id. at 1097.
287 Hansmann, supra note 68, at 87 n.92.
288 Id. at 89.
289 Id. More recently, Hansmann seems less inclined to give such nonprofits the benefit
of the doubt. Hansmann, supra note 15, at 634; see also Hansmann, The Evolving Law of
Nonprofit Organizations: Do Current Trends Make Good Policy?, 39 CASE W. Us. 807, 818, 822-
24 (1988-89) (urging continued contraction of scope of nonprofit tax exemption).
491 See supra note 286 for a discussion of the Bennett and Rudney view.
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alternative theories is adequate. It is to these competing theories,
and Hansmann's reasons for rejecting them, that we must now turn.
2. Traditional Subsidy Theory (Herein Mostly of I.R.C. Section
50 1 (c)(3))
The traditional subsidy theory of the tax exemption for altruis-
tic nonprofits, like Hansmann's capital formation theory, rests on a
particular view of the role of nonprofit organizations in a society
with a democratic polity and a capitalistic economy. The traditional
view of charity's role is the provision of two kinds of public benefits.
The first of these I will call primary public benefits, because they
are inherent in the particular activities that the organization under-
takes. Altruistic nonprofits generate primary public benefits either
by providing goods or services that are deemed to be inherently
good for the public or by delivering ordinary goods or services to
those who are recognized as being especially needy. Health care
and education are examples of products deemed to be inherently
good; providing them to anyone, irrespective of need, is considered
to produce public benefits. Providing food and shelter for the poor
or otherwise disadvantaged is an example of benefitting an espe-
cially needy class; it makes no difference that the goods provided
are themselves mundane.
Beyond these primary public benefits, charities are said to pro-
vide what I will call "metabenefits," benefits that derive not from
what product is produced or to whom it is distributed, but rather
from how it is produced or distributed. Traditional theory has
identified two ways in which charities provide such "metabenefits."
In the first place, they are said to deliver goods and services more
efficiently, more innovatively, or otherwise better than other sup-
pliers. In the second place, - their very existence is said to promote
pluralism and diversity, which are taken to be inherently desira-
ble. 29 '
'49 ' For examples of these views, see B. Hoi,KrNs, supra note 237, at 6-7 (charities foster
"voluntarism and pluralism" and decentralized, efficient decision-making and resource allo-
cation); L. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 133-39 (1955) (commending the
"pioneering element" in charitable trusts); Sacks, supra note 28, at 524 (citing "initiative of
thought and action," "diversity of views and approaches," and "experimentation in new
untried ventures"); Stone, Federal Tax Support of Charities and Other Exempt Organizations: The
Need for a National Policy, 1968 U.S. CAL. TAX INST. 27, 45 ("objectives of pluralism and
diversity").
This view is related to the defense of private foundations as "charitable entrepreneurs,"
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Traditional theory explains the charitable exemption as a
means by which the government encourages organizations engaging
in activities that promote the public good, activities that provide the
primary goods and metabenefits described above. 292 This theory
rests on the fairly explicit premise that not only particular goods
and services, but also particular modes of supplying them, can be
identified as especially good for the public under neutral principles
administrable by a government agency, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, subject to judicial review. 293
Hansmann suggests that economic efficiency might provide
such a neutral criterion, 294 but he finds it unnecessary to assess the
the most innovative and counter-majoritarian of charities. See, e.g., M. FRErvioNT-SMITH,
FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT 49-53 (1965) ("Foundations in a Pluralistic Society"); Bel-
knap, The Federal Income Tax Exemption of Charitable Organizations: Its History and Underlying
Policy, in 4 FILER COMMISSION PAPERS, supra note 3, at 2025, 2036 ("preference for private
activity and diversity"); Simon, supra note 235.
Cf. F. GAMWELL, BEYOND PREFERENCE 150 (1984) (Many third sector organizations, in-
cluding "health-delivery and social-service organizations," are "private regarding," in contrast
to public-regarding associations that promote "those activities in which individuals may
pursue the public world for its own sake and, thereby, maximize it.").
292 This view is widely expressed by both courts and commentators. See, e.g., Bob Jones
University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) ("Charitable exemptions are justified
on the basis that the exempt entitrconfers a public benefit—a benefit which the society or
the community may not itself choose or be able to provide, or which supplements and
advances the work of public institutions already supported by tax revenues."); M. FREMONT-
SMITH, supra note 291, at 158 ("The grant of tax exemption to charitable entities and the
allowance of tax deduction for charitable contributions represent an attitude of positive
governmental encouragement of philanthropy which has been present in the American tax
system since its inception."); B. HOPKINS, supra note 237, at 5 ("Clearly then, the exemption
for charitable organizations is a derivative of the concept that they perform functions which,
in the organizations' absence, government would have to perform; therefore, government is
willing to forego the otherwise tax revenues in return for the public services rendered."); H.
OLECK, NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND ASSOCIATIONS 277 (1988) ("these
organizations perform functions which would fall.squarely on the government if private
volunteers were not willing to devote their time and energy to them."); Belknap, supra note
291, at 2038 ("the policy underlying the tax exemption of charitable organizations is moti-
vated primarily by a desire on the part of government to encourage activities contributing
to the general welfare"); Reding, Federal Taxation: What is a Charitable Organization?, 44 A.B.A.
J. 525, 595 (1958) (charitable exemption "differs only in method from a disbursement of
government funds" and "therefore cannot be sustained at law except when the public interest
is served in much the same manner as when public funds are properly expended") (footnote
omitted); Stone, supra note 291, at 45 ("The principal justification for tax benefits granted
to these organizations [charities] and their donors should be that they relieve the government
of what might otherwise be necessary governmental functions which are better accomplished
in this fashion than they would be through direct government expenditures or grants.").
29' A less ambitious—and less debatable—premise would be that the exemption of char-
itable organizations is a subsidy of those products and modes of provision that authoritative
decisionmakers determine to be worthy of subvention, whether or not on the basis of a
"neutral," or even articulable, definition of public benefit.
294 More particularly, Hausmann suggests that such a neutral basis would be the spillover
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adequacy of the traditional subsidy theory with regard to particular
purposes. Instead, assuming arguendo that certain goods and ser-
vices should be subsidized, Hansmann maintains that a tax exemp-
tion limited to nonprofit suppliers is not generally an appropriate
means. He raises two problems with the subsidy theory: its failure
to explain, first, why for-profits supplying the same products are
not also exempt, and second, why the subsidy is tied to net profits.
With respect to the first problem, Hansmann examines several
arguments for subsidizing only nonprofits through the tax exemp-
tion, but finds that "none of these arguments is terribly compel-
ling."2" One argument is that nonprofits produce public goods,
goods the enjoyment of which cannot effectively be limited to those
who pay and which thus are unlikely to be produced in optimal
quantities by for-profit firms. Hansmann agrees that nonprofit pro-
ducers of public goods merit tax exemption, though on slightly
different grounds. Recall that organizations producing public goods
are likely to be nonprofit under contract failure theory, 296 and thus
need subsidy under Hansmann's own capital-formation rationale
for the exemption. 297 As he points out, however, the exemption now
applies to many organizations such as hospitals, schools, and nursing
homes that provide essentially "private" goods. These "exceptions"
in his view eat up the subsidy "rule" on which traditional theory
says the present exemption rests. 298
Another possible basis for limiting the subsidy to nonprofits is
the fear that for-profit suppliers would use the subsidy to increase
distributable profits rather than to increase output or lower prices.
Hansmann points out, however, that, in a perfectly competitive
economy without market failures, for-profit firms in the long run
will tend to pass a subsidy on to consumers as well as nonprofits
benefits that the subsidized goods confer on others than their direct consumers. Hansmann,
supra note 68, at 66. Presumably these goods would be subsidized up to the point at which
the marginal dollar of subsidy produces only a dollar of beneficial externalities. This is, of
course, to make economic efficiency the criterion of subsidization, and thus to define "benefit"
in terms of what those able to pay are willing to pay. As we have seen, supra note 69 and
accompanying text, desire—or need—beyond ability to pay is excluded from this calculus by
definition. Efforts to "weight" the dollar-backed preferences of the poor are but partial
solutions.
2U5 Hansmann, supra note 68, at 67.
296 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the contract failure
account of nonprofits that produce public goods.
297 See supra notes 283-86 and accompanying text 0)r a discussion of the capital for-
mation rationale.
298 Hansmann, supra note 68, at 68.
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will.299 New firms will enter the subsidized industry to get the su-
pranormal profits attributable to the subsidy, and the increased
output will drive prices down, thus ensuring that the subsidy is
passed on to consumers. Hansmann concedes that many markets
in which charities and other nonprofits operate are characterized
by market failures that would permit a for-profit to skim off any
subsidy. But Hansmann calls this "a rather attenuated argument," 30°
apparently for reasons we have already examined. 30 '
Hansmann thus scores telling points against the traditional sub-
sidy theory's limitation of the tax exemption to nonprofit organi-
zations that produce the good or service to be subsidized. So far,
however, we have looked only at the kind of good or service pro-
vided, ignoring any reasons for favoring nonprofits based on the
way they provide goods and services. We have not explicitly consid-
ered the metabenefits side of traditional subsidy theory. In a sense,
Hansmann explains the function of all nonprofits in terms of how
in certain instances of market failure they provide primary goods
like disaster relief more efficiently than their for-profit counter-
parts. Moreover, he would limit tax exemption to those nonprofits
that provide this metabenefit.
As we have seen, however, efficiency is only one of several
metabenefits that the traditional subsidy theory attributes to non-
profits. The most prominent others are pluralism and diversity.
Hansmann's economic analysis raises a critical question that is an-
swered only implicitly and unsystematically in the traditional subsidy
theory: Why are these metabenefits not provided in the market?
More specifically, does not the free market provide the greatest
possible pluralism and diversity? 3°2 Certainly not, if these asserted
virtues are interpreted—or expanded—to include modes of re-
source allocation that are alternatives to government fiat on the one
hand and ability to pay on the other. On this view, the free market
29g Id. at 67. The Utah Supreme Court raised a similar possibility in Utah County v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985). "It may very well be, as a matter
of public policy, that all hospitals, for-profit and nonprofit, should be granted a tax exemption
because of the great public need they serve." Id. at 277 (emphasis in original). This should
logically follow under traditional subsidy theory, the court reasoned, from the fact that "both
provide the public with the same service." Id. at 278. The court did not speculate further on
this possibility, however, because the Utah constitution would bar any legislative effort to
offer such a generous exemption. Id, at 277.
Hansmann, supra note 68, at 68.
3D1 See supra notes 281-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of these reasons.
902 See Gergen, supra note 69, at 1410 ("If a good may be provided through the market,
that mechanism promotes novelty and experimentation just as well.").
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and its constituent for-profit firms by definition fail to supply the
one metabenefit that charity by its nature does provide—altruism.
Even if there were a reason to subsidize nonprofit but not for-
profit production, there remains the question of whether tax ex-
emption is an appropriate vehicle for the subsidy. Hansmann points
out that such a subsidy is proportional to retained earnings, and
questions whether that linkage is justified under the traditional
subsidy theory. In his view, "there is no reason to expect a positive
correlation between the amount of a nonprofit's retained earnings
and the factors . . . that might justify a subsidy . . ."3°3
 Hansmann
does not explain, however, why such a positive correlation is a
necessary, as opposed to merely a desirable, condition for granting
a subsidy. It may be that tax exemption, with its coincidental link
to retained earnings, is the only politically feasible or practically
administrable form of subsidy to altruistic nonprofits as a class.
Sometimes half a loaf is better than none." 4
More fundamentally, both Hansmann and the traditional sub-
sidy theory may have created an illusory issue by describing the tax
exemption as a subsidy. The search for a link between retained
earnings and the reason for favoring the tax-exempt organization
would be less exigent if the tax exemption were viewed not as a
subsidy of some good—primary or otherwise—that the organization
provides, but rather as a recognition that the revenue thus ex-
" Hansmann, supra note 68, at 71.
"m At the risk of falling into the to pope fallacy, it is arguable that Hausmann has nut
shown why, if a positive correlation between retained earnings and the basis for the subsidy
is necessary, his own capital formation theory meets the condition. Indeed, the closest he
comes to addressing that issue is to say, in acknowledging the probable inadequacy of retained
earnings as an adequate source of capital for expansion, that "at least such earnings have
the advantage that they are likely to be proportional to the degree to which demand for the
organization's services exceeds its ability to supply them, since excess demand will generally
permit the organization to raise its prices (or attract larger donations)." Id. at 74.
1-kinsman!' has expressed a preference• for a related form of proportionality between
subsidy and volume of product subsidized in another context. fie maintains that the current
exemption from the unrelated business income tax of royalties that museums receive from
the sale by others of reproductions of works in their collections "produces a subsidy that is
neatly proportional to the publicly valuable service that the museum provides, which is
acquiring expensive art works for display at low or no fees." flansmann, supra note 15, at
631. He does not, however, elaborate on how this proportionality of subsidy with purpose is
achieved. The more likely relation would seem to be between royalties and the popularity of
the art work reproduced; reprints of cozy Currier and Ives winterscapes probably sell more
Christmas cards than, say, miniature facsimiles of Guernica. Thus, to the extent the mission
of museums is to collect and display art works appealing to something other than popular
tastes, the relation between reproduction royalties and museum purposes would seem to be
inverse.
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empted is for some reason not appropriately included in the tax
base. From this latter perspective, Bittker and Randert envision
quite a different theory of the tax exemption of altruistic organi-
zations. 305
3. Bittker and Randert's Technical Definition Theory
Bittker and Randert generally and enthusiastically accept the
traditional subsidy theory's premise that charitable purposes and
organizations are worthy of promotion. 3°° Moreover, they also find
evidence of this rationale in the earliest legislative history of section
501(c)(3). 307 But they point out two troubling practical problems
with this theory. First, they find it difficult to measure the asserted
virtues of charities. 3" Second, they note that when countermajori-
tarianism is one of the asserted virtues, as it is particularly for
private foundations, popularly elected legislators will be predictably
unimpressed. 30° Indeed, in their view, the decline in legislative tol-
erance for tax exemption of nonprofits warrants a re-examination
of its policy basis. 31 °
Bittker and Randert's canvass of the early legislative history of
section 501(c)(3) indicates that the basic reason for the exemption
of nonprofits was that the income tax could only logically be levied
on activities for profits" Bittker and Randert accept this nascent
rationale as essentially sound, faulting it only insofar as it fails to
distinguish between what they take to be the two functionally dif-
ferent forms of nonprofits. 3 ' 2 The first of these Bittker and Randert
describe as "public service organizations," because they "serve the
interest of society in a broad sense, ordinarily without economic
benefit to their organizers or benefactors." 3 's By contrast, the other
broad category of nonprofits, which they call "mutual benefit or-
ganizations," "are operated primarily for the benefit of their mem-
bers; they are nonprofit only in the limited sense that they do not
engage in business with the general public for the benefit of inves-
tors."314
3"5 Bittker & Randert, supra note 90.
306
 See id. at 332-33.
3"7 /d. at 304.
"8 Id. at 332-33.
888 Id. at 342.
"Id. at 301.
5 " Id. at 302-04.
312
 Id. at 305.
8 " Id. at 302.
"4 Id. (footnote omitted).
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We will examine below why, and to what extent, Bittker and
Randert believe mutual benefit organizations should be exempt
from income taxation. Our present concern is to examine their
claim that all forms of public service organizations' income should
be exempt. They identify two fundamental problems with taxing
the income of such organizations: first, their net income cannot be
made to fit under any workable tax definition of income, and sec-
ond, even if it could, no appropriate tax rate could be applied to
them.315
With respect to the definition of income, Bittker and Randert
point to problems on both the revenue and the expenditure sides
of the ledger. On the revenue side, the basic issue is whether to
treat dues and contributions as the equivalent, for tax purposes, of
business income or, alternatively, as gifts or capital contributions. If
dues and contributions are treated as the latter, Bittker and Randert
maintain, they are excluded from the computation of gross income
under provisions of the tax code generally applicable to individuals
and for-profit corporations."'
On the disbursements side, one basic issue is whether expen-
ditures for the conduct of the organization's program should be
deductible as analogous to ordinary and necessary business expen-
ses or nondeductible as not intended to make a profit."' Another
basic issue is whether the current charitable deduction could be
stretched or amended to cover such payments.'" If either of these
issues is resolved in favor of deductibility, as Bittker and Randert
suggest they should be, the taxable income of public service orga-
nizations will essentially be reduced to zero, because all their assets
are ultimately dedicated to their organizational programs. 319 Thus,
even if a workable definition of public service organizations' income
could be developed, the game would not be worth the candle.
Furthermore, Bittker and Randert argue that, even if a work-
able definition of their income could be developed, there would be
insurmountable problems in finding the appropriate rate at which
to tax it under either current theory of appropriate tax rates, the
"benefit" or "ability to pay" theories. The primary reason for this is
that, ideally, the rate should reflect the individual rates of the or-
515 /d. at 305.
' 16 Id. at 307-09.
" 17 id. at 309-12.
316 /d, at 312-13.
919 Id. at 311-12 (business expense deduction), 313 (charitable deduction).
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ganizations' beneficiaries, many of whom are likely to be poor and
thus "over-taxed" by any rate. Thus, if the game of taxing public
service organizations were to be played, the predictable losers would
be their beneficiaries.' 20
Hansmann takes issue with Bittker and Randert on both the
income-defining and rate-setting difficulties they identify. Before
turning to those specific criticisms, however, it is important to un-
derscore a salient formal feature of Bittker and Randert's argument.
As I have pointed out, they indicate at the outset their basic agree-
ment with the traditional subsidy view, that is, with the position that
there are affirmative features of public service organizations that
warrant favorable tax treatment. This belief, however, is extraneous
to their own argument in favor of the tax exemption. Their argu-
ment is not that the traditionally identified virtues of altruistic non-
profits make the tax exemption of their income desirable; rather,
their point is that peculiarities of that income—in particular, its
ultimate destination—make its tax exemption a practical necessity.
This distinction must be borne in mind in assessing Hansmann's
critique of the technical definition theory. Even if he shows that the
characteristic of altruistic nonprofits that Bittker and Randert iden-
tify does not make their tax exemption necessary, he may not have
shown that their tax exemption is necessarily a bad idea.
Hansmann offers several reasons why the problem of fixing an
appropriate tax rate for public service organizations is a red herring.
In the first place, he argues that, even as applied to businesses, the
corporate rate is seldom justified in terms of the "ability to pay" of
those on whom the tax ultimately falls. The incidence of the cor-
porate income tax is uncertain, and sometimes corporations are
viewed as having tax-paying capacities in their own right. 32 '
In the second place, Hansmann maintains that even if the
incidence of the tax were an appropriate concern, it would not
present a problem: "Mt is not obvious that the ultimate incidence
of an income tax levied on nonprofits would be especially regres-
sive."322 For one thing, donors are likely to share the burden with
beneficiaries. Donors will probably increase their giving to some
extent in order to offset the tax, rather than simply allowing less of
their gifts to go to charities' beneficiaries. To the extent that the tax
burden thus falls on donors, who are generally well-heeled, an
320 1d. at 314-15.
921 Hansmann, supra note 68, at 65.
922 Id
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income tax on nonprofits would not be regressive. And the bene-
ficiaries of nonprofits are themselves often well-to-do, whether the
organization receives its revenue from donations (as in the case of
museums, schools, and performing arts groups) or from sales of
goods or services (as in the case of private colleges and hospitals).
Finally, the exemption only benefits those charities that retain rev-
enues from year to year, as opposed to those like the Salvation
Army that pass their revenues directly through to their beneficia-
ries. Charities of the former sort, those that retain revenues in the
form of endowment funds or capital expenditures, "are generally
organizations, such as private schools, colleges, and hospitals, that
disproportionately serve the well-to-do." 323
Each of these criticisms is answerable, if not quite in Bittker
and Randert's own terms. Even if Hansmann is right that Bittker
and Randert misstate the conventional theory of corporate income
taxation, their theory of the exemption would still leave an intelli-
gible basis for taxing for-profit corporations. In effect, their tech-
nical definition of income, if extended to all altruistic nonprofits,
would simply convert the corporate income tax into an excise tax
on net earnings distributable for owners' private consumption. 324
With respect to the regressivity problem, both Hansmann on
the one hand and Bittker and Randert on the other take too narrow
a perspective. Even on the assumption that progressivity is an ap-
propriate goal of the tax system as a whole (an assumption all right-
thinking people held in a kinder, gentler time), progressivity need
not be present in every part of that system. Thus, one might tolerate
an element of regressivity in the tax exemption of elite cultural
institutions in the name of altruism, as long as the difference is
made up elsewhere in the system.
523 Id. at 66.
324
 Hansmann acknowledges this prospect but dismisses it with the following observation:
This argument proves too much, however, for it suggests that all nonprofit
corporations should be exempt, whereas exemption has in fact always been
available only to certain categories of them, and so far even the strongest
supporters of the exemption have not suggested that it be extended to all
organizations that are legitimately formed as nonprofit corporations.
Id. at 64 (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted). This suggestion is precisely the thesis of
this part of my paper, which I elaborate at infra notes 333-36 and accompanying text.
liansmann notes that this suggestion could be rejected on the argument that either nonprofit
organizations themselves or those who receive their services should be viewed as the ultimate
owners of nonprofits' capital. Hansmann, supra note 68, at 64. As he correctly points out,
however, the Fact that such analogies could be made does not mean they should be diapositive.
Id. This is all the more true when,. as we have seen in this very connection, contrasting
analogies can also be drawn.
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Finally, in his assertion that tax exemption benefits only non-
profits that retain earnings, Hansmann begs important questions
raised by Bittker and Randert. On the one hand, to reach the
conclusion that highly redistributive charities like the Salvation
Army do not benefit by the tax exemption, one must assume that
their distributions would be deemed deductible expenses. Only if
these expenditures are deductible do organizations that distribute
all revenues within the annual tax accounting period have no tax-
able income. If these expenses are not deductible, then the benefits
the Salvation Army confers upon indigents would have to be pur-
chased with after-tax dollars. Whether these expendittires would be
deductible is an open question. As Bittker and Randert point out,
these expenditures do not fit comfortably within the current defi-
nition of ordinary and necessary business expenses, with its empha-
sis on profit-earning motivation."'
On the other hand, to reach the conclusion that capital-intense
organizations actually benefit from the exemption, one must assume
negative answers to the questions Bittker and Randert raise about
the scope of the depreciation deduction. If, contrary to Hansmann's
assumptions, capital-intense organizations' plant and equipment
were subject to sufficiently generous depreciation allowances, their
potential taxable income might, as Bittker and Randert suggest, be
effectively eliminated, albeit more indirectly and awkwardly than
under the present system of outright exemption. 326
Thus, Hansmann's assault on the rate-setting difficulty is not
especially effective. He has considerably greater success, however,
attacking the more critical premise of the technical definition theory,
the purported problem of constructing a workable definition of
altruistic organizations' income."' In the first place, as he points
out, many charities receive most of their revenues not from dona-
tions, as Bittker and Randert tend to assume, but from the sales of
goods and services directly to consumers. Hospitals are an obvious
example. Hansmann argues that:
For such organizations it would be perfectly easy and
natural to carry over the tax accounting that is applied to
business firms, taking receipts from sales as the measure
of gross income and permitting the usual deductions for
expenses incurred in producing the goods or services sold.
323 Bittker & Randert, supra note 90, at 309-10.
326 Id. at 313-14.
5" Hansmann, supra note 68, at 58-62.
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The resulting net earnings figure could be taxed just as
in the case of a business firm. 328
Hansmann, as we have seen, is perhaps too glib in his reference to
"the usual deductions." Read one way, Hansmann may be implicitly
answering the question Bittker and Randert pose—are distributions
to altruistic organizations' beneficiaries, in kind or cash, to be treated
as deductible?—in the affirmative. 329 But that question could plau-
sibly be answered in the negative. If by "usual deductions" Hans-
mann has in mind "ordinary and necessary business expenses," then
such deductions could quite consistently with current concepts be
limited to those expenditures necessary to the production of in-
come. Disposing of income earned is obviously a different matter,
and could be treated less favorably.
But to say that ordinary concepts of income measurement could
be carried over to the income of commercial nonprofits is not to
say that they should be. Nor is it clear why applying these concepts
in the nonprofit context is any easier or more natural than applying
the very different approach suggested by Bittker and Randert. As
a descriptive matter, Hansmann is quite right that the receipts of
commercial nonprofits closely resemble those of their for-profit
counterparts. At the same time, Bittker and Randert are equally
right in pointing out that the distribution of receipts in the two
cases is quite different. Identifying these characteristics of non-
profits—similarities to for-profits on the one hand and differences
from them on the other—leaves entirely unanswered the normative
question of whether their income should be treated the same. Hans-
mann's assimilation of the income of commercial nonprofits to that
of for-profit firms shows that the taxation of the former's income
is possible, not that it is appropriate.
This confusion of the possible with the desirable is still clearer
in Hansmann's discussion of the revenues of donative nonprofits.
He argues that, even for charities that receive most of their revenue
in the form of donations, "there is a natural correlate to the concept
of taxable income developed for business entities." 3" This is Hans-
mann's now-familiar equation of purchases and donations. To use
an only slightly tendentious example, CARE could be taxed on the
donations it receives, just as GM is taxed on its sales revenues. To
32H Id. at 59.
329 Hansmann has indicated in private correspondence that the answer is "Clearly yes,
in my view." Letter from Henry Hansmann to Rob Atkinson (Dec. 13, 1989).
"'' Hansmann, supra note 68, at 61.
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use Hansmann's example, your paying Tiffany's to send a wedding
gift to a friend is structurally "much the same as if you give to the
Red Cross money to spend on food for a flood victim; in each case
you are paying an organization to render services to a third
party."33 ' The obvious point of identifying this structural similarity
is to suggest that the Red Cross could be taxed on the excess of its
donation revenue over operating expenses, just as Tiffany's is taxed
on its net profits. Hansmann explicitly universalizes this conclusion
immediately after the Tiffany's example: "Thus, it seems that with-
out much difficulty we can extend to nonprofits the general prin-
ciples of tax accounting commonly applied to profit-seeking
firms." 332
The strength of Hansmann's critique of Bittker and Randert's
theory is to point out that all the questions they raise about the
definition of altruistic nonprofits' income are technically answerable
on fairly straightforward analogies to the income of for-profit firms.
This might require a degree of complexity, even convolution, but
these would hardly be novelties to the tax code. Thus, if we are not
to extend ordinary principles of income taxation to nonprofits, we
must look for a normative, rather than merely a technical, reason.
Tiffany's net income available for distribution to its stockholders is
arguably different from the Red Cross's distributions of donations
to flood victims, but the two could be made subject to tax with
roughly equal convenience. But again, that only poses the normative
question: Should we make this extension?
Though Bittker and Randert fail to show us that the taxation
of altruistic organizations' income is practically impossible, they con-
firm a point made in more detail in section IV. Altruistic nonprofits
differ from their for-profit counterparts, if not in the nature of
their revenues, then certainly in the identity of their beneficiaries.
As we shall see in the next subsection, it is possible at least in theory
to take this distinction as a substantive, as opposed to a technical,
basis for the favorable tax treatment of altruistic nonprofits.
4. Altruism Itself as the Basis of the Tax Exemption of Altruistic
Nonprofits
An alternative to Hansmann thus emerges from this assessment
of the traditional subsidy theory and the technical definition theory
531
 Id. at 61-62.
"2 Id. at 62,
May 1990]
	 NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
	
617
in light of Hansmann's efficiency criterion. In this subsection I will
first compare the altruism theory with the other theories in the
abstract. I will then illustrate the differences in outcome that the
different theories produce by applying them to an example. As we
shall see, the altruism theory is essentially a synthesis of the tradi-
tional subsidy theory and Bittker and Randert's technical definition
theory. In the final subsection we will look more closely at the
merits—and demerits—of the altruism theory itself.
The best way to see both the indebtedness of the altruism
theory to the other theories and its differences from them is to
begin with the Code's definition of charity in section 501(c)(3)–the
definition that the traditional subsidy theory defends. That defini-
tion has two essential criteria, the affirmative requirement of a
purpose that produces public benefits and the negative prohibition
of private inurement and excessive private benefits" Traditional
subsidy theory focuses on the affirmative criterion, attempting to
justify the favorable tax treatment of charities in terms of the public
benefits flowing from the particular kinds of activities they under-
take. The metabenefits associated with the manner in which the
preferred activities are conducted figure prominently in theoretical
defenses of the existing scope of the exemption, but not in the
framework of the exemption itself." 4
 And in both the legal defini-
don and its traditional defense, the prohibition of private inurement
is something of an afterthought, perhaps based on what Hansmann
shows to be the dubious assumption that for-profit firms would
invariably skim off any subsidy in the form of additional profits.
Bittker and Randert, by contrast, focus on the negative crite-
rion, the prohibition of private inurement. The peculiarity of their
public service organizations' income lies ultimately in its not being
available for distribution to private investors. Bittker and Randert
simply assume the legitimacy of the affirmative requirement that
exempt organizations pursue a purpose approved by, the Code as
redounding to the public benefit.
Hausmann argues that linking the prohibition of private in-
urement with the affirmative requirement of providing certain pri-
mary benefits is at odds with the idea of subsidizing those benefits.
This is because for-profit firms, which are excluded from the sub-
ass
	 § 501(c)(3) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a), (b), and (c) (as amended in
1976) (setting out general exemption criteria).
3" An element of the metabenefit of altruism, however, does occasionally appear at the
margin, as 1 discuss more fully infra note 335.
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sidy by the private inurement prohibition, will pass any subsidy on
to consumers under conditions of reasonable competition. Under
his own theory, by contrast, the private inurement provision is
essentially related to the rationale for the subsidy. The subsidy is
designed to promote the metabenefit of efficiency, and only non-
profit firms address the kinds of contract failure and experience
the kinds of capital constraints that warrant efficiency-based relief.
The altruism theory of the tax exemption combines these three
elements—primary benefits, metabenefits, and the private inure-
ment prohibition—differently. Like the Hansmann and traditional
subsidy theories and in contrast to Bittker and Randert, the altruism
theory rests on the premise that the favorable tax treatment of
altruistic nonprofits is an affirmative preference for something they
provide. It also builds on the traditional theory's insight that the
desirable attributes include not only primary benefits, but also me-
tabenefits. Yet it incorporates Hansmann's criticism that it makes
no sense to subsidize only nonprofit producers of primary benefits.
Furthermore, it counters Hansmann's observation that for-profits
may also supply some metabenefits like pluralism and diversity with
the observation that one metabenefit, the altruistic provision of
goods and services, is available only from nonprofits."'
" 5 Though a complete comparison of section 501(c)(3)'s exemption criteria and the
altruism theory lies beyond the scope of this paper, it is important not to exaggerate the
differences. In its application, if not in its articulation, section 501(c)(3) may well exhibit
substantial overlap with the scope of the exemption that would follow from the altruism
theory. One commentary on the traditional subsidy theory has shown that the standard for
exemption under the residual category of "charity" of section 501(c)(3) requires a "donative
factor," that is, "the provision of goods or services at no charge or at a charge below cost."
Persons, Osborn, and Feldman, Criteria for Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3), 'in 4 FILER
COMMISSION PAPERS, supra note 3, at 1909,1947-50 (1977) [hereinafter Criteria). The required
degree of donativeness under § 501(c)(3) varies according to the goods and services provided,
id. at 1948-49, probably reflecting an implicit preference for the delivery of certain products
or the delivery of any kinds of products to certain recipients. This preference may also
account for the fact that, outside the residual category of charity, organizations performing
exempt functions listed in section 501(c)(3)—education, for example—are not explicitly re-
quired to exhibit any degree of donativeness in the form of either below-cost sales or donative
financing. Indeed, some have suggested that this may be increasingly true of even the residual
charitable category: "as the criteria pertaining to charitable organizations evolve in response
to changing conditions in society, it is possible that some charitable activities will be exempted
from the donative requirement altogether, just as education is now so exempted." Criteria,
supra, at 1949. This rather misleadingly suggests, however, that the latter organizations lack
altruism. As we have seen, Type 7 organizations—commercial entrepreneurial nonprofits
that operate for the benefit of their consumers—exhibit a degree of altruism, or donativeness,
to the extent that they sell their products at a price that covers all costs but that of capital.
Nevertheless, the scope of exemption under section 501(c)(3) is probably both more and
less inclusive than it would be under the altruism theory. Section 501(c)(3) does not cover
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Altruism is close to the structural uniqueness that Bittker and
Randert emphasize about the income of altruistic nonprofits. But
the altruism theory accepts Hansmanti's argument that the exemp-
tion of this form of income is not a technical necessity. It is, rather,
a deliberate social policy choice that must be made on non-efficiency
grounds, grounds other than those Hansmann maintains are the
sole legitimate basis for the exemption. This is not to say that he is
wrong in pointing to an efficiency-based rationale for exempting
some altruistic organizations. But it is to say that he is wrong if he
thinks he has discovered the one true way, the sole reason why
altruistic nonprofits might be given favored tax treatment. In sum-
mary, the altruism theory takes the formal aspect of altruistic or-
ganizations that Bittker and Randert identify and offers it as a
substantive metabenefit meriting tax subsidization.
Mr. Orton's Ceramic Foundation is again a useful example, this
time for illustrating the practical implications of the different ex-
emption theories. Under Hansmann's theory, the Foundation would
be denied exemption because the production of pyrometric cones
exhibits none of the forms of contract failure he identifies. The
cones are private goods, and their purchasers, who are their con-
sumers, are likely to be specialists quite capable of monitoring their
quality. The Foundation, of course, has a monopoly on cone pro-
duction by virtue of its patent, but the production itself could readily
be conducted by for-profit licensees.
The altruism theory would exempt the Foundation's income
because it is being used to subsidize consumption by someone other
than those who control the organization, in this case, those who use
pyrometric cones in ceramics research. Under this theory, there
would be no inquiry into the merits of such research, no search for
public benefits flowing from it. The metabenefit of altruistic pro-
duction would suffice, at least prima facia.
altruistic provision of goods or services independent of the nature of the product or the
need of the recipient. See, e.g., Christian Stewardship, Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 1037,
1045 (1978) (denial of charitable status to organization that offered free advice on charitable
giving aspects of estate planning to prospective donors to affiliated religious organizations);
Weisbrod, Book Review, 11 Poe. CHOICE 111, 114 (1971) (reviewing T. IRELAND & D.
JOHNSON, TUX ECONOMICS OF CHARITY (1970)); see alSO Sacks, supra note 28, at 520 ("[Wlhen
activities have been adjudged adequately performed through the market mechanism, they
have not been regarded as philanthropic, even though organized on a nonprofit basis."). On
the other hand, section 501(c)(3) exempts some mutual organizations even though they
provide essentially private goods to their members on an ordinary contractual basis, as long
as these goods are deemed to redound to the "public benefit." See Sound Health Assoc. v.
Commissioner, 71 T.C. 158, 191 (1978) (recognizing charitable status of member•controlled
health maintenance organization).
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By contrast, after ascertaining that the threshold test of non-
inurement is met, traditional subsidy theory would focus on the
nature of the good provided to determine whether it conferred the
kind of public benefit that warrants tax exemption. In ruling on
the Foundation's exemption, the majority and the dissent in the
Tax Court differed on precisely this issue. Bittker and Randert's
approach has no problem justifying the majority decision; the Foun-
dation has no income distributable to equity owners. But if the
dissent were to prevail on the issue of public purpose, the technical
definition theorists would face a dilemma. They would have to
decide whether to follow the altruism theory in extending the ex-
emption to all altruistic nonprofits, irrespective of the kinds of goods
or services they provide, or the traditional subsidy theory in limiting
the scope of the exemption to those organizations that provide
primary public benefits recognized by the courts. Bittker and Rah-
dert fairly explicitly adopt the latter position. 336
B. Mutual Benefit Organizations
Mutual benefit nonprofits provide a helpful comparison to al-
truistic nonprofits at this point. I have argued that the locus of
altruistic organizations' benefits may serve as the basis for their tax
exemption. This subsection briefly examines whether the same can
be said of mutual benefit organizations. In this connection, tradi-
tional subsidy theory is less helpful. But here again, the debate
between Bittker and Randert on the one hand and Hansmann on
the other raises an implicit policy issue that cannot be resolved in
terms of Bittker and Randert's technical analysis and that need not
be decided solely on the basis of Hansmann's economic analysis.
Bear in mind, however, that this treatment of mutual benefit or-
ganizations is merely offered for the sake of comparison and sym-
metry, not to add much that is new, much less to say the final word.
As with altruistic nonprofits, a preliminary terminological note
is in order here. By "mutual benefit nonprofit" I mean a Type 10
organization, a nonprofit that derives its revenues from sales of
ordinary consumer goods or services to its members, who control
the organization and for whose benefit it operates."? Bittker and
Randert use the term "mutual benefit organization" in essentially
536 Bittker & Randert, supra note 90, at 331-32.
537 See supra notes 163-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of Type 10 organi-
zations.
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the same way,558 but cover two identifiable additional kinds of or-
ganizations. First, they include consumer cooperatives, which, as we
have seen, are distinct from Type 10 organizations only in that they
are permitted to confer benefits on their members in cash as well
as in kind. Second, Bittker and Randert implicitly include, or at
least do not explicitly exclude, mutual nonprofit organizations that
I classify as altruistic because they provide their members with either
public goods or "socialized" private goods. With these slight differ-
ences noted, however, it is safe to view Bittker and Randert's mutual
benefit nonprofits as coterminous with my Type 10 nonprofits.
Hansmann's four-part typology of nonprofits, as we have seen, does
not distinguish mutual commercials operated for members' benefit
from those operated for the benefit of others. Because Hansmann's
tax policy discussion is limited to the former, his description of
mutual commercial nonprofits overlaps almost precisely with my
Type 10 and Bittker and Randert's mutual benefit nonprofits. Ac-
cordingly, I will use Bittker and Randert's more familiar term,
mutual benefit nonprofit, throughout the following discussion.
1. Traditional Subsidy Theory
With respect to mutual benefit organizations, the traditional
subsidy theory is less well articulated. In part, it follows the "public
benefit" theory of the charitable exemption."" In part, it acknowl-
edges that the historical bases for tax exemptions of many section
501(c) organizations are obscure and perhaps better explained in
terms of political power than policy merit. 34° This is perhaps re-
flected in the fact that, in dealing with these organizations and their
close kindred, consumer cooperatives, in the Tax Code, "Congress
has preferred piecemeal legislation to broad generalizations." 941 As
a result, it has "established many divergent taxing systems, which
turn on such variables as the organization's size, function, history,
and occupational or geographic conditions. " 942
"8 Bittker & Randert, supra note 90, at 302.
"9 See P. TREUSCH, TAX-EXEMPT CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 5 (3d ed. 1988) ("This
welter of categories [in I.R,G. 501(c)1 . . . suggests that the granting of tax-exempt status
is aimed either, at encouraging private organizations and public instrumentalities to take on
a task that must otherwise be met by governmental appropriation or at fostering some activity
regarded as fundamental or socially desirable.").
54D See McGovern, The Exemption Provisions of Subchapter F, 29 TAX LAW. 523 (1976).
"' Bittker & Randert, supra note 90, at 349.
so Id. at 349.
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2. Bittker and Randert's Theory
Bittker and Randert manage . to hear two contrapuntal themes
in the Code's cacophony, themes suggesting that some forms of
mutual benefit income should be taxed and other forms exempt.
Bittker and Randert derive the exemption of their exempt function
income—in their case, the excess of revenues from sales to members
over costs—from the purpose of these organizations, which is "to
provide goods and services to their members at cost." 343 Organiza-
tions that operate for that purpose in effect simply return net
revenues to members as refunds for overcharges, albeit in kind
rather than in cash.344 To put the matter in terms we used in section
III, the locus of benefit is the organization's members. On the
analogy of net revenues to refunds, Bittker and Randert argue that
they should not be taxed at the organizational level. Rather, the
organization is properly viewed as an aggregate of its members,
none of whom would be taxed as an individual on receiving over-
charge refunds.345 This is the principle theme that Bittker and
Randert perceive in the tax exemption of mutual benefits.
There is, however, a counterpoint. What happens if the orga-
nization does not immediately expend the overcharge for members'
benefit, but instead invests it to generate passive income used later,
say, to reduce membership fees or product prices? Under Bittker
and Randert's theory of mutual benefit organizations as aggregates
of their members, their passive income should be taxed. If the
members themselves received individual refunds and invested
them, the proceeds would be ordinary taxable income; by leaving
the refunds in the organization, the members have simply pooled
their individual accounts. 346 Otherwise, the members would be re-
ceiving tax advantages by doing things together that they could not
receive by doing them as individuals."'
"3 Id. at 348.
s" This is not true of revenues from sales to nonmembers, which under Bittker and
Randert's approach would be subject to tax, and which are in fact taxable in the case of some
kinds of mutual benefit organizations under current law. Bittker & Randert, supra note 90,
at 350-52 (receipts from nonmembers generally taxable in the case of social clubs and
consumer cooperatives); id. at 352-53 (exemption of receipts from nonmembers in the case
of various other mutual benefit organizations and some cooperatives "probably reflects benign
neglect more than thoughtful attention").
", Id. at 348-49.
Bittker & Randert, supra note 90, at 349-50.
517 Hansmann does not address Bittker and Randert's theory that the investment income
of mutual benefit organizations should be taxed. Perhaps this is because their position on
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3. Hansmann's Critique
Hansmann's basic position on mutual benefit organizations is
that their exemption is to be assessed in terms of the capital-for-
mation criterion discussed above in connection with altruistic non-
profits. If they arise in contexts where contract failure is a problem,
then they are likely to be the most efficient suppliers and yet, owing
to the constraints on their access to equity capital, they are not likely
to be able to expand at an optimal rate. Under these conditions,
mutual benefit organizations warrant the exemption of their net
revenues from taxation as a means of increasing their retained
earnings available for growth. 348
But, as Hansmann points out, some mutual benefit organiza-
tions—social clubs, for example—arise in industries not beset by con-
tract failure and provide their members essentially private goods
that are available from alternative for-profit suppliers. These mu-
tual benefit organizations fall outside the capital-formation rationale
for tax exemption. With respect to them, Hansmann concedes that
Bittker and Randert's exemption argument has some force. Recast-
ing their theory slightly, Hansmann agrees that, at one level of
analysis:
Since we do not tax individuals on household production
that they use directly for their personal consumption, such
as leisure activity and home-grown vegetables, it is incon-
sistent to levy a tax on the proceeds resulting when indi-
viduals band together, in a nonprofit or a cooperative
corporation, to produce services for themselves. 3"
To treat the two similar forms of production differently for tax
purposes would create artificial, and perhaps inefficient, incentives
in favor of household production. 35° But, Hansmann points out, an
equally apt analogy between for-profit firms and mutual benefit
organizations suggests a diametrically opposed result:
[I]t is not immediately apparent that there is a principled
reason for imposing a tax on the return to capital in a
tennis club in which the investors of capital and the cus-
tomers are different people (as is likely to be the case if
investment income is a corollary to their position on exempt function income, which he finds
fundamentally flawed.
	 •
545 Hansmann, supra note 68, at 93-94.
549
 Id. at 95.
"0 Id.
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the club is formed as a business corporation), but not when
the investors of capital and the customers are the same
group of people (as is likely to be the case if the club is
organized as a (mutual) nonprofit corporation or as a
cooperative corporation)."'
Here again, Hansmann has caught Bittker and Randert in a
dual fallacy. For one thing, they treat a factual feature—in this
instance, the similarity between mutual benefit organizations and
household production—as dispositive of a normative issue, whether
mutual benefits should be tax exempt. This treatment could, of
course, rest on a hidden but arguably accurate assumption, namely,
that nonprofit production is like household production in the way
that, as a policy matter, justifies the exemption of household pro-
duction from the income tax. From this premise it would follow
that, all other things being equal, production by mutual benefits
should also enjoy tax exemption. As a matter of fact, however,
household production is probably ignored for tax purposes because
of measurement and monitoring problems that are not as serious
in the context of mutual benefit organizations." 2
Beyond that, all else is not equal. Even if mutual benefit orga-
nizations and household production share the feature that entitles
the latter to tax exemption, mutual benefits nevertheless exhibit
another feature that points to a different result. In Hansmann's
view, this skewing additional feature is their similarity to for-profit
production. Having found that production by mutual benefit or-
ganizations is like household production, which is tax exempt, and
also like for-profit production, which is taxable, Hansmann has
identified a dilemma. Moreover, as Hansmann points out, the res-
olution of the dilemma has practical repercussions: treating like
forms of organization differently for tax purposes creates biases in
favor of the more advantageously treated form. Finally, Hansmann
implies, quite rightly, that the way out of the dilemma does not lie
in the factual similarities themselves; these are the source of the
dilemma, not its solution. His resolution is to use the bias of tax
preference to offset the allocational bias he has identified, that is,
the inaccessibility of equity capital to nonprofits addressing contract
failure.353
351 Hansmann, supra note 68, at 95-96.
3" See M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 23-26 (5th ed. 1988) (noting theo-
retical, practical, and political problems of defining income to include imputed service income,
or household production).
3" Hansmann, supra note 68, at 96.
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But, as we have seen in connection with altruistic nonprofits,
promotion of efficiency is not the only possible normative basis for
exempting an organization's income. There I suggested that the
structural differences between for-profit and nonprofit revenues—
the availability of the former for distribution to equity owners, as
opposed to the dedication of the latter to the benefit of others—
could be taken as a substantive reason for exempting the income of
nonprofits. One might prefer altruistic provision of goods and ser-
vices, and decide to encourage organizations that engage in it with
the exemption of their income from taxation. A similar argument
can be made in the context of mutual benefit organizations. In
addition to noting, as Hansmann does in his tennis club example,
that nonprofit and for-profit suppliers differ essentially in the iden-
tity of those who receive the returns on their capital, one might
decide, on grounds of public policy or private preference, that
organizations operating to benefit their members should be given
inducements unavailable to those operating to enrich their inves-
tors. In other words, mutualism, like altruism, could be viewed as
a metabenefit to be encouraged with preferential tax treatment. 354
C. Unrelated Business Income of Altruistic Nonprofits
Thus far we have examined the policy reasons for exempting
exempt function, gift, and investment income, first of altruistic
organizations; then of mutual benefit organizations. In this subsec-
tion we address separately the exemption of the fourth and final
form of nonprofit income, unrelated business income. The principal
reason for treating it separately is that, beginning in 1950 355 and to
an even larger extent after 1969, 356 this form of income has been
subject to tax irrespective of the exemption status of the recipient
organization. 357 The twin foci of the often elliptical debate about
the unrelated business income tax are efficiency and fairness. No
clear consensus has emerged on either point. 358
354 See F. GLADSTONE, Supra note 80, at 87-89 (urging treatment of mutual aid and self-
help organizations as charities under United Kingdom tax system). I will not explore the
merits of mutualism further, though some of what I say in defense of altruism in notes 362-
79 and accompanying text, infra, is applicable to mutualism, mutates mutandis.
355
 Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 301, 64 Stat. 906, 947-53.
"6
 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 121, 83 Stat. 487, 568-84.
357
 I.R.C. § 511 (1988).
55°
 Hansmann suggests that the existing system of taxing unrelated business income is
fundamentally sound on efficiency grounds. Hansmann, supra note 15. Susan Rose-Ackerman
has concluded that the tax in its present form creates more inefficiency—and unfairness-
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My altruism account offers little on the former point beyond a
cautionary note: even if the efficiency point is resolved in favor of
the tax, other normative issues remain to be addressed before the
debate is closed. One of these is whether exemption might never-
theless be an appropriate means of subsidizing the work of some
or all altruistic organizations, even at some cost in efficiency. Reso-
lution of that question, in turn, requires renewed focus on the
fairness issue: even if one thought indirectly subsidizing certain
nonprofits through the exemption of their unrelated business in-
come were a good idea, would it be fair to deny the exemption to
for-profits• engaged in producing the same good or service?
The answer to this question lies, alas, beyond the scope of this
paper, and perhaps also beyond my ethical insights. There is, how-
ever, a hidden premise in one form of the unfairness argument that
can be readily—and briefly—revealed. Reduced to its essence, the
argument runs like this:
(1) Major premise—It is unfair to treat like organizations
differently, such as by granting tax exemption to one but
not another.
(2) Minor premise—For-profit and nonprofit producers
of widgets are alike in that they produce and sell widgets.
(3) Conclusion—To grant tax exemption only to nonprofit
widget producers would be unfair. 359
The problem with this syllogism lies in its second premise, which
silently assumes that a single asserted likeness, here the common
production of widgets, is the only relevant characteristic. This may,
than it corrects, and thus she advocates its abolition. Rose-Ackerman, Unfair Competition and
Corporate Income Taxation, 34 STAN. L. REA, . 1017 (1982). Traditional subsidy theory has tended
to track the law itself. It once defended exemption of charities' unrelated income as destined
for charitable purposes; it now tends to concede that such exemption would lead to "unfair
competition" with for-profits. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 291, at 40-41, 51-52; see also F.
GLADSTONE, supra note 80, at 86 (similar view of charities in United Kingdom). Bittker and
Randert discuss the imposition of the tax on unrelated income as one of several recent
retreats from full exemption and criticize it on a variety of economic and tax policy grounds,
Bittker & Randert, supra note 90, at 319-26, relying in part on the analysis of Klein, Income
Taxation and Legal Entities, 20 UCLA L. REV. 13, 61-68 (1972).
"9 See Bennett & Rudney, supra note 286, at 1095:
The tax status of income-producing activities of nonprofits should be based on
the fundamental principle and Constitutional guarantee of "equal treatment
under law." . . . Commercial activities of nonprofits are carried on in the
marketplace in competition with taxpaying firms. There is no justification for
subsidizing such private market activity by treating the entity's commercial
activity as tax free.
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of course, be true. But sometimes it is not, as the following argument
of the same form suggests:
(I) Major premise—lt is unfair to treat similar individuals
differently, as by taxing some at higher rates than others.
(2) Minor premise—High income individual taxpayers
and low income individual taxpayers are all individuals.
(3) Conclusion—Taxing high income taxpayers at higher
rates is unfair.
This latter syllogism, for all its formal correctness, may be ques-
tioned nonetheless. An equally logical, and at one time politically
respectable, argument reaches a radically different conclusion on
the assumption that wealthy taxpayers' wealth itself has a significant
bearing on the rate at which it is fair to tax them.
A parallel shift in premises gives a different conclusion in the
UB1T debate as well:
(1) Major premise—It is sometimes fair to treat different
organizations differently, as by publically subsidizing one
that provides a desirable good or service that the other
does not provide.
(2) Minor premise—In addition to producing widgets, al-
truistic nonprofits, but not for-profit organizations, pro-
vide the metabenefit of altruism. 36°
(3) Conclusion—Altruistic nonprofit widget makers may
fairly be granted tax exempt status that is denied to for-
profit producers.
This argument, of course, is hardly above challenge itself. One
might well question, for example, whether altruistic provision of
goods and services is socially desirable. 86 ' And even if one takes the
premises as true, the syllogism only proves that abolishing the un-
related business income tax would be fair, not that it is desirable.
As with the question of progressive income taxation, allocative and
incentive effects cannot be ignored. We must turn to these questions
36° Directly, in the case of Type 5 organizations like Hansmann's shoe store, where net
gains are used to subsidize shoe consumers, or indirectly, as in the case of Type 4 organi-
zations like NYU's macaroni factory, where net profits from the sale of one product arc used
to cross-subsidize consumption of another.
Sill As James and Rose-Ackerman point out, "we must acknowledge that the concept of
'equity' is highly subjective. All people would not agree on whether the income distribution
is made better or worse alter cross-subsidization by NPO's [nonprofit organizations]." E.
JAMES & S. RosE-AcKERmAN, supra note 8, at 91. My purpose here is not to resolve that issue,
but to pose it more clearly.
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of altruism's inherent desirability and attendant costs in the final
subsection.
D. Altruism as a Metabenefit to Be Subsidized
This subsection, I am afraid, is bound to be something of an
anticlimax. In section III, I identified nine kinds of organizations
that embody a recognizable form of altruism ignored by the contract
failure theory of nonprofits, and in section IV I showed that al-
truistic organizations address critical problems with individual al-
truism, problems that neither for-profit firms nor governmental
entities can fully solve. In the preceding parts of this section, I
formally analyzed altruism as a metabenefit that is the essential
characteristic of altruistic organizations and showed that granting
such organizations favorable income tax treatment would not run
afoul of the problems Hansmann raises with other exemption jus-
tifications. It would be logical for me here to prove that altruism
really is a good thing and thus worthy of tax favors. But that is too
ambitious. The most that I hope to do in this subsection is to suggest
why I do not attempt this proof and to show what some of the costs
will be if altruism is nonetheless taken as worthy of subsidy.
1. The Goodness of Altruism
Like responsible parenthood and apple pie, altruism has a cer-
tain presumptive appeal. Unfortunately, it is hard to place that
appeal on a solid theoretical foundation. It may be possible to argue
in favor of the altruistic provision of goods and services on instru-
mental grounds, as a means to some higher end. Hansmann, for
example, has shown that some altruistic nonprofits provide goods
and services more efficiently. Simon argues that one particular kind
of altruistic organization, the private foundation, provides a greater
degree of innovation than is likely to come in their absence from
either for-profit firms or the government. Perhaps an argument
could be constructed showing that all altruistic organizations serve
to advance some recognized good like efficiency or innovation or,
as traditional theory suggests, pluralism or diversity.
Kenneth Boulding has offered the outline of an instrumental
defense of altruism that, if sustainable, would tend to undermine
any efficiency-based attack on the tax exemption of altruistic orga-
nizations. Building on Schumpeter's analysis of the culture of cap-
italism, Boulding suggests that market economies may not be able
to sustain the societies that produce them. The institutional frame-
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work of market economies may have to be supported by grants,
transfers that, unlike those of the market itself, do not involve a
material quid pro quo to the transferor. 362 To the extent that this
is true, the kinds of transfers in which altruistic organizations es-
sentially engage would be preconditions of an efficiently-operating
market, the desideratum of the normative side of economic analysis.
But even if uncompensated transfers are essential to a market
economy, it does not necessarily follow that indiscriminate encour-
agement of organizations engaging in such transfers would be a
boon to capitalism. Indeed, as Hansmann has suggested, such en-
couragement might be baneful because it might undermine another
critical component of capitalist societies, the urge for personal ag-
grandizement. In view of this risk, "one might argue that a society
based on a free enterprise economy must be ever vigilant to main-
tain the entrepreneurial ethic."363 Unless capitalism is truly a frail
flower, however, the baneful or beneficial effects it would feel from
any particular public policy toward altruistic nonprofits are probably
negligible.
On a less grand scale, incidental effects of exempting altruistic
organizations are more predictable. This extension of the tax ex-
emption would necessarily promote the acknowledged metabenefit
of pluralism, because altruistic provision of goods and services is an
alternative to both market and governmental provision. The plu-
ralism fostered by the exemption of all altruistic nonprofits, more-
over, would be a step beyond the pluralism often associated with
the charitable exemption in its present form. The emphasis there
is on a pluralism of means, of different ways of undertaking pur-
poses publicly recognized as worthy. The altruism theory would
promote a pluralism of ends, of different visions of what purposes
should be undertaken for the benefit of others. Under the altruism
theory, the presumption would be that any activity carried on altru-
istically is worthy of encouragement through tax exemption. Altru-
ists would thus be encouraged not only to find new ways to provide
recognized public benefits like health care and education, but to
define for themselves new public benefits. By accepting the altruistic
provision of any good or service as presumptively good, the law
would leave it to individual altruists to choose the particular prod-
ucts they think their fellows most need. Thus an inevitable byprod-
"2 K. liouLuiNc, THE ECONOMY OF LOVE AND FEAR 28 (1973) (citing J. ScnumPETER,
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1942)).
srn Hansmann, supra note 129, at 525.
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uct of implementing the altruism theory of the exemption would
be a broader form of pluralism.
One might, of course, question whether that form of plural-
ism—or, indeed, any of the other ends that the exemption of al-
truistic organizations can be alleged to serve—is itself truly desira-
ble. We come, directly or indirectly, to a basic question: what is
ultimately good? I hope I will be forgiven for not attempting to
answer that question here. Less modestly—and perhaps less forgiv-
ably—I must admit my suspicion that the question of inherent
goodness may not be subject to proof, in the case of either altruism
or other proposed desiderata. Behind Hansmann's efficiency anal-
ysis is an elaborate effort to show why efficiency is, if not the
summum bonum, then at least a reasonable approximation in hu-
man affairs.364 Similarly, Simon's defense of private foundations in
terms of their innovativeness rests explicitly on John Rawls's theory
of justice."' With respect to altruism, Robert Paul Wolff has dem-
onstrated that regard for others' welfare, evert for the welfare of
society, is at least a possible and intelligible preference. But, as he
admits, it is one thing to say something is a possible preference, and
quite another to say that it should be preferred. 366 I suspect that
the latter issue is not a mailer of logical proof, but of faith, of freely
chosen values and visions. 367
2. Counting the Costs of Altruism
I decline, therefore, to try to show that altruism is inherently
good. But by reviewing some of the costs of supporting altruistic
organizations with tax exemption, I hope to make the case for their
tax exemption clearer, if not compelling.
a. Loss of tax exemption for non-altruistic organizations
Extending the federal income tax exemption to all altruistic
organizations would not necessarily involve withdrawing the ex-
564 See R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981), especially chapter 4, "The Ethical
and Political Basis of Wealth Maiimization."
56 ' Simon, supra note 235, at 251.
366 R. WOLFF, THE POVERTY OF LIBERALISM 193-94 (1968).
567 One problem with this Heist refusal to argue the good of altruism is that it leaves
my flanks open to those who assert that altruism is undesirable, a sign of weakness, rather
than strength, of character. See, e.g., F. NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS (W.
Kaufmann Sc R. Hollingdale trans. 1967). Having admitted the vulnerability of my position
to this line of attack, I will not consider it further. Instead, I will address the possible objections
of those who, while valuing altruism in the abstract, might question the wisdom of promoting
it in the form and by the means 1 recommend.
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emption that some non-altruistic organizations—mutual benefit or-
ganizations, for example—now enjoy. The altruism theory adds a
new basis for exemption that would take its place among others
such as those offered by traditional subsidy theorists and by Hans-
mann. If the altruism theory displaces anything, it is faith in one
truly legitimate basis for tax exemption. Under the altruism theory
in its purest form, altruism would be a sufficient, but not a necessary,
condition of tax exemption.
b. Efficiency costs
We have noted several times in passing the charge that non-
profits are in general less efficient producers than their for-profit
counterparts, primarily because they lack the salutary supervision
of ordinary investors with an economic incentive to ensure that
costs are minimized. If this theory is true, then exempting the
income of altruistic nonprofits from taxation would be encouraging
production by inefficient suppliers, hardly on its face a good thing.
I do not mean to explore the charge of inefficiency further here,
much less to try to rebut it. I do, however, want to point to several
mitigating factors.
First, as Hansmann shows, in industries characterized by the
kinds of contract failure he identifies, for-profit firms may them-
selves be subject to greater inefficiencies. In such industries, non-
profits, even if they are without the discipline of ordinary investors,
may nevertheless be the lesser evil or, more positively, the second
best.
Second, in industries not marked by contract failure, harm in
the form of lost efficiency in particular industries should be reduced
by competition, either from other nonprofits or from for-profits.
Even assuming that tax advantages allow nonprofits to dominate an
industry, as proponents of the original unrelated business income
tax purported to fear, 368 monopolization is hardly an inevitable
result. More likely, other nonprofits would enter the industry, driv-
ing producers' returns—and consumers' prices—toward competi-
tive levels.s6" Moreover, if nonprofit suppliers as a group operate
568 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG.
SERV. 3053, 3081 ("The problem at which the tax on unrelated business income is directed
is primarily that of unfair competition."); H. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in 1950 C.B. 380, 409 (same language as Senate Report); H. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE Corro. & ADMIN. NEWS 1645, 1689 (referring to the "general
problem of unfair competition resulting from the conduct of an unrelated trade or business").
369 See Thompson, supra note 33, at 135-36 (tendency of donors to seek most efficiently
operated nonprofits).
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so wastefully that the price they charge reaches the point at which
for-profits can earn a market rate of return on their capital, non-
profits should lose purchasers to either new or existing for-profit
firms. Thus, in industries where both for-profits and nonprofits can
co-exist—principally those industries that provide ordinary con-
sumer goods and services—the former serve implicitly to discipline
the latter. From a rather paradoxical perspective, the role of for-
profit firms can be viewed as keeping their nonprofit counterparts
in line.
But why tolerate—or worse, encourage—even this "efficiency
gap"? The only reason I can offer is that altruism can be viewed as
a competing value, requiring that a balance be struck to effect an
acceptable tradeoff of one for the other. Such tradeoffs are hardly
novel. At the level of particular goods, we must decide between
knives and margarine; at the metalevel of analysis more directly
relevant here, we debate trading allocative efficiency for distributive
justice. I am simply suggesting that altruistic supply might be an-
other value to be weighed against allocative efficiency.
c. Tax exemption as an appropriate means
But even if altruism is admitted to be a desirable value for
which some degree of economic efficiency should be sacrificed, and
even if altruistic organizations are a useful vehicle in its implemen-
tation, is the tax exemption of their income an appropriate means
of encouragement? The issue of whether there is a better way is,
once again, an issue we cannot resolve here. Any full consideration
of that issue, however, should not lose sight of two points. In the
first place, tax exemption does help those organizations on which
it is bestowed; as Hansmann points out, it allows them to retain
more earnings to use toward the purposes for which they were
founded. The question, therefore, is not whether the exemption is
helpful, but how much help in the form of tax exemption costs.
Second, in looking for less costly alternatives, it must be borne in
mind that the existing system enjoys a considerable legitimacy and
the not negligible advantage of being essentially in place; any alter-
native, however attractive in the abstract, must pass the threshold
test of political viability.
d. Administrative costs
One obvious cost to be considered in evaluating any change in
the present exemption system, particularly any expansion, is the
May 1990]	 NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 	 633
cost of its administration. If the exemption is to be extended to all
altruistic organizations, then a minimal requirement must be that
altruistic organizations can be identified and policed at an acceptable
cost. In section III, I took this requirement to heart and tried to
define a form of altruism that could be identified in the various
nonprofits I described not only in principle, but also in practice.
Even if I have failed to provide a criterion that can serve as an
administrable criterion for exemption status, I think my definition
of weak altruism is useful in two ways. The first, and most limited,
utility of that definition is to help identify what should at least be a
marginal factor in deciding individual cases under present law. In
some close tax exempt status cases like Presbyterian and Reformed
Publishing Company"° and Orton Ceramics Foundation, 37 ' weak altru-
ism is a factor that gives an objective basis for distinguishing for-
profit competitors, even if that factor is not to be given dispositive
weight. Second, and more generally, the definition of a form of
altruism that is a possible candidate for tax subsidy opens rather
than closes inquiry into whether difficulties in administering that
definition are surmountable now in some cases, and whether they
might not be eventually overcome with continued effort in other
areas.
e. Regressivity problem
As we saw in Hansmann's critique of Bittker and Randert's
technical definition theory, the beneficiaries of many organizations
exempt under present law are well-to-do. Museums, performing
arts organizations, and universities cater to considerably different
social strata than does the Salvation Army. A general way to correct
this perceived regressivity problem, I suggested earlier, would be
to offset it with more progressivity in the tax system as a whole. A
more fine-tuned approach, which is to . a limited extent reflected
today in the requirements of exemption under the residual charit-
able category of section 501(c)(3),372 would be to require a redistri-
butive element as a precondition of exemption of organizations
engaged in particular activities. Though the recent trend has been
away from such a redistribution requirement in most areas, 373 and
"" 743 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1984).
"' 56 T.C. 147 (1971).
"2 See supra note 335 for a further discussion of section 501(c)(3).
"' Simon, supra note 26, at 84-85. In England, by contrast, the appeal of a redistributive
requirement seems to be enjoying something of a revival, at least at one end of the political
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though such a requirement would add a condition extraneous to
the basic criterion of altruism that I propose, the addition would
not be fundamentally at odds with that criterion.
1. Privilege and the power to allocate
Even if the problem of regressivity is surmounted, or accepted,
there is the related, and less tractable, problem of allocative power
and its attendant social costs. With all donative nonprofits, and
particularly with private foundations, the subsidy of the tax exemp-
tion strengthens institutions that are the creatures, if not the ser-
vants, of the wealthy and thus at least indirectly enhances their
patrons' prestige and power to allocate societal resources. This in
turn tends to confirm and perhaps strengthen old patterns of dom-
inance on the one hand and old patterns of deference and depen-
dence on the other. To those with a deep dislike of inequality, this
is an obviously distasteful side effect of exemption. 374
But if tax inducements to private philanthropy are in this re-
spect a bitter pill, several considerations make it a somewhat easier
pill to swallow. For one thing, the situation has arguably been im-
proved by the passage of the private foundation rules, particularly
the limitations on continued holdings of business operations and
the prohibition of the more overt forms of political involvement.
And the situation may still be further improved. A frontal assault
on the deference problem would be to require that gifts over a
certain size be anonymous. A less direct, but more ambitious, ap-
proach would be to inculcate in both philanthropists and their
beneficiaries a genuine sense that the former are doing no more
than their duty as social stewards and the latter receiving only their
due as fellow human beings.
spectrum. See F. GLADSTONE., CHARITY, LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1982) (especially chapter
5, "Who Shall Benelit?," questioning legitimacy of charitable status of English "public" schools
and private hospitals). And the trend away from a redistributionist requirement in this
country has not gone unchallenged. See, e.g., Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon,
506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (challenge to I.R.S. reduction in amount of service to indigents
required of hospitals seeking charitable exemption), vacated on other grounds, 426 U.S. 26
(1976).
"4 See W. GAYLIN, I. GLASSER, S. MARCUS, & D. ROTHMAN, DOING GOOD: THE LIMITS OF
BENEVOLENCE X (1978) (collection of essays addressing the recognition that "a claim once
considered to be of the most virtuous sort, the claim to be acting benevolently, ha[s] become—
to understate the point—suspect"); J. VAN Tn., supra note 1, at 63-67 (outlining a Marxist
critique of voluntary organizations).
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On a less optimistic note, however, there may be no alternative
that produces the present level of donations. Deference may be the
price of generosity; private power bases may be a cost that accom-
panies decentralized reform. And if private philanthropy is not a
poison pill, it is hardly a panacea. Society will certainly not be
radically transformed in the short run by the operation of altruistic
nonprofits, whether or not their income is tax exempt. But even if
more dramatic remedial measures—sharply progressive income tax-
ation, truly redistributive transfer taxation, socialism itself—are
much to be desired, they are certainly not soon to be achieved.
Those who discount the evils of incrementalism and those who are
resigned to them may be willing to settle for private philanthropy
as part of the second best.
g. Prohibitions of current law
Section 501(c)(3) of the tax code now imposes two kinds of
negative conditions on the activities of charitable organizations.
First, section 501(c)(3) by its own terms forbids charities to engage
in any political campaign activities and in more than an insubstantial
amount of lobbying activities. Second, the United States Supreme
Court has interpreted the congressional intent behind section
501(c)(3) to preclude the exemption of activities that violate fun-
damental public policies like the racial desegregation of educa-
tion. 375
 Whatever the wisdom of these conditions, 3m either could be
continued without upsetting the basic notion proposed here, that
altruistic organizations are generally entitled to tax exemption.
h. Eccentric purposes
We have seen that section 501(c)(3) in its present form, sup-
ported by the traditional subsidy theory, bases the tax exemption
of charities on the supposedly salutary provision of particular prod-
ucts or the relief of recognized forms of need. The altruism theory,
by contrast, takes the altruistic provision of any good or service as
inherently desirable and prima facie worthy of encouragement
through tax exemption. 1 have argued that, in addition to recog-
"5
 Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
96
 On the political restrictions, see Clark, supra note 280 (political activity); on prohibition
of activities in violation of public policy, see J. DOUGLAS, supra note 9, at 130; Galston, Public
Policy Constraints on Charitable Organizations, 3 VA. TAX REV. 291 (1984).
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nizing the inherent good of altruism, the latter approach also de-
sirably decentralizes decision-making, encouraging donors and
founders to exercise wide discretion in sowing the seeds of their
altruism. It must be admitted, however, that there are risks in letting
a thousand flowers bloom; in the field of the world, the danger is
that the Evil One will plant tares among the lilies.
Under the common law of charitable trusts, which federal tax
law explicitly tracks, 3" purposes that are deemed impossible to
accomplish or grossly eccentric have been denied charitable sta-
tus. 878
 It could be argued that the permissiveness of the altruism
theory threatens to remove this restriction and permit a luxuriant
crop of useless, if not noxious, weeds to grow in the garden of
charity. This problem is compounded, so the argument would run,
by the fact that the lives of charities are unlimited; mutant charities
should be chopped down before they take root, not allowed to go
on bearing their insipid—or baneful—fruit forever. There are two
responses to this argument.
The first is to dismiss the problem as relatively insignificant. To
the extent that the organization sells its products at something
approaching the market price, that alone is evidence that people
want them; the only harm here is an arguably misplaced subsidy.
The cost in terms of "wasted" resources may be greater in the case
of nonprofits fully supported by donations, where consumer de-
mand is wholly lacking. Yet even assuming that the particular pur-
poses for which donors set aside resources are sometimes truly
pointless, this dead loss must be counted against the more general
gain of allowing individual diversity in the choice of altruistic ob-
jects. It can scarcely be denied that a similar tolerance for eccen-
tricity is now indulged in the case of religious organizations as a
corollary to the first amendment's positive preference for free ex-
ercise and pluralism. Negatively—and still in the penumbra of the
first amendment—it may be objected that the prevention of eccen-
tric charitable purposes is worse than the disease.
The second response is to import something of the old policing
mechanism into the new exemption criterion, but with an ear to the
warnings sounded above. Like the restrictions on political activity
and on activity that violates public policy, this can be seen as an
3" Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1985) ("The term 'charitable' is used in section
501(c)(S) in its generally accepted legal sense . 	 ").
"8 G. BoGERT, supra note 264, § 379, at 204-05; 4A A. Scorr, supra note 258, § 374.7,
at 229-31; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 374.7 (1959).
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additional criterion implementing policy concerns essentially extra-
neous to the promotion of altruism. Here, however, there is a
greater risk of sub rosa return to the traditional subsidy theory. As
the list of useless purposes to be weeded out grows longer, it threat-
ens to become a requirement that only certain favored purposes be
allowed to thrive. Once the shears are in hand, all it takes is an
overzealous gardener to carve the rambling vegetation of a country
retreat into the strictly classical geometry of the topiary at Ver-
sailles. 379
It may be that the various objections discussed in this subsection
preclude using the weak altruism I have identified as an indepen-
dent basis for federal income tax exemption. It may be too costly
to identify and monitor; it may require too great a sacrifice of other
values; it may need to be supplemented by other, essentially unre-
lated, criteria. Even so, identifying the altruistic provision of goods
and services as a possible value and describing this phenomenon in
a number of structurally different kinds of organizations, some of
which closely resemble their for-profit competitors, should shift the
terms of the debate on the proper scope of the exemption. It can
no longer be said that certain nonprofits that produce the same
good or service as counterpart for-profit.firms are to be treated the
same because there is no principled reason for treating them dif-
ferently. In the face of such a reason—the asserted desirability of
altruism—opponents of exempting altruistic organizations must ar-
gue either that altruistic provision is not inherently good or that
the good comes at too great a cost in other values. To make either
argument is implicitly to acknowledge the most basic premise of the
altruism theory—that the debate over the scope of the tax exemp-
tion of nonprofits is at bottom a debate about values, less a disagree-
ment about what the world is like than about what it ought to be
like.
In discussing the proper scope of the federal tax exemption
for altruistic nonprofits, we are engaged not so much in a voyage
of discovery, as in, an exercise of statecraft. The product will be
more like the Pilgrims' Mayflower Compact than Vespucci's map.
Having charted the nonprofit domain, we now need a charter of
cooperation between the for-profit, nonprofit, and governmental
spheres for the improvement of our common world. My purpose
379 See L. Sits, supra note 267, at 1,33 (noting need to balance the elimination of eccentric
purposes with the risk of destroying the pioneering spirit of charity).
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has been to argue for a larger role for altruism in the world we
must make.m°
VI. CONCLUSION—TOWARD AN HERETICAL THEORY OF FOR-PROFIT
FIRMS
We began with Hansmann's assumption that for-profit firms
are the norm in our society's provision of goods and services. But
"norm," as I noted there, is an ambiguous notion. It can have a
merely descriptive function, denoting what is prevalent or predom-
inant. In that sense, for-profit firms are—perhaps always will be—
the norm in our society, and nonprofits' role may be merely deriv-
ative, as Hansmann's theory suggests. But "norm" has another,
prescriptive sense, a sense that refers to what ought to be. In that
sense nonprofit firms, and the altruism they embody, may be our
norm. On this view, the invisible hand of the market, operating
without regard to need, is not the ideal, but a necessary stopgap
where the helping hand of altruism, implementing conscious con-
cern for need, has not yet reached.
"° This is emphatically not to say that the design of that world should not borrow From
the insights of neo-classical economics. But as Robert Paul Wolff reminds us in his critique
of liberalism, the philosophical foundation of neo-classical economics, "It is shrewd of the
philosophers of liberalism to insist that their world of private values is the only possible
world." R. WOLFF, POVERTY OF LIBERALISM 199 (1968).
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